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Abstract  
This work set out to assess and examine the position of the individuals as non-state 
actors within the process of international law creation, in essence taking an existing 
problem and bringing a new idea. In undertaking this aim three new classifications of 
non-state actor have been identified in which the evidence gives a better informed 
theory. These new classifications, the authorised, independent and unauthorised 
individual, give a more realistic account between the theoretical narrative of the 
individual and realities seen within international law creation. In contrast to the 
current theories which are heavily theoretical and abstract, this work has an 
evidence based approach informing on a new theoretical framework. The authorised 
individual is someone mandated to perform negotiations of future international law 
on behalf of an authorised-decision maker, usually a state government. The principal 
features of the authorised individual are that they are briefed to act on behalf of 
states, usually conforming to a strict mandate to which they are expected to follow. 
The independent authorised individual is similarly related to the authorised individual 
in that they are mandated by an authorised decision maker. The main differences 
being they are given more freedom to perform the role and are asked to fulfil more 
general aims and expected outcomes set down by the individual’s home 
government. John Ruggie and the process used by him in the creation of the 
UNGP’s provide an excellent example of the work of this category of individual. 
Finally, the unauthorised individual is someone who by conventional standards and 
expectations wouldn’t be expected to have a role in the negotiations for international 
law making, i.e. they have no mandate, and are not acting on behalf of a state. 
Examples are Raphael Lemkin and John Peters Humphrey. To demonstrate that 
individuals have a role in law-making, this alternative approach has a focus on the 
realities of the international system. In using Rational Choice theory models of 
analysis the effectiveness of the different categories of the individual can be seen, 
with clear benefits of the work of independent authorised individuals demonstrated 
as effective law makers within the system.  
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Introduction 
The formal role of the individual in the process of international law creation is an 
underdeveloped area of international law. This thesis intends to examine the role 
that individuals play when creating international law. Presently, especially in the 
mainstream approach within international law, the individual is side lined during the 
creation process. A highly state centric system is considered as the only significant 
theoretical model. This idea helps suppress the role of the individual at almost all 
stages of international law. The realities of the international system no longer match 
this theoretical ideal, with individuals gaining access to international tribunals and 
international organisations giving rights to individuals.1 To continue with either a 
modification of existing theory or ignoring the role of the individual within international 
law would not sufficiently credit the individual for the role they have within the 
system. 
The main themes which give rise to the individual’s role within international law are 
the focal point around which this thesis’s new theoretical narrative is built. The 
themes include consent, legitimacy, authority, process, and the abstract nature of the 
state. These five themes raise important questions such as: how do people within 
states give consent to those sent to make international law? How do governments 
consent to international law creation? What is the place of legitimacy within the 
system of international law creation? How do states give authority and authorisation 
to those undertaking law creation? What is the purpose of doing so? How much 
authority can be retained by a government, not actually within the room, during a 
creation event? Is the process of creation a good method of deriving legitimacy for 
international law? When international law creation is considered in depth we start to 
                                                          
1
 For example the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948), The European Convention of Human Rights 
(1950) or The African Charter on Human and Peoples Rights (1981)  
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look beyond that abstract idea of the state and start to consider the individual who is 
actually working under the identity of the state.  
I. Objectives of the Thesis 
The thesis will focus on the need for a new assessment and re-valuation of the 
individual within the creation of international law. The project has four basic 
objectives, firstly to assess the role and value of the individual in the creation of 
international law. Second, to provide a new theoretical framework to conceptualise 
the role of the individual within the creation of international law that accurately 
reflects the realities of the international system. The new theoretical framework will 
demonstrate that it is sufficiently robust and a superior model to any current literature 
on relation to the individual. Finally, this framework for understanding the individual 
will examine and analyse existing models of decision making within the process of 
international law creation in order to demonstrate that it is workable.  
II. Structure of the Thesis 
The thesis will be split into six chapters; the first will extensively review how the 
individual has been understood within the existing literature. This will serve to 
provide some background on the issues associated with a state centric nature of 
international law, whereby the individual is given only a minor role. This will 
illuminate the nature of the problem being tackled here, that the theoretical narrative 
no longer accurately reflects the realities of international law creation. This 
background review will be expanded to evaluate and assess the dominant positivist 
conception of international law since the turn of the twentieth century. In doing this it 
will illuminate how positivists have understood the development of the place of the 
individual. Legal process theory will also be explored as an additional theory to 
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understanding the role of the individual within international law. Finally a comparison 
with international relations will be undertaken to see how a different, but closely 
related, area understands the individual.  
The second chapter starts to set out the first part of the new theoretical framework 
for increasing the understanding of how the individual acts within the international 
system. This chapter will focus on the authorised individual; these individuals are 
those that follow instructions, usually given by authorised decision makers, when 
creating new legal documents. These documents are usually created at bi and multi-
lateral talks between states. The authorised individual is usually a diplomat or 
representative of the state, but they can also have a lower profile as back room staff 
within a delegation. The authorised individual may also appear on a scale of 
independence, with some authorised individuals being under far more instructions 
when states want to protect high value interests. At other times instructions may be 
less precise and the authorised individual is given far more independence in the 
interpretation of what they need to ensure within the negotiations of international law. 
Discussions such as those that created the Universal Declaration on Human Rights 
(UDHR) and SALT (Strategic Arms Limitation Talks) agreements provide excellent 
examples to demonstrate how different authorised individuals work with different 
levels of detailed instructions.  
Chapter three introduces the second part of the new theoretical narrative which 
involves the independent authorised individual. These individuals have much more 
freedom than the authorised individuals, but still require state support or nomination 
for their position within the international system. These individuals tend to be state 
representatives to international negotiations but are given broad aims instead of 
specific instructions. Members of the international judiciary include judges serving at 
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the International Court of Justice, or the European Court of Human Rights. The final 
area where independent authorised individuals can be found is UN special 
procedures mandate holders.  
Chapter four provides an in-depth examination of the independent authorised 
individual John Ruggie, in the role of a UN special procedures mandate holder. It 
focuses on Ruggie to see how he performed this role in the creation of the United 
Nations Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights (UNGP)2. This closer 
look intends to set out the role of the modern independent authorised individual in 
the context of mastering a highly contentious human rights issue. It will expand on 
the ideas expressed in chapter three regarding how independent authorised 
individuals have the ability to successfully use the law creation process. This section 
intends to break down the different elements of how the UNGP’s and the Protect, 
Respect, and Remedy Framework (Framework) were achieved, focusing on the 
process elements including the selection of Ruggie himself, the mandates he was 
working under, the approach, his strategy of principled pragmatism, the language 
and structure of his speeches, the team he created, the resources (both financial and 
in kind), the open debate, and finally the willingness to engage and accept new 
ideas. 
Chapter five sets out the last part of the new theoretical narrative and focuses on the 
unauthorised individual. These individuals would, by the positivist understanding of 
international law, have nothing to do with the creation of new law. They are 
individuals that have no formal place within the law creation system. They are often 
found working within the secretariats of international organisations and can have 
significant influence over the direction and development of new legal documents. 
                                                          
2
 http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Publications/GuidingPrinciplesBusinessHR_EN.pdf accessed 14.01.13 
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Other unauthorised individuals work completely outside the international system and 
exert change by persuading authorised individuals to act on their behalf. Notable 
unauthorised individuals will be examined; they are John P. Humphrey and Raphael 
Lemkin.  
The final chapter examines decision making of the individual within international law. 
Using game theory provides a greater account of how these individuals’ decision 
making actually works within international negotiations. This chapter will draw on all 
categories of individual discussed in the proceeding chapters to illustrate how 
reputation of the individual can affect the decision making process and, therefore, 
affect the outcomes of international summits. Other theoretical models will be 
assessed and examined to see the influence that the new theoretical framework can 
have. The Tragedy of the Commons, alongside game theory models, prisoner’s 
dilemma, stag hunt, battle of the sexes and dove and hawk, should lead to the 
conclusion that this theoretical model gives a far better understanding of the 
individual’s role within the creation of international law.  
III. Engagement with Existing Literature 
The thesis will engage with the literature which has already been published in this 
area. There are numerous books and other publications detailing how international 
law is created and used. Many of these publications are focused on the state, and 
the role that the state plays within the international system. By engaging with this 
significant body of literature an assessment of why the state has become the de 
facto primary actor within the international system. By charting the rise of 
international law from the Peace of Westphalia, the process of state regulation can 
be understood, thus why the state became central to the primary player. Other 
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scholars, for example Randall Lesaffer,3 have considered Westphalia as the starting 
point for their arguments. Lesaffer’s considers that the creation and function of peace 
treaties, running from Westphalia to Versailles has formed a backbone of a 
European international constitution from which other international law documents 
take their origins. Using Westphalia as the starting point for the state centric nature, 
also encompasses the trend for natural law theory of Emmerich de Vattel4 and Hugo 
Grotius5, these two scholars placed the state at the centre of international law where 
it has remained. Grotius’s contribution was to separate ius gentium (the law of 
peoples) and the ius natural (natural law properly) into the modern law of nations, 
which applied to the rulers of states.6 Vattel introduced the doctrine of the equality of 
states into international law. He made the argument that a small state was not less 
powerful than much larger states.7 Under Thomas Hobbes’s social contract the 
individual’s rights are recognised, but also that individuals would collectively come 
together to cede some of their rights to the state, reinforcing the importance of the 
state to international law. 8 The natural law theory identifies the state as the most 
important actor, but with the beginning of the 20th century, scholars have attempted 
to break the state monopoly on international law. Hans Kelsen and the sociologic 
                                                          
3
 Randall Lesaffer, “Peace Treaties and the Formation of International Law” as found in Edited by Bardo 
Fassbender and Anne Peters, The Oxford Handbook of The History of International Law, (Oxford University 
Press: Oxford: 2012), pp71-94 
4
 Vattel’s primary work Droit des gens; ou, Principes de la loinaturelleappliqués à la conduiteet aux affaires des 
nations et des souverains, first published in 1758. Available in English translation Ed. Joseph Chutty, Emmerich 
de Vattel, The Law of Nations: Or the Principles of the Law of Nature, Applied to the Conduct and Affairs of 
Nations and Sovereigns, (Cambridge University Press: Cambridge: 2011) 
5
 Grotius primary work De Jure Belli ac Pacis written during 1623 to 1624. Available in English translation Ed 
Stephen C. Neff, Hugo Grotius On the Law of War and Peace: Student Edition, (Cambridge University Press: 
Cambridge: 2012) 
6
 James Crawford, Brownlie’s Principles of Public International law, (Oxford University Press: Oxford: 2012) p7  
7
 Arther Nussbaum, A Concise History of the law of Nations, (Macmillan: New York: 1954), pp156-64 
8
 J.C.A. Gaskin (ed), Thomas Hobbes: Leviathan, (Oxford University Press: Oxford: 2007)  
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solidarism of Georges Scelle are two such examples, both stating that the individual 
was the ultimate and true subject of all legal orders.9 
The start of the nineteenth century marked a significant change within the theoretical 
narrative to positivism.10 Within the positivist conception of international law state 
centralism was re-enforced, having been made the only significant actor by the 
natural law theory. Positivism re-enforced that position and remained unchallenged 
as only the states themselves could enter into treaties, or give consent to other 
actors. While these generally ensured states kept a monopoly of the subjects of 
international law, this discounts the role of all other actors.11  
The Oppenheim series of books,12 which span the early part of the 20th century set 
out the positivist stance of the individual, being that they are objects of the law of 
nations.13 Despite the increased importance in the concern for the individual within 
the 20th century, resulting in the beginnings of distinctive new branches of 
international law, human rights law and humanitarian law, the positivist conception of 
the individual remained as the object of law.14 The rise of the International 
Organisations such as the League of Nations and International Labour Organisation 
all required the consent of states to be formed and states remained central to their 
running and organisation of the international system.15   
                                                          
9
 Robert Kolb, The Protection of the Individual in Times of War and Peace, as found in Edited by Bardo 
Fassbender and Anne Peters, The Oxford Handbook of The History of International Law, (Oxford University 
Press: Oxford: 2012) p319 
10
 Malcolm N. Shaw, International Law, (Cambridge University Press: Cambridge: 2008) p27 
11
 Steven R. Ratner & Anne-Marie Slaughter, “Appraising the Methods of International Law: A Prospectus for 
Readers”, The American Journal of international law, Vol. 93, No. 2 (April 1999), p 239 
12
L. Oppenheim, International Law: A Treatise, (Longman’s, Green and Co: London: 1905). Please see Chapter 1 
section 2, for a full account of the Oppenheim series.  
13
 L. Oppenheim, International Law: A Treatise, (Longman’s, Green and Co: London: 1905) p344 
14
 Lauterpacht, H., International Law: A Treatise by L. Oppenheim, (Longman’s, Green and Co: London: 1955) 
p.639 
15
 Kolb (2012) pp.321-329 
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The main theoretical doctrine within modern positivist literature, concerned with the 
individual, still remains within the broad outline of the object and subject debate as 
discussed in the Oppenheim series. Shaw’s International Law,16 currently in its sixth 
edition, indicates that the individual is a subject within international law through the 
increasing practice of states. Shaw does not consider, in depth, why the individual is 
to be considered a subject, but seems to accept the general dominance of the state 
within the international system. Others such as Martin Dixon,17 Malcolm Evans,18 
and Antonio Cassese’s19 all come to similar positions that the individual is, on 
balance, a subject, but the international system is still focused and dominated by the 
state. The individual is further scrutinised by Brownlie20 and O’Connell.21 Brownlie 
expresses a positivist position similar to that of Oppenheim, in the latest version 
edited by Crawford.22 The position is maintained that, while individuals may be 
considered subjects, it is unhelpful to consider them as such as they do not have the 
same rights and responsibilities as other subjects, 23 such as the ever dominant state 
actor. In contrast, O’Connell acknowledges the place of the individual as part of the 
international community and, therefore, must have personality. 24  
Hersch Lauterpacht’s own position was far more complex than the extreme 
positivism he expressed in editing three editions of Oppenheim; in his own work he 
expressed his vision of international society as one founded on the rule of law.25 
Lauterpacht was not a rigid positivist, happy to embrace a distinctive thread of 
                                                          
16
 Shaw (2008) 
17
 Martin Dixon, Textbook on International Law, (Blackstone Press: London: 1993) 
18
 Ed Malcolm D. Evans, International Law, (Oxford University Press: Oxford: 2003) 
19
 Antonio Cassese, International Law, (Oxford University Press: Oxford: 2001) 
20
 Ian Brownlie, Principles of Public International law, (Clarendon Press: Oxford: 1966) & Ian Brownlie, Principles 
of Public International law, (Oxford University Press: Oxford: 2008) 
21
 D.P.O’Connell, International Law, (Stevens: London: 1970)  
22
 James Crawford (2012) 
23
 James Crawford (2012) p121 
24
 D.P. O’Connell, International Law, (Stevens: London: 1965) p116  
25
 Iain Scobbie “Hersch Lauterpacht (1897-1960)” as found in Edited by Bardo Fassbender and Anne Peters, The 
Oxford Handbook of The History of International Law, (Oxford University Press: Oxford: 2012)  p1181 
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natural law throughout his work. Perhaps his most significant work, International law 
and Human Rights26 gives a significant place of the individual under international 
law. Lauterpacht states that the individual is a subject of international law, and this is 
due to an interpretation of the UN charter. 27 In further support of this, the individual 
has acquired a status and a stature which has given them fundamental rights of the 
individual, independent of the law of the state.28 In conclusion, Lauterpacht argues 
that while the individual has rights and personality this does not mean that they can 
actually be used, unless an international tribunal or international organisation is 
willing to hear a case and make judgment against a state.  
Another theoretical perspective emerged within the Yale School29 established and 
developed by Harold Lasswell and Myres McDougal.30 This narrative sets out to 
combine the analytical methods of other social sciences most notably international 
relations and seeks to apply these methodologies to the perceptive purpose of the 
law.31 This school of thought has since been developed by scholars such as Richard 
Falk32, Anne-Marie Slaughter33 and Rosalyn Higgins.34 Ratner and Slaughter argue 
that the greatest contribution and value from this narrative is the “emphasis on both 
                                                          
26
 H. Lauterpacht, International law and Human Rights, (Stevens & Sons Limited: London: 1950) 
27
 H. Lauterpacht (1950) pp.33-35 
28
 H. Lauterpacht (1950) pp.3-4 
29
 Please see James Crawford, Brownlie’s Principles of Public International law, (Oxford University Press: 
Oxford: 2012), p11 or W. Michael Reisman, Siegried Wiessner & Andrew R. Willard, “The New Haven School: A 
Brief Introduction”, The Yale Journal of International Law, Vol. 32, pp575-582 
30
 Please see Harold D. Lasswell and Myres S. McDougal, Jurisprudence for a free society: Studies in law, 
science and policy, (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, Dordrecht, 1992),  Myres S. McDougal, “Some Basic Theoretical 
Concepts about International Law: A Policy-Oriented Framework of Inquiry”, The Journal of Conflict Resolution, 
Vol. 4, No. 3, 1960, pp337-354:  Myres S. McDougal and Harold D. Lasswell, “The Identification and Appraisal of 
Diverse Systems of Public Order”, The American Journal of International Law, Vol. 53, No.1, 1959, pp1-29: 
Harold D. Lasswell and  Myres S. McDougal, “Legal Education and Public Policy: Professional Training in the 
Public Interest”, The Yale Law Journal, Vol. 52, No. 2, 1943, pp203-295 
31
 W. Michael Reisman, Siegried Wiessner & Andrew R. Willard, “The New Haven School: A Brief Introduction”, 
The Yale Journal of International Law, Vol. 32, pp575-576 (pp575-582) 
32
 Richard Falk, The Status of Law in International Society, (Princeton University Press: New Jersey: 1970) 
33
 Anne-Marie Slaughter, A New World Order, (Princeton University Press: New Jersey:2004) 
34
 Rosalyn Higgins (1994) 
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what actors say and what they do.”35 Higgins, setting her argument within the context 
of the positivist subject/ object debate, focuses on participants within the system; this 
can, therefore, include individuals and multinational corporations of non-state 
actors.36 Due to this conceptual understanding this school is more focused on how 
rules are actually used by all actors within the system, not what the rules actually 
are.37 An advantage of considering this theory is that it has a much wider focus on 
international actors, often described as “authorised decision makers” 38 these are any 
actor who actually contributes to the international system. Slaughter takes this idea a 
step further, arguing that if the international system is considered in the same way 
that domestic governments are viewed, a whole system of government networks and 
actors pop up everywhere.39 Legal process theory gives far greater scope to any 
actor within the international legal system, even the individual. 
The final area of literature worthy of engagement is to see how International 
Relations engages with the individual within law creation. Four notable threads of 
debate have dominated International Relations: realism v idealism in the 1930s, 
Traditionalism v Behaviourism 1960s, neo-realism v neo-liberalism 1980s and finally, 
in the 1990s, rationalism and reflectivism.40 Interestingly, realism and positivism 
share a common focus on the state as the main actor within the international 
system.41 In contrast, Liberalism within International Relations is the perspective 
based on the assumption of the goodness of the individual and the value of 
international political institutions in promoting social progress. 
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The aim of this thesis is to examine all of the theoretical perspectives above as well 
as to consider space for a new way of evaluating the individual within the creation of 
international law. This work seeks to analyse the diversion between theoretical 
narratives and the practice of international law.  
IV. Methodology  
The thesis will first explore the nature and context of the individual’s role within 
international law with reference to the extensive literature described above. This will 
serve to provide some explanation as to why the individual’s role within the 
international system has been overlooked within the state centric approach of current 
mainstream international legal theory. It is against this background that a new 
theoretical narrative of the individual and the scope to which they have a significant 
role within international law creation will be set out. 
The method being taken will be a theoretical and evidence based approach, looking 
at both previous theoretical narratives and individuals’ past experiences when they 
have created international law. In essence, this provides evidence informing on a 
new theory. Due to the nature of international law creation it takes time for the 
publication of information regarding how documents were created to be made public. 
This is due to the desire of the state centric version of international law wishing to 
keep a façade that law is created by states alone. As such, a historical approach has 
been taken, with many examples of individuals being taken from significant 
developments of international law since the creation of the UN. Much evidence has 
been sourced from autobiographies, biographies, and secondary accounts of events. 
This approach means that participants are more open about their roles and events 
are no longer classified as secret; this is important regarding arms limitation talks. A 
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historical account also means that accounts of debates have been written by those 
individuals involved and their accounts can normally be cross-referenced against 
secretariat minutes or support documents. This also means that archive material 
supporting the analysis being undertaken is available from the UN archives. One 
notable, recent example is used in John Ruggie’s creation of the UNGPs. This, 
almost unique, process in law creation was undertaken in a very open way, with 
supporting documents, reports, records, and an account by Ruggie all either 
available during the creation process or very soon after the process was completed.  
V. Original Contribution  
While the issue of international law creation has been considered before, it has in the 
past usually been in relation to a state based approach. This thesis will seek to 
provide an analysis focused upon how the individual is involved within the creation of 
international law. In doing this the thesis will consider the review of the current 
theoretical narrative in order to understand how effective the current literature is in 
describing the role of the individual. A new theoretical framework on the individual 
will then be created in order to provide a more realistic model of how the individual 
interacts and functions within International law creation. Part of this will provide one 
of the first reviews of the Ruggie process used in the creation of the UNGPs.  
This thesis will reflect the law as it stands on 1st March 2014. 
 
 
 Chapter 1:- Doctrinal review, The Place of the Individual in International Law 
I. Introduction 
“Individuals are just as important to the Law of Nations as territory, for 
individuals are the personal basis of every State. Just as a State cannot exist 
without a territory, so it cannot exist without a multitude of individuals who are 
its subjects and who, as a body, form the people or the nation. The individuals 
belonging to a State can, and do, come in various ways in contact with foreign 
states in time of peace as well as of war. The Law of Nations is therefore 
compelled to provide certain rules regarding individuals.”1 
This quotation taken from Arnold McNair’s fourth edition of Oppenheim’s 
International Law shows the importance of the individual within international law. Yet 
this quotation does not capture the whole theoretical narrative that has been 
developing and changing for over one hundred years. This chapter seeks to evaluate 
the current theories concerning the place of the individual in international law, and 
where there are any gaps within the current knowledge base.  
To accomplish this goal the doctrinal review will be broken down into five sections, 
each evaluating and analysing particular areas of interest concerning the place of the 
individual within international law. This first section, will consider the significance of 
the traditional focus of states in international law. In starting with an assessment of 
the development of international law since 1648, it will consider how the rise of 
natural law, into the nineteenth century positivism and the rise of international 
organisations, side-lined the individual and almost every other actor to ensure the 
dominance of the state. This will reflect the development of the doctrinal realities 
and, in doing so, outline the strength the state has had in becoming the main 
theoretical player.  
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 A. McNair (ed), International Law: A Treatise, (Longman’s, Green and Co: London: 1926) p518 
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The second section will examine the question of personality within international law. 
This section will focus on notable works by scholars, including Oppenheim’s, 
Brownlie, and Lauterpacht. Oppenheim and Brownlie have a significant number of 
back editions to give an insight into how the place of the individual has evolved in 
international law. Lauterpacht has delivered some of the most significant works in the 
last century. This evolution has raised interesting arguments in legal literature 
regarding whether individuals have legal personality within international law. This 
argument will be the common theme throughout this work, yet by closely monitoring 
the argument that has developed, it is then possible to pin down areas where the 
argument has evolved or changed. This change could be a reaction to events or just 
an evolution in thinking. By looking at these turning points it should help our 
understanding of the position of the individual in international law. In turning to 
consider the rise of modern textbooks a direct comparison can be made with 
Oppenheim’s literature. This will provide an insight into how the mainstream 
literature of the individual has developed and changed since the early part of the 
twentieth century.  
The Third section, having seen how state-centric positivism is still dominant within 
international law today, will consider international legal process theory as advocated 
by the New Haven School. In doing this it will explore how this theory better suits 
today’s conception of international law, being able to accommodate all actors as 
participants and influences from a variety of sources. This will be contrasted against 
the work of Antonio Augusto Cançado Trindade, whose academic judgements are at 
the cutting edge of how the individual should be treated within International Law.   
This will be followed with an assessment of how non-state actors are treated within 
the theoretical literature. The focus will be on a narrative greatly enhanced in the last 
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twenty years as more attention has been placed on this particular actor. By 
examining non-state actors, analysis can be made as to how the theoretical narrative 
has adapted to allow for an increased role. This may provide an insight into how the 
narrative can be adapted once more to accommodate a bigger role of the individual. 
The final section will focus on how International Relations, the closest social science 
discipline to international law, treats the individual within the international sphere. 
Focusing on three different schools of thought, realism, liberalism, and 
constructivism, provides a broad approach to see how this discipline interacts with 
both the individual or, if they are highly focused, on the state as the main actors. 
In evaluating the place of the individual in not only legal theory but the wider social 
sciences this chapter will chart the development of scholars’ thoughts and theory 
throughout the last century and will, therefore, draw conclusions as to how ideas 
have developed and changed. This information will act as the theoretical framework 
within which to analyse the issues in subsequent chapters. This review is by no 
means a comprehensive review of all sources, which is outside the scope of this 
work, but will significantly demonstrate the trends, changes and development of the 
place of the individual.  
II. The State Centric Nature of International Law 
Historically, one of the most striking features of international law is the state-centric 
nature which will be a major theme of this chapter. Therefore, this section intends to 
examine why this is the case and in doing so explore the underpinnings of 
international law. Many works on international law2 consider the development of the 
                                                          
2
 For example see James Crawford, Brownlie’s Principles of Public International law, (Oxford University Press: 
Oxford: 2012), Chapter 1, pp3-19 or Stephen C Neff, “Short History of International law” as found in Malcolm D. 
Evans (ed), International Law, (Oxford University Press: Oxford: 2003), pp3-31 or Malcolm N. Shaw, International 
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subject from the rise of the Eurocentric state based system of relations to the 
modern day. Within these reviews that take into account the Peace of Westphalia 
(1648), Vattel’s international law, and the development of international law in the late 
nineteenth century the development of international organisations is finally 
considered. These factors are considered, not so much as the underpinning of 
international law, but as a process reflecting the development of international law, 
whereby philosophy and perspectives have been adapted and changed to keep pace 
with the development of international law.  
Modern international law is generally traced back to the last 400 years. The basic 
ideas of a system of regulations between different political entities can be traced 
back to the dawn of civilisation.3 International law grew out of the desire to regulate 
the relations between states. This gradual process is shown first through the 
development of states themselves between 12th and 16th centuries4 in which 
recognisable power structures can be seen, and second the diminished power of the 
Holy Roman Empire and the Pope after the Thirty Years War with the resolution of 
the Peace of Westphalia in 1648.5 Crawford makes the argument that as a result of 
Westphalia “…ultimately at the expense of the notion of the civitasgentium maxima - 
the universal community of mankind transcending the authority of states”.6 As a 
result of Westphalia the reality meant that the increasingly powerful states, for which 
expansion and Empire were around the corner, attempted to formulate some 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
Law, (Cambridge University Press: Cambridge: 2003), pp1-42. The general histories of International law as seen 
in these works is accurately described by MarttiKoskenniemi, in the Artily “A History of International Law 
Histories” as found in Edited by Bardo Fassbender and Anne Peters, The Oxford Handbook of The History of 
International Law, (Oxford University Press: Oxford: 2012) p944-945 
3
 On this please see D.J. Bederman, International Law in Antiquity, (Cambridge University Press: Cambridge: 
2001) 
4
 Antonio Cassese, “States: Rise and Decline of the Primary Subjects of the International Community”, as found 
in Edited by Bardo Fassbender and Anne Peters, The Oxford Handbook of The History of International Law, 
(Oxford University Press: Oxford: 2012), p944-945 Also see James Crawford, The Creation of States in 
International Law,(Oxford University Press: Oxford: 2007), p6-10 
5
 Antonio Cassese (2012) p50 
6
 James Crawford, The Creation of States in International Law,(Oxford University Press: Oxford: 2007), p10 
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international governance, which consisted, according to Cassese, of three basic 
rules: the free use of the high seas, the capture of pirates and resorting to force.7 
This was enhanced by states emphasising three fundamental rights: The right to 
self-preservation, self-defence and intervention.8 The realities of this era, prior to the 
start of the twentieth century, were that states were growing in strength both 
economically, and also militarily. Generally, a divine king or landed elite ruled over 
the states, therefore, the common individual was unimportant to the system. 
Relations between states followed the only sensible course available, which was to 
ensure that international law was primarily concerned with the state and its practice 
towards other states. This Euro-centric approach to its development, partly due to 
the advanced nature of the European nations, ensured the dominance of European 
states over less developed states. Notably Randall Lesaffer9 sets out the argument 
that the development of international law within the last 400 years can be linked to 
that of the creation and function of peace treaties. The acknowledgment of a series 
of peace treaties that run from Westphalia to Versailles have formed the backbone of 
a European international constitution. These peace treaties laid down the 
foundations of international order, such as religious neutrality, and common 
responsibility of states for upholding peace and stability.10 While Lesaffer makes a 
valid and strong argument as to the development of international law from peace 
treaties, the importance of the peace treaty to the whole of international law is 
perhaps, overstated. A more balanced approach may be in order to state the 
importance, but in conjunction with other developments which took place between 
Westphalia and Versailles such as the place of custom, the building of empire, 
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 James Crawford (2007) p55 
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 Lesaffer (2012) pp.71-72 
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diplomatic practice and other treaties. The use of peace treaties as a means of 
international law development helps to explain the role of the state, as war and 
peace are a state dominated activity. With the industrial revolution, large standing 
armies could be maintained; therefore, regulation by the international community as 
to the acceptable conduct of war became increasingly apparent. 
The German scholar Hegel first proposed the doctrine of the will of the state. Within 
this doctrine it emphasised the role of the state and subordination of the individual, 
because the state enshrined the wills of all individuals, which evolved into a 
collective or higher will. While on the outside, the state was sovereign and, therefore, 
supreme to the individual and external state.11 This theory demonstrates the 
domination of the state over the individual, and that the individual’s needs are taken 
care of by the state. The domination of international law by states reached its peak in 
the 1920s when sovereignty was assigned a unique value in the international sphere 
and as an extension of this international law was largely dependent on the consent 
of states and was applicable to states alone.12 
The state centric nature of international law can be partly linked to state practice and 
also the role of scholars writing on the subject, notably natural law and the positivist 
schools. The natural law works of Emmerich de Vattel13 and Hugo Grotius14 have 
had a significant influence on the development of modern international law. These 
two scholars played a key role in theoretical position of the state as the central actor 
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 See https://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/hegel/works/hi/history4.htm accessed 12.02.14 or Shlomo 
Avineri, Hegel’s Theory of the Modern State,(Cambridge University Press: Cambridge: 1974) 
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in international law. Grotius’s significant contribution was to separate iusgentium (the 
law of peoples) and the ius natural (natural law properly) into the modern law of 
nations, which applied to the rulers of states.15 The effect of this was for Grotius to 
suggest that international law, as the gradual development of universal principles of 
justice, could be deciphered through human agency, separately from any religion.16 
Vattel’s contribution, no less significant, was to introduce the doctrine of the equality 
of states into international law. He made the argument that a small state was not less 
powerful than much larger states. He also made the important distinction between 
laws of conscience and laws of action, stating that only the second was of 
importance.17 Therefore, he reduced the importance of natural law as from the 
Roman law tradition. However, within his resolution he establishes the importance of 
the state over the individual in doing this, helping to explain why the state became 
the primary actor. Vattel’s separated the law of nature from international law, but also 
he separated the law of nature which applied to the individual as apart from the 
state. In doing this he regarded the individual as independent of the state, but the 
state had its own will, distinguishable from its members.18 Therefore, in setting out 
this argument, Vettel aided the state-centric nature of international law by separating 
the individual from the state, which had previously been seen as one and the same. 
Consequently, the law of nature was created as a result of this split to a product of 
the will of states not of the individuals comprising the state.19 
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The presence of Vattel’s doctrine within almost every textbook on international law 
indicates the strong dominant position that it occupied from the eighteenth until the 
start of the nineteenth century. As Parlett so clearly argues: 
“The nineteenth century framework of the international legal system reflected 
Vattel’s state-centrism: international law was the regulating the relations 
between sovereign states, who were the exclusive subjects of international 
law. The relations of individuals were governed by municipal law; if 
international law dictated standards or rules as to their treatment at all, it only 
imposed an obligation on states to create rights for individuals through their 
domestic law.”20 
Natural law soon gave way to natural rights theory and the work of Thomas Hobbes 
and the social contract.21 Under Hobbes’ social contract the individual’s rights are 
recognised, but also that the individual would collectively come together to cede 
some of their rights to the state, reinforcing the importance of the state to 
international law. Hobbes’ system of states was anarchic as it emphasises that 
states are out for their own self-interest, and that no one was above states to add 
control to state practice. Hobbes’ work provides a basis not just for international law 
but is also used in Hans Morgenthau’s22 defining work on international relations. 
The start of the nineteenth century marked an evolution in international law doctrine 
to one which was expansionist and positivist.23 The logical extension that national 
systems of law depended upon the will of the sovereign was, therefore, extended 
into the international sphere the law between nations depended upon the will of 
states. This links back to Hegel and the will of states. Positivism strengthens the role 
of the state as the central actor. In Bentham’s An Introduction to the Principles of 
                                                          
20
 Kate Parlett (2013) p16 
21
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Morals and Legislation24 the argument is made that as national sovereigns could 
proclaim laws for the benefits of their own citizens, they also could equally create 
international law.25The positivist position can be described as “international law is no 
more or less than the rules to which states have agreed through treaties, custom, 
and perhaps other forms of consent.”26 Therefore, only the actors to which states 
consent have a role within international law. This position can be seen within the first 
volumes of Oppenheim27 and is reflected by Crawford in Brownlie as: 
“…positivism was distinguished by the notion that only positive law – that is, 
law which had in some form been enacted or made by authority – could be 
considered true law. International law, which could only with difficulty be seen 
to be made – and then in a diffuse way was caught up in this.”28 
Within this positivist conception of international law state centralism was re-enforced, 
having been made the only actor by the work of Vattel, positivism ensured that 
position remained unchallenged as only the states themselves could enter into 
treaties, or give consent to other actors. While these generally ensured states kept a 
monopoly of the subjects of international law, this discounts the role of non-state 
actors.29  
Some notable changes start to occur within this positivist dominated period with the 
rise of the International Committee of the Red Cross, the Holy See, and the Order of 
St. Johns of Malta.30 These organisations, while not considered as equal to states, 
certainly had influence and consideration within international law. Importantly, they 
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had been allowed by states to have a position within the system. This fulfilled the 
positivist’s conception to require consent for actors within international law.  
Since the beginning of the 20th century, scholars have attempted to break the state 
monopoly on international law. Hans Kelsen and the sociologic solidarism of 
Georges Scelle are two such examples both setting out that the individual was the 
ultimate and true subject of all legal orders.31 Georges Scelle emphasises three 
principle themes within his conceptualisation of the system of International law and a 
significant break from positivism; the trial of state sovereignty, the advent of 
federalism and the promotion of the individual at the core of all reasoning.32 In 
advocating a theory of “international law called ‘Methodological individualism’, which 
focuses on the actions and responsibilities of individuals and aims to demystify the 
State”33 this theory is neither positivist nor pragmatic; it envisages a sociological 
theory of law in general as one aspect of the legal phenomenon.34 It realises that all 
societies, including the international society was composed of individuals and to 
ignore this was to be trapped in an anti-scientific collectivism.35 The fact that states 
hold such a dominant place was due to historical accident,36 for which all individuals 
and groups are linked.37 Individuals within states are either subjects of liberties, 
objects of behavioural regulation, or as administrators “gouvernants”.38 Due to this, it 
would be artificial to differentiate between international law dealing with government 
                                                          
31
 Robert Kolb, The Protection of the Individual in Times of War and Peace, as found in the Oxford Handbook of 
International law, p319 
32
 Hubert Thierry, “The European Tradition in International Law: Georges Scelle”, European Journal of 
International Law, No 1, 1990, p198 
33
 Oliver Diggelmann, Georges Scelle (1878-1961), as found in the Oxford Handbook of International law, p1162  
34
 Hubert Thierry, “The European Tradition in International Law: Georges Scelle”, European Journal of 
International Law, No 1, 1990, p197 
35
 Martti Koskenniemi, The Gentle Civilizer of Nations: The Rise and Fall of International law1870-1960, 
(Cambridge University Press: Cambridge: 2002) p330 
36
 Koskenniemi (2002) p330 
37
 Antonio Cassese, “Remarks on Scelle’s Theory of “Role Splitting” (dedoublement fonctionnel) in International 
Law”, European Journal of International Law, No 1, 1990, p211 
38
 Koskenniemi (2002) p332 
31 | P a g e  
 
actions and individuals actions.39 This promotion of the individual at the expense of 
the state was a revolutionary way of assessing international legal theory. Scelle’s 
theory places the individual at the centre of the international system, creating a direct 
link between international law and the individual without the state having a significant 
role. This system would have had the power for international law to directly modify 
the domestic law of a state. Consequentially, sovereignty of states would, for 
practical purposes, no longer exist.40 The theory suffered due to its combination of 
realism and utopianism; too abstract a system to ground in a realistic program in the 
post-war world and far from independent of the political struggles (the start of the 
cold war) that it hoped to overcome.41  
The increased importance in the concern for the individual resulted in the beginnings 
of Human Rights Law and Humanitarian Law. Positivism’s role during the early 
twentieth century, the rise of the International Organisations such as the League of 
Nations and International Labour Organisation all required the consent of states to 
be formed and states remained central to their running and organisation of the 
international system.42 Increasingly, international law has moved away into accepting 
other actors; as Christoph Schreuer argues, the classical model of state at the centre 
of international law has served an extremely useful purpose. The concentration of 
authority at the level of national governments has facilitated the abuse of power. 
International law has responded to such abuses with a massive growth in 
international human rights law, and such laws have limited the freedom of state and 
the absolute concept of sovereignty has gone. However, the basic underlining 
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concept of state-centric power is still established within international law.43Schreuer 
goes on to argue for a functionalist approach to international law that accepts the 
different actors but values them for their power functions.44 
Since1648, international law has developed with the state as its sole actor. It is only 
relatively recently, since 1945, that any other actor within international law has been 
given serious thought. This state centric doctrine that has occurred in the literature 
explains why international law has always viewed the individual and other actors as 
unequal partners. Even the literature regarding the development of international law 
can be seen as a process that has developed in order to reflect the current practice 
amongst states. The practice of states has not only influenced the literature but the 
literature has influenced the practice of states.  
III. Oppenheim’s Positivism of the 20th Century 
When considering the concept of the individual in international law, it is useful to start 
with academic texts that have editions reaching back to the turn of the twentieth 
century. The twentieth century saw huge change with the technological and social 
advances that have revolutionised the world. These same technological and social 
advancements have also raised many interesting questions, some of which affect the 
situation of the individual within international law.  
Oppenheim’s series on international law is a good source. Oppenheim himself 
prepared the first edition in 190545 and the series continued after his death. First by 
Roxburgh46 in 1920, McNair47 in 1926, and this was followed by Lauterpacht48 editing 
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four editions, with his final edition published in 1955.49 After a break of thirty eight 
years a ninth edition was published with Jennings and Watt50 as editors. The first 
edition published in 1905 nicely sets out the starting position of the debate on 
personality when Oppenheim’s argues: 
"But what is the real position of individuals in International law, if they are not 
subjects thereof? The answer can only be that they are objects of the law of 
nations. They appear as such from many different points of view."51 
This initial statement is then clarified by Oppenheim who sets out the three 
conditions that make individuals the object of international law and not the subject of 
it. First, the law of nations recognises the personal supremacy of the state over its 
individuals.52 Second, the supremacy of states recognises the right of states over 
foreign subjects within their states.53 Finally, the law of nations may seize and punish 
foreign pirates on the open seas,54 or when belligerents may seize and punish 
neutral blockade runners and carriers of contraband on the open sea without the 
individual’s home state having a right to interfere.55 Finally Oppenheim concludes his 
work by stating:  
"If, as stated, individuals are never subjects but always objects of the Law of 
Nations, then nationality is the link between this law and individuals. It is 
through the medium of their nationality only that individuals can enjoy benefits 
from the existence of the Law of Nations."56 
This argument is further reinforced with explanations that diplomats and other aliens 
with special rights do not gain these rights from international treaties but rather due 
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to municipal law which the state was obliged to create as party to an international 
treaty.57 This leaves the focus for enforcement of international law down to states to 
incorporate into domestic law. Therefore, this has all the weaknesses of a system 
whereby state sovereignty is the primary aspect. This dynamic of the importance of 
state sovereignty is reinforced when Oppenheim discusses the rights of man, that 
there is no such guarantee in the law of nations and that as the law of nations is 
between states, there is no place for the individual.58  
Oppenheim provides an ideal starting point for this theoretical narrative that, as of 
1905, the individual is definitively an object of international law and certainly not a 
subject. The second edition59 published in 1912, is almost identical in respect of how 
the individual within international law should be viewed to that of the first edition. 
These two editions provide an ideal snapshot of Edwardian positivism.  
The two volume, third edition published in 192060 and 1921,61 was mainly written by 
Oppenheim until his death in 1919, with the work complemented and supplemented 
by Oppenheim’s student,62 Ronal F. Roxburgh using Oppenheim’s notes to finish the 
edition.63 With Roxburgh being a former student of Oppenheim and using his notes it 
can be reasonably concluded that this third edition is of Oppenheim’s theoretical 
narrative.64 This edition has strong echoes of the first edition. The editions post First 
World War witnessed the chapter on the individual developing in content and size, to 
include post-war changes to international law. With the creation of the League of 
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Nations65 the existence of rights and duties is expanded from just between states to 
include those between international organisations and states.66 Therefore, an 
expansion in the meaning of subjects was already in development. In this third 
edition Roxburgh and Oppenheim further continue down a difficult path by creating a 
third way; arguing that when international law creates an independent organisation 
certain powers can be granted to courts, councils and individuals. Yet these rights 
are neither international, nor municipal rights, but only rights within the organisation 
concerned.67 This approach is theoretically consistent, that individuals gain rights 
under international treaties, yet saying that this does not alter the general 
relationship between international law and the individual is both impractical and 
illogical. By giving individuals rights under treaties it changes the nature of 
international law, and, therefore, by arguing for this third way in order to maintain a 
theoretical position means that Oppenheim is failing to take into account, the 
changes and developments with the realities of the time.  
The fourth edition of Oppenheim was edited and updated by Arnold D. McNair in 
1928. This update being published as the post first world war economic bubble was 
about to burst, causing extensive economic and social problems. Therefore, this 
update brings with it the ideal optimistic inter-war snapshot of international law, and 
as such it can increase our understanding of international law from a viewpoint not 
usually examined. The unique circumstances of post-war economic and social 
mobility, coupled with the development of international organisations for the first 
time, were a set of conditions never seen before in social sciences giving a unique 
lens in which to view the role of the individual. This was followed by international 
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decline throughout the 1930s and the perceived failure of the international system 
building up to the start of the Second World War this period is not seen with much 
fondness. McNair builds on the previous editions by arguing the individuals are only 
ever objects of international law,68 and that any rights given to individuals from 
international law are only enforceable through the use of municipal law,69 yet 
international law requires that states make these municipal laws within the state.70 
Though, McNair recognises the exception to those international organisations such 
as Permanent Court of International Justice or the European Danube Commission 
that can grant certain rights and duties directly to individuals.71 In restating the 
position expressed in past editions, McNair, struggles to find a solution to the 
question of individuals that fits into a situation where international organisations are 
interacting directly with individuals, but still maintains a theoretical position according 
to which they are objects of international law. 
For the fifth edition of Oppenheim’s International Law, Hersch Lauterpacht had taken 
over the editorship of the series. Having been a student and close friend of McNair 
and assistant on the previous edition72 he was perfectly placed to continue the 
traditions of the Oppenheim. Lauterpacht may not have been the most obvious 
candidate to agree with the extreme positivist method embodied within the series, 
basing his conceptions of international law on the rule of law.73 74 Published in 1938 
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as the international system was starting to breakdown75 and gearing up towards war, 
the edition remains optimistic with the international system. Much of the discussion 
regarding the individual remains unchanged from the previous editions. One notable 
area that has seen development is this idea of the third way of individuals gaining 
rights under international organisations but not becoming subjects of international 
law. Lauterpacht takes much the same lines as his predecessors yet concludes, “As 
such they must be deemed to possess a species of international personality of their 
own.”76 This point in starting to consider that an actor other than a state may have 
some level or description of legal personality was the start of a revolution in terms of 
wider acceptance of other actors, including individuals.  
With the publication of the updated eighth edition version of Oppenheim’s work, 
edited for the final time by Hersch Lauterpacht,77 a new emphasis and switch 
towards the individual can be seen through an increase in depth and size of the 
chapter regarding the individual. The chapter has a more in-depth discussion 
regarding the individual, with the argument being made that “Individuals are not 
normally subjects of the Law of Nations; they have certain rights and duties in 
conformity with, or according to, International Law?”78 A discussion of occasions 
when individuals have rights conferred on them follows, notably heads of states, and 
foreign citizens.79 A revolutionary argument is then made by Lauterpacht stating: 
"Moreover, the quality of individuals as subjects of international law is 
apparent from the fact that, in various spheres, they are, as such, bound by 
duties which international law imposes directly upon them. The various 
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developments since the two World Wars no longer countenance the view that, 
as a matter of positive law, states are the only subjects of international law. In 
proportion as the realisation of that fact gains ground, there must be an 
increasing disposition to treat individuals, within a limited sphere, as subjects 
of international law."80 
This position is quickly corrected to more traditional positivism, that the “normal 
position of individuals in International Law, if they are not regularly subjects thereof? 
The answer can only be that, generally speaking, they are objects of the Law of 
Nations.”81 Lauterpacht sets out an evolving positivist position that takes into account 
the recent developments in International law, but remains in a position which is at 
best a compromise where the individual no longer comfortably fits into being an 
object but the positivist theoretical narrative is not ready to identify them as subjects.  
Over these eight editions, spanning 47 years, a clear growth can be seen in the 
justification and the place of the individual in international law to the position in the 
eighth edition where the opinion has been clarified to the extent that the individual 
does have personality, albeit only in certain circumstances. This earlier statement is 
clarified when he picks up the argument that, surely if individuals are not subjects of 
international law then, by reasonable deduction, they are objects of the law of 
nations.82 This argument holds up if we are prepared to believe that the only two 
definitions that an individual can be is either subject or object, without this third way 
concept of the limited subject.  
One reoccurring aspect in the Oppenheim series of books is a quote from the end of 
the chapter on the individual, which features in all pre-Second World War editions, 
which needs further explanation:  
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“Lastly, there is no doubt that, should a state venture to treat its own subjects 
or some of them with such cruelty as would stagger humanity, public opinion 
of the rest of the world would call upon the Powers to exercise intervention for 
the purpose of compelling such State to establish a legal order of things within 
its boundaries sufficient to guarantee to its citizens an existence more 
adequate to the ideas of modern civilisation.”83 
This statement can be interpreted in a number of ways, and in a number of different 
lights depending on the edition from which it is taken. For example, with the McNair 
fourth edition this can quite easily be seen as advocating an interventionist policy in 
order to prevent another state from abusing its citizens. As the editions move closer 
to the Second World War they can be seen as a reaction to the breakdown in the 
international system and the rise of fascism in Europe and the Far East. Therefore, 
this justifies the state’s interfering with the sovereignty of other states for the benefit 
of a state’s population, a huge theoretical step forward for the law of nations during 
this time. This statement should be read in the context of the chapter that perhaps 
individuals should be given international personality in order to protect them from 
states abusing their own citizens as part of the colonies system of Empire.  
The publication of the ninth edition of Oppenheim’s International law,84 edited by Sir 
Robert Jennings and Sir Arthur Watts, came thirty-eight years after the previous 
edition. The edition continues the tradition of Oppenheim to be a thoroughly positivist 
work, which is reflected within a notably similar structure being maintained within the 
work. The authors, although experts in the field, do not think as radically as the 
previous editor, Lauterpacht. When the work considers the individual it uses the 
single chapter formation as before, yet the theoretical narrative has advanced as 
would be expected. From the outset, the editors accept the position of individuals as 
subjects: 
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“It is no longer possible, as a matter of positive law, to regard states as the 
only subjects of international law, and there is an increasing disposition to 
treat individuals, within a limited sphere, as subjects of international law.”85  
This position is accepted as states do occasionally give individuals standing and 
rights without the intervention of municipal legislation, with these rights enforceable 
at international tribunals.86 Individuals, private companies, and NGOs enter into 
direct legal relationships on an international plane with states, and, therefore, 
support the arguments that the individual is indeed a subject.87 Finally the authors 
address the issue of state intervention in order to address human rights violation, in 
which they point towards the development of humanitarian treaties preventing 
slavery, forced labour, and protection of stateless persons and refugees.88 Pointing 
towards the Charter of the United Nations89 which recognised the importance of 
fundamental and human rights, and upon which the European Convention on Human 
Rights90 and the United Nations Covenants,91 have developed complex rules that are 
legally binding upon states.92 As such this ninth edition is a theoretical step forward 
for positivism from the previous edition. This should not be seen as surprising due to 
the length of time between editions but in the process still retains the extreme 
positivism familiar to the Oppenheim series. The concluding point we can take from 
this edition is that individuals are subjects of international law. This means that they 
have a role within the international sphere, and demonstrates clear development and 
evolution. The greatest step forward with the ninth edition is that the editors view 
points towards the creation of international human rights law which is a turning point 
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and the place where the individual starts to have increased recognition as an actor in 
international law.93 
III.1.Modern Positivism  
Since the early 1990s a new generation of textbooks on international law has been 
launched, these books are similar to Oppenheim in that they give a good overview to 
the whole subject area. By and large many of these mainstream books are mainly 
positivist theoretical narratives, but by exploring the debate within these works a 
greater understanding of the post-cold war doctrine will be gained. Through analysis 
of this literature one will be able to see if legal process theory has penetrated the 
mainstream.  
The main theoretical doctrine within this modern literature concerned with the 
individual still remains within the broad outline of the object and subject debate as 
discussed above in Oppenheim’s text. Shaw’s International Law94, currently in its 
sixth edition indicates that the individual is a subject within international law through 
the increasing practice of states; as a result of, but not mutually exclusive to, the 
expansion of human rights law.95 In the same edition he qualifies his argument 
slightly by stating "it remains only to determine the nature and extent of this 
personality".96 If Shaw is uncertain about the scope of this personality, there is little 
point in him arguing that individuals have it. Without defining the scope of personality 
there is little purpose to having something which cannot be reasonably defined and 
as such remains in a state of flux. This argument remains relatively unchanged 
throughout his textbook series as it moves forward in editions. The argument 
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becomes more elaborated drawing a link between the increase of the status of the 
individual being bound closely with the individuals place under the system of 
international protection of human rights.97 The sixth edition of Shaw does not move 
the argument forward much more than that seen in the fifth edition. The most striking 
part of Shaw’s work, over the course of the six editions is the general lack of 
information and interest taken by Shaw in regards to the personality of the individual, 
and the acceptance of the dominance of the abstract notion of the state. 
Martin Dixon98 takes a similar approach to Shaw, in his textbook series on 
international law using the subject and object debate to discuss the position of the 
individual. However, unlike Shaw he reaches the conclusion that individuals and 
most international organisations will have personality, but this will be a reduced 
personality compared to that of states.99 This position echoes views expressed by 
Brownlie, but unlike Brownlie his argument is reasoned by stating that this 
personality has been conferred on individuals and international organisations by 
states accepting, recognising and supporting this concept.100 This idea is developed 
in the fourth edition where he argues that the personality is due to the consent of 
states.101 In the sixth edition Dixon’s argument has evolved once more to the position 
that individuals now have full personality in international law, and, as such, 
arguments about the consent of states being needed have been removed. The 
removal of this argument means that that work no longer includes his excellent point 
that states would find it politically difficult to withdraw their consent from individuals 
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being subjects.102 Within this work a clear development has occurred in Dixon’s 
argument over the space of his textbook series, from one where individuals are only 
special subjects, to subjects where the consent of states is required and thus can be 
withdrawn, to individuals as full subjects. 
Evan’s textbook103 series has Evans as the editor and not the author of the works. 
First published in 2003, and now in its third edition by 2010 it indicates a high level of 
development in the theoretical narrative. The chapter regarding the individual and 
that is of interest to this review is written by Robert McCorquodale.104 The chapter, in 
all three editions, has a strong emphasis on giving a review of the debate on the 
individual as subject or object regarding personality of the individual. While 
McCorquodale does not draw any surprising conclusions in any of the volumes he 
does side with the debate that individuals are indeed subjects of international law.105 
In the third edition of McCorquodale’s one interesting passage highlights a new 
position for this work when the argument is made that:  
"The rights of individuals and the rights of states in the international legal 
system are not identical but, whilst they may overlap or interact (such as 
under international humanitarian law in relation to use of force on a territory 
affecting combatants and non-combatants), they are distinct rights.”106 
Both states and individuals have personality, yet the rights that this personality gives 
are not the same. At first this may seem apparent as clearly individuals and states 
are widely different entities, yet having this distinction makes it easier to find 
differences in how their personality can be treated. Consequently, limiting the 
personality of an individual could, theoretically, be easier in the event that an 
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international tribunal felt that the individual should not have personality in 
international law equal to that of a state. Having distinct rights and forms of 
personality makes practical sense, yet it still leaves the door open to affecting the 
level and depth of personality of individuals in comparison to that against the 
personality given to states. This is nicely summarised in the conclusion of the 
chapter when McCorquodale writes:  
“In most cases the crucial issue is whether the individual has an independent 
role in the system or whether the individual’s role is solely dependent on State 
consent.”107 
In the first edition of Antonio Cassese’s, International Law,108 first published in 2001 
Cassese focuses on the role of states as the primary focus of international law. His 
only consideration of individuals is when the argument is made that individuals have 
a limited capacity to act within the international sphere, and this is due to the lack of 
an enforcement mechanism to enforce these rights and duties.109 As such he reflects 
other, earlier opinions in which the individual’s personality is limited by the ability to 
enforce these rights.  
This limited scope and consideration within the first edition is telling in itself. The 
area is either of little interest to the author or he believes the debate is already pretty 
much settled and accordingly no lengthy discussion is needed. However, in the 
second edition110 the debate is given more of a detailed and extended passage on 
the development of the legal personality of individuals, which reviews the different 
arguments and bodies of thought from different perspectives such as traditional and 
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modern.111 When Cassese summarised his argument at the end of the chapter he 
writes: 
"In sum, in contemporary international law individuals possess international 
legal status. They have a few obligations, deriving from customary 
international law. In addition, procedural rights ensure to the benefit of 
individuals, not however vis-a-vis all, States, but only towards the group of 
States that have concluded treaties, or the international organizations that 
have adopted resolutions, envisaging such rights. Clearly, the international 
legal status of individuals is unique: they have a lopsided position in the 
international community."112 
Cassese, in his second edition, summarises the idea that since the individual does 
have personality in international law, individuals also have responsibilities coupled 
with the rights they have acquired. This is not a new argument, yet his observation 
that individuals now have a lopsided position in the international community is an 
interesting comment that brings a new insight to the issue of individuals in 
international law. This development means that with the individual gaining 
personality they have a more favourable position than states under international law, 
which subsequently raises political, as well as legal questions. If this was really the 
case then the emphasis in world politics and international organisations would move 
their own emphasis towards the individual, rather than the current state centric 
based policies of these international organisations.  
Analysis of the mainstream debate over the last twenty years indicates that the 
theoretical narrative has advanced very little, with legal positivism expressed by 
Oppenheim and Brownlie still being the main ideas expressed within the works. 
These works hark back to the positivist school of thought of a state-centric system 
built on the consent of states. This relatively conservative approach to international 
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law re-enforces the idea of the individual as only a secondary actor within the system 
at best. The effect of this is to leave the reader in a theoretical landscape which is 
distant and apart from the realities displayed with the modern, international legal 
system. The following section will explore why international law has developed to be 
state-centric. 
III.2.Hersch Lauterpacht 
In writing three editions of Oppenheim’s International Law113 and being an assistant 
on a fourth to McNair,114 Lauterpacht was engaging with the extreme positivist 
method embodied within the title, which was in contrast to his own views.115 
Lauterpacht’s own position was far more complex, expressing his vision of 
international society as one founded on the rule of law.116 His conception of the role 
of law, influenced by Kelsen, advocates “the notion that legal rules are abstract and 
only resolve into individual legal relations through judicial decisions or the agreement 
of the parties.”117 However, despite this influence Lauterpacht was not a rigid 
positivist, with a distinctive thread of natural law running through his work.118 While 
Lauterpacht was editor of Oppenheim’s international law he kept true to the strict 
positivist approach that was an important feature of the work, yet in his own work he 
expressed his own perspective of international law, most notably in International law 
and Human Rights119. While being a flexible positivist but seeing a place for natural 
law and the necessity of international judiciary, Lauterpacht can almost be seen as a 
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pragmatist seeing how the international system could be best served by combining 
these elements. 
Lauterpacht’s concern for the individual within international law, as expressed with 
International Law and Human Rights was a theme that ran throughout his career. 
From the early days in Vienna he rejected the notion of states alone as subjects of 
international law.120 He first tested the idea of human rights in the article The Law of 
Nations, the Law of Nature, and the Rights of Man121. This academic paper was a 
first attempt for the later books in which the concept of human rights are more clearly 
articulated. Lauterpacht’s perspective on international law and the need for an active 
international judiciary is a justification to his argument that the UDHR had to be of a 
binding nature on states.122 His book An International Bill of Rights123  was 
considered revolutionary as it was the first legal set of proposals on the subject of 
human rights.124 It advocated the legally binding nature required of a future, 
international human rights document: 
“The International Bill of the Rights of Man is, with regard to the contemplation 
of the present draft, a legal instrument asserting legal rights and obligations. 
The obligations are, primarily, those of the States accepting the Bill and 
binding themselves to observe it.”125 
“the International Bill of Rights of man would include the obligation to 
participate in the international supervision and enforcement of its clauses.”126 
A second, much revised edition of this book was published in 1950 under the new 
title of International Law and Human Rights.127 Lauterpacht was critical of the UDHR 
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stating it “is not in itself an achievement of magnitude”128 due to “no legal force and, 
probably only inconsiderable moral authority”.129 This work was very much more than 
a second edition of the pervious book,130 it went much further in its scope according 
to Elihu Lauterpacht: 
“The new book, as stated in its preface, had three purposes: first, to analyse 
the legal effects of the human rights provisions in the UN Charter and the 
relevant practice of its organs; Secondly, to re-examine the question of an 
international bill of rights of man in light of the initial efforts of the UN to give 
substance to the idea; and, thirdly, to present afresh the wider problem of the 
subjects of international law. This third aspect drew heavily upon the 1945 
volume. He also thought it desirable to discuss in a general way development 
of a regional solution in the form of the proposed European Court and 
Commission of Human Rights.”131 
The effect of the two books on the on-going negotiation for both the UDHR, and the 
two covenants on human rights appears to be non-existent.132 If either book was 
ever discussed during the committee stage, it did not have a direct influence on 
proceedings and does not appear in any record.133 
International Law and Human Rights is broken down into three distinct sections. It is 
only in part one where Lauterpacht explores the argument regarding the individual. 
Lauterpacht’s argument is based upon two particular themes connected to the UN 
charter. First, that the UN charter indicates that individuals have personality within 
international law on the grounds that the interpretation of the charter does not 
prevent any individual or international body from acquiring rights under or being 
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bound by other international duties.134 Lauterpacht supports the argument that the 
coming into force of the UN charter has been translated in many fields and in respect 
of rights and duties into positive law for the individual.135 The second theme from the 
charter is that the individual has acquired a status and a stature which has given 
them fundamental rights of the individual, independent of the law of the state. As 
such it is clear that the individual has personality in international law.136 However, 
even with this argument for personality being made so clearly and strongly, it links 
into Lauterpacht’s second main argument that even having these rights and 
personality does not mean that they can actually be used, unless an international 
tribunal or international organisation is willing to hear a case or receive petitions of 
complaint.  
"The position of the individual as a subject of international law has often been 
obscured by the failure to observe the distinction between the recognition, in 
an international instrument, of rights ensuring to the benefit of the individual 
and the enforceability of these rights at his instance. The fact that the 
beneficiary of rights is not authorised to take independent steps in his own 
name to enforce them does not signify that he is not a subject of the law or 
that the rights in question are vested exclusively in the agency which 
possesses the capacity to enforce them."137 
In summary, Lauterpacht sets out that individuals have personality in international 
law derived from the UN charter, but are unable to fulfil this personality without a 
tribunal for individuals to take their complaints to. Without such a tribunal the 
individual’s position has only moved forward theoretically, and in reality is still in the 
traditional position as an object of international law.  
Lauterpacht’s work, especially International Law and Human Rights radically 
changed the theoretical framework for international law, and importantly for how the 
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individual was perceived within international law. His work on Human Rights was 
truly ground breaking,138 prior to his work nothing like this existed. An International 
Bill of Rights of Man was the first time that an inclusive list of rights had been set out 
in this format. Today, these achievements seem small, yet without Lauterpacht’s 
contribution, intentional law would be a very different discipline.   
III.3. Ian Brownlie, Marek St. Korowica, & D.P. O’Connell 
The question of personality is given further scrutiny by Ian Brownlie139 and Marek St. 
Korowica, both writing after Lauterpacht, they explore the concept further. Marek St. 
Korowica in 1956140 outlines many problems with the issue of personality of 
individuals in international law. Korowica commences with a review of practice up to 
1956, highlighting that many legal writers after the First and Second World Wars 
were in favour of the individual gaining international legal personality. He states that 
this was achieved, albeit, in a limited way with the Upper Silesian Convention.141 He 
states that the concept of personality in international law relies on states’ consent as 
to who has this personality. It requires state’s consent which means that this consent 
can be withdrawn. If personality relies on state consent it implies that the personality 
is limited. This limitation is created by the uncertainty of the on-going personality. 
Without the assurance of personality no matter the circumstances or issues arising 
from the concept that personality cannot be fully exploited. This issue links into 
Korowica’s idea that there are many practical and moral reasons for recognising 
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rights,142 and in doing so would place safeguards on, not only those using rights and 
personality, but also for states in how these obligations should be upheld.  
Just ten years after Korowica’s article, Ian Brownlie published the first edition of 
Principles of Public International Law143 in a similar outlook to Oppenheim. The book 
has grown and evolved into having a significant number of editions with a similar 
positivist conception of international law as Oppenheim. The first edition published in 
1966 came after Lauterpacht’s seventh and eighth editions of Oppenheim’s 
international law. Brownlie’s work continues to develop the arguments regarding 
standing of the individual and picks up in terms of time span where Oppenheim left 
off. Brownlie sets out the far more positivist argument that while individuals are 
recognised under international law in cases of genocide, and war crimes, but under 
international treaties they are not recognised and it is merely an international 
agreement for individuals to seek claims against the state under municipal law.144 
Brownlie does make the concession that the individual has a more general role 
within international law when seen in connection with human rights law and the self-
determination of peoples. However, this distinction is somewhat artificial and almost 
impossible to achieve within the realities of the system. This position is hard to 
maintain as it requires that human rights law be treated in a parallel system to that of 
other fields of international law, which would be both unrealistic and impractical with 
the lessons of human rights law not being applied to the rest of international law. It 
also fails to take into account the effect that economic and social events can have. 
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Brownlie's position only evolves very slightly, in his sixth and seventh editions145 
where he sets out the argument that:  
"There is no general rule that the individual cannot be a 'subject of 
International law', and in particular contexts he appears as a legal person on 
the international plane. At the same time to classify the individual as a 
'subject' of the law is unhelpful, since this may seem time to imply the 
existence of capacities which do not exist and does not avoid the task of 
distinguishing between the individual and other types of subject."146 
Brownlie’s argument only develops very slightly between editions, remaining true to 
the original positivist argument. The influence of the realities of international law 
mean, though, that his argument is not as strong as he would desire, expressing a 
qualification on his argument that it is “unhelpful” to consider individuals as 
subjects.147 This final position arrived at by Brownlie in 2008 is only slightly ahead of 
Lauterpacht’s 1955 position in Oppenheim, where he acknowledges the individual as 
a subject. But qualifies the argument with a desire for them to have a distinct place 
as subjects of international law, which is away from that of states as subjects. This 
requires that individuals need to meet different criteria to that of states to gain 
personality in international law.    
In a similar fashion to Oppenheim’s international law, Brownlie’s Principles on 
International Law were continued after his death, by his former student and 
colleague, James Crawford. Crawford is a highly regarded scholar who has written 
extensively on the state within international law148 and was nominated as a judge for 
the International Court of Justice in 2012149. The eighth edition150 continues the 
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same theoretical position of Brownlie, but he updates the work to reflect 
developments. The effect is in relation to the individual within international law and is 
still maintaining the position of the seventh edition. The edition provides justification 
that it is unhelpful to consider individuals as subjects on the basis that there are 
capacities which do not exist, and it does not distinguish the individual from other 
subjects within international law.151 While human rights law gives the individual rights 
and responsibilities these norms cannot be enforced horizontally between 
individuals, and that states still maintain almost all responsibility for actions which 
breach rights.152 
While Brownlie maintains his position throughout the majority of his work others such 
as D.P. O’Connell153 were much quicker to acknowledge the place of the individual. 
However, O’Connell’s justification as to why the individual has personality is perhaps 
more intriguing than this acknowledgment. His argument is nicely summarised when 
he states that: 
"The individual as the end of community is a member of the community, and a 
member has status: he is not an object. It is not a sufficient answer to assert 
that the State is the medium between international law and its own nationals, 
for the law has often fractured this link when it failed in its purpose."154 
“Does it suffice to admit that the individual’s good is the ultimate end of the 
law but refuse the individual any capacity in the realisation of that good? Is the 
good in fact attained through treating the individual as an instrumentality of 
law and not as an actor? Philosophy and practice demonstrate that the 
answer to all these questions must be in the negative…”155 
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Consequently, an individual is an end-user of the international society they must be 
part of the international community and therefore logically have to possess 
personality under international law. O'Connell is highlighted in Higgins156 as one of 
the first to challenge this traditional debate, therefore his argument while basic is 
ground breaking in its rejection of the traditional theoretical approach.  
This section summarises evolving developments regarding the positivist ideas of the 
place of the individual within international law. There is clear progression towards the 
recognition of the individual as a subject, yet some the scholar considered above for 
example Brownlie,157 are not happy to acknowledge this point and as such have 
taken to creating a new concept of the limited-subject personality for individuals. This 
is not upsetting the traditional positivist landscape of the law of nations while 
incorporating human rights law and the increasing influence the individual has in 
treaties and international organisations. 
IV. Antonio Augusto Cançado Trindade  
Antonio Augusto Cançado Trindade has extensive personal experience of the 
international tribunal system, having sat as a judge and later president of the Inter-
Americans Court of Human Rights (IACtHR)158 and since 2009 has sat as a judge on 
the International court of justice.159 His written work is built on and reflected within his 
work at these international tribunals, and is at the cutting edge of how the individual 
should be treated within international law.  
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Within Cançado Trindade’s work, International law for Humankind: Towards a new 
“Jus Gentium”160 the individual161 is given far greater importance and standing than 
in most past and contemporary works. This is expressed within part four162, where 
the subjects of international law are considered at length, and is of importance to this 
review. The individual is regarded within the work as “true subjects – rather than 
simply “actors” – of international law”163, later stating “to call individuals ‘actors’ in 
International Law is nothing but a platitude. They are true subjects of international 
law, bearers of rights and duties which emanate directly therefrom.”164 Perhaps the 
most important reasoning behind this assertion of the individual’s importance, 
Cançado Trindade draws on the Right of Petition within the ECHR and IACtHR as 
the central mechanism by which individuals have been able to take up this 
position.165  Capacity and personality are closely linked, but should an individual not 
enjoy a full juridical capacity, this does not mean that they would suffer in no longer 
being a subject of International Law.166 
In this line of argument, Cançado Trindade tackles one of the common concerns 
regarding the condition of the individual that they should have limited personality, 
being that individuals only have limited capacities within international law, whereas 
states do not. For example, states can enter and make treaties. This argument is 
addressed with a direct comparison with domestic law, whereby not all individuals, 
participate, directly or indirectly, in the process of law creation, and their status as 
subjects of domestic law is not questioned. This argument is further extended to 
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legal norms that the creation and application of norms has never required the full 
participation of international actors.167 This acceptance represents a “significant 
achievement of contemporary International Law”168 which has “hindered its 
progressive development towards the construction of a new jus gentium”.169 Further 
to the mere identification of the individual as an end-user of the law, Cançado 
Trindade’s also argues that the individual, alongside NGOs and other entities of civil 
society, can act in the process of formation and application of international norms.170 
With this identification it promotes the idea of the possible role that the individual 
may have in the creation of International law, the main subject of this work.  
Part five171 of the book regards the construction of the international law for 
humankind, one of the ambitions of the title. After discussions as to the importance 
of the individual, chapter eleven starts with an acceptance that this work does not set 
out that individuals or humankind have replaced states as subjects of international 
law, but instead that states now co-exist alongside individuals, international 
organisations.172 In exploring certain conceptual constructions such as jus cogens, 
the common heritage of mankind, the right to peace, and the right to development, 
Cançado Trindade sets out the argument that over the last 60 years international law 
has increased towards becoming more humanised.173 This results from enhanced 
state responsibility for international crimes, and the ever increasing protection of 
human rights through international tribunals and instruments. Cançado Trindade is 
certainly at the cutting edge of the individual within international law, but his 
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arguments as to why the individual is a subject are convincing and are embraced by 
this work.  
Within his work, The Access of Individuals to International Justice,174 Cançado 
Trindade argues that the right of access to courts, especially at international level, is 
fundamental to the international protection of human rights. Cançado Trindade 
argues that the importance of the right to access to justice belongs in the domain of 
jus cogens.175 The significance of this is that it automatically accepts the place of the 
individual within the international system, and accepts their place within international 
courts. In a similar fashion to International law for Humankind: Towards a new “Jus 
Gentium”176 the argument is made that the individual is not just an actor but a subject 
of international law, and that this distinction is important as it does not give parity 
between individual and States.177 The work goes on to explore different examples of 
access to international tribunals, reinforcing the idea of the individual as subject of 
International law. This work builds on, and is closely related to, the previous work 
examined.  
The final work of Cançado Trindade’s work to be considered within this review is The 
Construction of a Humanized International law178 this work brings together a 
collection of individual opinions of the authors. Many of these opinions have a focus 
on the humanisation of international law, in which the individuals concern is elevated 
to the same level as states. In essence this work gives the practical demonstration of 
the academic ideas expressed within International law for Humankind: Towards a 
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new “Jus Gentium”179 and The Access of Individuals to International Justice180 have 
been adopted by the author in judgements.  
Cançado Trindade’s focus on the individual, and the arguments made are highly 
credible and greatly advance the field. However, they are very focused on the 
individual in terms of being an end-user of the law, i.e. subject. He hardly touches on 
the subject of the individual with capacity to create international law and that is 
where this work is aimed.  
V. Process Based Theory  
The New Haven or Yale School181 established and developed by Harold Lasswell 
and Myres McDougal182 sets out to combine the analytical methods of other social 
sciences most notably international relations and seeks to apply these 
methodologies to the perceptive purpose of the law.183 This school of thought has 
since been developed by scholars such as Richard Falk,184 Anne-Marie Slaughter,185 
and Rosalyn Higgins186. According to Falk, “McDougal combines the outlook of legal 
realism with the systematic policy science of Harold Lasswell”.187 This entailed a 
significant change to the theoretical underpinnings of understanding towards 
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international law. Falk’s contribution in The Status of Law in International Society188 
sets out to reconcile Kelsen’s theory of international law as autonomous with that of 
McDougal arguing for its relevance. “This book is an attempt to develop a conception 
of the international legal order that effectuates reconciliation between these 
intertwined considerations of autonomy and relevance”.189 This perspective on 
international law as policy-oriented and viewing international law as a process of 
decision making by which various actors clarify and implement their common 
interests in accordance with their expectations of appropriate processes and 
effective governance.190 Reisman, Wiessner and Willard set out that: 
“The New Haven School defines law as a process of decision that is both 
authoritative and controlling; it places past such decisions in the illuminating 
light of their conditioning factors, both environmental and predispositional, and 
appraises decision trends for their compatibility with clarified goals; it 
forecasts, to the extent possible, alternative future decisions and their 
consequences; and it provides conceptual tools for those using it to invent 
and appraise alternative decisions, constitutive arrangements, and courses of 
action using the guiding light of a preferred future world public order of human 
dignity.”191 
Ratner and Slaughter argue that “Perhaps the New Haven School's greatest 
contribution has been its emphasis on both what actors say and what they do.”192 As 
McDougal and Feliciano argue: 
“International law may be most realistically observed, and fruitfully conceived, 
as a process of authoritative decision transcending state lines by which the 
peoples of the world seek to clarify and implement their common interests in 
both minimum order, in the sense of the prevention of unauthorised coercion, 
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and optimum order, in the sense of the promotion of the greater production 
and wider distribution of all values.”193 
In undertaking this conceptual position it concentrates less on the exposition of rules 
and their content and more on how those rules are actually used by all actors within 
the international system.194 Therefore, if a legal rule is not used by actors, it has 
minimum value under legal process theory due to it having minimum real world 
effect. A rejuvenation of the theory into New International Legal Process195 sets out 
that the theory should also have certain normative values that are different from or in 
addition to those of positivism. With these values international organisations should 
be given the authority to make decisions that support such values.196 However, in 
determining normative values in this theory we are distorting the nature of the 
concept by not only setting out to identify those normative values within international 
society, but also asking institutions to apply them. While this makes logical sense, 
asking an international organisation to implement a normative value such as human 
dignity may be difficult. What, actually, is this value in reality? How far does it go? 
What effect does it have in a realistic sense? When faced with these questions we 
start having to use the legal process theory to understand the normative values, and 
get into a recurring cycle.  
Legal process theory has a wider focus on international actors as “authorised 
decision makers”197 than traditional legal theories. McDougal defines authorised 
decisions makers as: 
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“Authority is the structure of expectation concerning who, with what 
qualifications and mode of selection, is competent to make which decisions by 
what criteria and what procedures. By control we refer to an effective voice in 
decision, whether authorised or not. The conjunction of common expectations 
concerning authority with a high degree of corroboration in actual operation is 
what we understand by law.”198 
These authorised decision makers are in the majority with traditional states199 and 
second international organisations200 but the theory does not exclude non-state 
actors. Weissner and Willard point to a whole range of actors including: 
“Besides the traditional nation- state, whether independent or associated with 
another actor, the world social and decision processes include 
intergovernmental organizations, non-self-governing territories, autonomous 
regions, and indigenous and other peoples, as well as private entities such as 
multinational corporations, media, nongovernmental organizations, private 
armies, gangs and individuals. An actor with actual or potential influence is a 
candidate for participation in the decision process; and by grasping the totality 
of the international process of decision, policy-oriented jurisprudence enables 
scholars, advisers and decision makers to be maximally effective while 
empowering non state entities to play greater roles in decision.”201 
Higgins explores this idea further by setting out that without subject or objects, but 
only participants (this includes individuals, multinational corporations and private 
non-state actors)202 this comprehensive approach gives far greater scope to almost 
any actor within the international legal system, notably even the individual. This 
recognition of all actors is a significant step forward to the state centric approach and 
the subject/ object debate regarding the individual. These actors are also 
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transcending the boundaries of particular territorial communities,203 therefore, giving 
emphasis to those actors which are non-states.                            
Problems and Process: International Law and How We Use It204 suggests that 
“international law is a process for resolving problems”,205 a system of authoritative 
decision-making and should not be understood as a set of rules206 finally concluding 
that “the role of international law is to assist in choice between these various 
alternatives”.207 In arriving at these conclusions Higgins tackles the subject/ object 
debate:  
"…the whole notion of "subjects" and "objects" has no credible reality, and, in 
my view, no functional purpose. We have erected an intellectual prison of our 
own choosing and then declared it to be an unalterable constraint."208 
This break with the theoretical narrative that has dominated the literature, 
demonstrates how far the theoretical narrative had departed from the realities of the 
international system. By rejecting this debate, Higgins’s also rejects much of the 
traditional thought regarding international law, and argues that:     
"It is more helpful, and closer to perceived reality, to return to the view of the 
international law as particular decision-making process. Within that process 
(which is a dynamic and not a static one) there are a variety of participants, 
making claims across state lines, with the object of maximising various 
values."209 
With this move towards having only participants within international law it allows, as 
has been seen above, for a far broader view of those that have personality, such as 
states, individuals, multinational corporations, NGO's and international organisations 
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such as the UN, and IMF.210 This greater scope of personality in international law 
means that the theoretical system more accurately reflects the realities of the 
system, especially in an increasingly globalised society. This reflection of the reality 
on the ground is fundamental to understanding how the system can be improved and 
developed. An increased scope of who has personality allows for a clearer 
understanding of rights and duties and with this comes greater accountability, not 
only for states but for NGOs and transnational corporations.  
Slaughter, in a similar fashion to Higgins, argues that as a result of our pre-
disposition to viewing the international system with the unitary state at the forefront 
with the state being represented as one voice211:  
“…is the wilful adoption of analytical blinders, allowing us to see the 
“international system” only in the terms that we ourselves have imposed.”212 
Similarly to Higgins’ self-imposed intellectual prison as an analytical tool,213 
Slaughter argues that due to examining the international system, through that of 
unitary states, means the focus is on the traditional international organisations and 
formal state delegations. However, if we start to consider the international system of 
states in the same way that domestic governments are considered,214 “provides a 
lens that allows us to see a new international landscape. Government networks pop 
up everywhere.”215 These networks are both horizontal and vertical, vertical being a 
relatively rare decision by states to delegate their sovereignty to an international 
organisation, such as the EU.216 However, even the EU sits within a broader set of 
regulatory networks among OECD states. With the OECD membership coming from 
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the USA, Japan, and Mexico, as such this system is a multi-layered global regulatory 
system.217 The genius of Slaughter’s work is in going beyond the identification and 
consideration of these networks to “how they actually conduct the business of global 
governance”218. In doing this, a spine of governance networks was created, which 
included international organisations, NGOs, and other non-state actors, thereby 
including a wider participation in international law than usually seen, but also 
retaining an accountable core of government. This moves away from the almost 
obsessive examination of states and international organisations now seen within the 
international law literature. 
The New Haven School and legal process theory still views states as the primary 
actors but also gives room to other decision makers, most notably non-state actors. 
The school also gives a new lens in which to observe international law as a process 
made by authoritative decision makers, therefore, not just giving increased 
recognition to non-state actors but also to how all actors interact using international 
law. This opens the door to further inquiry into how this process actually works. How 
do the actors function? Are these actors’ individuals within larger actors, such as 
NGOs? This last question is certainly intriguing with the Slaughters multi-layered 
networks approach; can networks within actors be identified?  
VI. Non-State Actors 
The traditional conception of international law being state-centric has difficulty fitting 
other actors into the doctrine. As Alston argues: “the phrase “non-state actors” 
makes it abundantly clear that, as far as international law is concerned, the key 
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actors are divided into two categories: states and the rest.”219 This raises the 
question of how non-state actors fit into this positivist conception of international law. 
Some non-state actors within the traditional positivist conception of international law 
are far easier to reconcile with this conception. The Sovereign Order of Malta and 
The Holy See are considered as subjects of international law on the basis of a 
historical claim and recognition by other states.220 Other non-state actors are far 
harder to reconcile within the positivist framework, these actors include insurgents 
and belligerents, transnational corporations, and international public companies.221 
Some of these non-state actors are easier to reconcile, essentially those that have 
close links to states and are, therefore, accepted by the states to have a role such as 
insurgents and belligerents. These actors are generally recognised under 
international law when they become the de facto administration of a specific territory, 
and in due course may become the recognised government of a particular 
territory.222 Examples of this range from the unrecognised Republic of Somaliland 
which administers a portion of Somalia223, to the Republic of Abkhazia which has a 
minimum recognition within the international community224, to the more widely 
recognised Republic of Kosovo, which is not a full member of the international 
community because Serbia still claims territorial sovereignty, but Kosovo is a 
member of the IMF and World Bank. Non-state actors such as international public 
companies and transnational corporations are far harder to bring into line with the 
subject/ object debate, yet with international public companies: 
“…personality will depend upon the differences between municipal and 
international personality. If the entity is given a range of powers and is 
                                                          
219
 Philip Alston, Non-state Actors and Human Rights, (Oxford University Press: Oxford: 2005) p19 
220
 Shaw (2008) pp.243-244 or James Crawford (2012) pp.124-125 
221
 Shaw (2008) pp.245-250 
222
 Shaw (2008) p245 
223
 http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-14115069 accessed 2/03/14 
224
 http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/7582181.stm accessed 2/03/14 
66 | P a g e  
 
distanced sufficiently from municipal law, an international person may be 
included, but it will require careful consideration of the circumstances.”225 
While transnational corporations are seen by Shaw as “remain[s] an open one”.226 
The consideration of transnational corporations has changed dramatically with the 
UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights,227 which certainly raises the 
questions regarding the status of transnational corporations within international 
law.228 Since the 1949 advisory opinion of the ICJ229 in which it stated that the UN 
was a subject of international law and could enforce its right by bringing international 
claims: 
“Accordingly, the Court has come to the conclusion that the Organization is an 
international person. That is not the same thing as saying that it is a State, 
which it certainly is not, or that its legal personality and rights and duties are 
the same as those of a state…. What it does mean is that it is a subject of 
international law and capable of possessing international rights and duties, 
and that it has capacity to maintain its rights by bringing international 
claims”230 
This advisory opinion sets out that international organisations have been recognised 
as having legal personality in international law,231 this personality is not the same as 
states’ personality. These particular non-state actors have, to varying degrees, 
gained a limited amount of acceptance under international law, not the full subjects 
of states but more than those held by objects.  
Alston proposes an interesting theory of the “Not-a-Cat” concept. The concept 
relates to Alston’s daughter describing any animal such as a rabbit or a mouse as 
simply “not-a-Cat”, this is then transferred as a metaphor to international law, 
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whereby anything that is not a state is described as a non-state actor, irrelevant as to 
the importance or scope of the organization.232 Alston critiques this method of 
evaluating non-state actors as: 
“Uni-dimensional or monochromatic way of viewing the world. It is not only 
misleading, but also makes it much more difficult to adapt the human rights 
regime in order to take adequate account of the fundamental changes that 
have occurred in recent years.”233 
This argument that sees all actors within international law divided between two 
categories also has an effect on how they are treated as subjects or objects. Alston’s 
argument builds on this notion that the term “object” has been defined with such 
“flexibility” and “generosity” and that no particular entity could not be treated as such 
due to these factors.234 He concludes this chapter within his collection of works, by 
stating that there appears to be reluctance on the part of academics to change the 
status of non-state actors or even create a wider range of definitions available.235 
This is reflected within the non-state actors considered above.  
Unlike the legal process that has been explored in this chapter, where any 
participant within the international system is given status, mainstream international 
law, especially positivist international law, sticks with the object and subject doctrine. 
In doing this this positivist doctrine limits actors to a select grouping. As Alston 
argues:  
“…at least a subset of non-state actors has suddenly become a force to be 
reckoned with and one which demands to be factored into the overall equation 
in a far more explicit and direct way than had been the case to date.”236 
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The place of non-state actors will always cause a theoretical issue for legal 
positivists, as they simply do not suit that theory of international law and reconciling 
the two creates issues. The realities are that non-state actors are increasingly 
playing an important role within international law, therefore, the legal process theory 
and the notion of participants is far more suited to the accurate reflection of  the 
international system. 
VII. International Law and International Relations: - Methodology  
The relationship between International Law and International Relations are closely 
related, notable inter-disciplinary works exist such as John Murphy’s book on The 
United States and the Rule of Law in International Affairs,237 or John Setear’s 
article238 on treaty law which highlights the need to consider political, alongside legal 
concerns. Also Jutta Brunnee and Stephen Toope’s239 work on Environmental 
Security and Freshwater Resources, which provides an interesting analysis on the 
interplay between regime theory and international environmental law. These two 
disciplines can be described as the two sides of the same coin, similar but notably 
different. These differences primarily centre on the unique methodological approach 
of each individual discipline. This sub-section intends to explore some of these 
methodology differences which shape the different approaches between 
International Law and International Relations.  
The fundamental difference between the fields of International law and International 
Relations is that International law is focused on the legal system while International 
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Relations focuses on the political system.240 This has the effect that international law 
is focused on “analysis of legal rules and instruments, and their application to facts. 
The ultimate aim of studying international legal theory is to understand the principal 
systemic and structural categories of the international legal system.”241 In Ratner and 
Slaughter’s The Methods of International Law242, they focus on the various 
methodologies of international law, asking each contributor to tackle the same issue 
from a different methodological perspective. This work provides an excellent 
overview of the different methodologies available to international law scholars and 
these are identified as Legal positivism, New Haven School, International Legal 
Process: Critical Legal Studies; International Law and International Relations; 
Feminist Jurisprudence; Third World Approaches to International Law; Law and 
Economics. 243 These different approaches are set up to tackle and answer three 
broad questions: questions of compliance; questions of the formation of international 
rules; and policy oriented approaches. 244 In essence, International law is focused on 
a system of binding rules, by which all actors must work within. In order to give a full 
picture the approaches include creation of law, application of law, and how that law 
works in practice.  
International relations differ within their approach to methodology, as Scott Burchill 
identifies in Theories of International Relations245, ten important approaches: 
Liberalism, Realism, Rationalism, The English School, Marxism, Historical Sociology, 
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and Critical theory, Post Structuralism, Constructivism, Feminism and Green Politics. 
246 247 These methodological approaches try to explain a range of political 
interactions between States, International Organisations, and Non-State Actors. This 
focus is, therefore, on how these relationships work and the effect that they can 
have, this can be within the creation of international law. This work will move the 
closest towards the International Relations methodology when considering the work 
of John Ruggie in the creation of the United Nations Guiding Principles on Business 
and Human Rights. However, as Alexander Orakhelashvili states:  
“Politics can be relevant for the existence, creation and change of 
international law in a number of ways. But politics is not the same as law; it 
certainly matters in terms of States agreeing to a rule or instrument, but it 
does not influence the content of already established legal rules, nor prejudice 
the separate existence of law.”248 
While interdisciplinary work and politics can be helpful to international law, and 
notably to this work in chapter four. This work’s main focus is within International law 
and when examining how Ruggie created the UNGPs the development of the law is 
always at the heart of the matter, rather than the politics. The methodology used to 
achieve this is derived from that policy oriented approach of the New Haven School, 
with additional emphasis on the importance of the individual. The chapter can also 
be seen within the context of constructivism and how agents of states interact to 
create law.  
                                                          
246
 Burchill (2005)  
247
 Burchill (2005) Some of these approaches have been considered at length within Chapter 1 
248
 Orakhelashvili (ed) (2011) p375 
71 | P a g e  
 
VIII. The Individual within International Relations 
So far this review has considered the individual and domination of states within 
international law. This review will now consider a wider spectrum of how the 
individual and state is reflected in another social science, international relations. This 
evaluation will explore what it means to be an individual within this discipline and 
whether there are any underlining values or concepts that can transcend 
international law. International Relations (IR), perhaps the closest social science to 
international law, shares a common history starting with both disciplines having 
foundations in the Peace of Westphalia in 1648.249 Within the last century some 
notable debates within IR have been established; realism v idealism in the 1930s, 
Traditionalism v Behaviourism 1960s, neo-realism v neo-liberalism 1980s and finally 
in the 1990s rationalism and reflectivism.250 This section will consider some of the 
main lenses through which to view the place of the individual in IR.   
The basic themes of realism are the anarchy of the state of nature, the self-interest 
of actors, the priority of power over morality or justice, the focus on states as primary 
actors, and the examination of these ideas will reflect in a realistic or scientific 
account of IR.251 Realism within IR has its origins in Machiavelli’s The Prince252 and 
Thomas Hobbes’ The Leviathan253 where both of these works expressed that the 
individual was fundamentally motivated by their own self-interests, and the most 
dangerous of these self-interests was the desire for power. Therefore, any 
interaction at a state level was one without rules; this is most notable in Machiavelli’s 
The Prince and the city-based system of a pre-unified Italy. Significant works by E.H. 
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Carr254 and Hans Morgenthau255 signalled the start of modern realism. Carr’s work, 
is an attack on the utopian views of liberals that led to a dangerously flawed inter-war 
system as a result of the 1919 settlement.256 Hans Morgenthau argues that states 
are self-interested, power-seeking rational actors, who seek to maximise each 
individual state’s security. In the process he sets out six principles of realism, which 
consider that the state is central to IR having their roots in human nature. That in this 
regard interest defines power and that; realist maintains the autonomy of the political 
sphere.257 In essence, realism is a simplification of the world. Due to the power 
interests at play within realism, the prisoners’ dilemma has been used to model the 
dynamics of the interactions between the actors in order to anticipate behaviour.258 
The state centric nature of realism is similar to the positivist conception of 
international law259 as such it has many of the short comings that legal positivism 
has, and can only, in part, explain the international system. The view struggles when 
wider actors are considered, and much like positivism is only clear when states are 
the only actors.   
Liberalism in IR is the perspective based on the assumption of the goodness of the 
individual and the value of international political institutions in promoting social 
progress. Liberalism is principally associated with the internationalism of the interwar 
period as proposed by liberals such as Woodrow Wilson,260 which came under heavy 
criticism from Carr. As with many forms of liberalism it has its foundations with the 
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works of Bentham,261 Locke,262 and Kant.263 As with realism, liberalism shares a 
common philosophical underpinning with elements of international law. Liberalism 
and legal process theory also share the same basic conceptions; both look further 
than the power hungry, state-centric approach offered by realists and positivists. 
Focusing instead on the normative imperatives and multitude of actors in world 
politics especially international organisations.264 Liberalism explores IR with 
promotion of all actors, and shares a similar approach to legal process theory 
explored above. 
Constructivism embraces all actors with IR, setting out the theory of a socially 
constructed system, which reflects our own prejudices, ideas and assumptions rather 
than an objective social reality.265 As Alexander Wendt identifies "that the structures 
of human association are determined primarily by shared ideas rather than material 
forces, and that the identities and interests of purposive actors are constructed by 
these shared ideas rather than given by nature".266 Therefore, it is stated that 
international organisations and inter-governmental organisations are all included 
within the social construct. A large part of this theory relates to the perception of 
actors and what they want. Therefore, if a state perceives themselves as a great 
power, they will want and act as such, regardless of their actual material 
capabilities.267 Viewing international law as socially constructed would certainly allow 
for any actors to be considered within the international system, yet the process is 
largely still state dominated with how they view their own power. Within International 
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law how they perceive power, may also give rise to when they wish to follow 
international law and when not.  
Other approaches to IR have focused on the leadership of individual state leaders. In 
Valerie Hudson’s Foreign Policy Analysis: Classic and Contemporary Theory268, the 
second chapter269 discusses the effect that an individual leader can have on IR. The 
argument is made that within the context of the post-cold war the identity of 
characteristics of leaders can give greater understanding of foreign policy, the so 
called “great man” approach.270  Within this great man approach nothing but the 
characteristics of the personality matter to foreign policy. Therefore, when 
considering Iraq or North Korea in the 90s, the leader’s personality was central to 
understanding the international relations of the state.271 The effect of this was that to 
consider a broad strategy of deterrence and negotiation effectively required an 
understanding of the leader’s world views.272 Within Hudson’s considerations she 
explores the effect that emotional states of the individual world leaders can have on 
international relations: 
 “Emotion is one of the most effective ways by which humans can change 
goal emphasis”.273 
Hudson illustrates this point by using psychological experiments in which individual’s 
decision making changes when they are in a heightened emotional state.274 If world 
leaders are in heightened emotional states far different results with foreign policy 
decisions are often obtained. Hudson notes reluctance among leaders to undertake 
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empirical psychological assessments due to the negative consequences seen within 
such action.275 In concluding the chapter, Hudson states that “leaders do matter, and 
that analysis of perception, cognition, and personality of world leaders is well worth 
undertaking.”276 This psychological analysis of interest, as, if it is applicable to world 
leaders the same can be said for those undertaking important roles in drafting 
international law or working with international organisations. For instance, when the 
UN secretariat drafts concluding observations for human rights treaty bodies, the 
mood of the secretariat official may influence the strength of the report and the depth 
of report in different areas of interest. In other areas the mood of delegates 
interacting with each other may have significant influence on the outcomes of 
documents. Should individuals not get along, on a personal level, this could be 
reflected in a document which fails to deliver as would have been expected. But if 
they get along well, and met socially, issues in new legal documents may be 
resolved far quicker giving a much more complete document. This area remains 
significantly underdeveloped within wider International Relations literature.  
International Relations provide, not just an interesting lens to consider the 
international system, but also a reflective lens to look at international law. This 
exploration has given rise to the ideas of an international system whereby the legal 
process is one embedded within a socially constructed system. This would marry 
liberalism to constructivism, to a certain extent, but it would propose an interesting 
lens to view international law. 
                                                          
275
 Valerie M. Hudson (2007) p53 
276
 Valerie M. Hudson (2007) p63 
76 | P a g e  
 
IX. Conclusion 
Within the literature concerned with international law it almost always talks about the 
individual as either why or why not they are subjects of international law, yet 
overlooks the individual in the role of contribution to the creation of international law. 
Instead, scholars seem closed off in a world in which states are abstract entities, and 
have the ability to decide law without individuals or almost any other actor having a 
consideration. The desire to keep the state-centric nature of international law has 
blinded the theoretical narrative to developments which accurately reflect the 
international system today. While the subject and object debate left the growing 
realities of international law behind, it has become clear that the theoretical narrative 
no longer fits the realities seen within the international legal system. Parallels can be 
drawn between this debate and that of cultural relativist and universalism in human 
rights law.277 What can be drawn out is a fluid debate that has developed from the 
start of the last century to the present day. Arising from the subject/ object debate is 
a steadily increasing body of thought which, overtime, comes out in favour of the 
individual having personality under international law, albeit only in limited 
circumstances. This development has evolved very slowly, with many scholars 
unwilling to let go of legal positivism which has been the major theory since the mid-
nineteenth century. By letting go of common held doctrine, theory and practice can 
once more start to move closer together. Legal process theory allows for this to 
happen, by viewing international law as a decision-making system which allows for 
different actors as participants. This allows for factors that create difficulties to 
positivists to be openly considered without issue to the underlining considerations, as 
such the theory actually reflects practice.  
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Two significant turning points can be identified within the literature; first Lauterpacht 
International Law and Human Rights278, in which the individual is accepted as a 
subject of international law due to the practice of international law, and the need for 
the theatrical narrative to catch up with the practical situation. This work was radical 
in its nature and brought a new perspective to the situation and Lauterpacht should 
be recognised for the role and impact that he had. In much the same way as the 
second turning point did in Higgins’s work Problems and Process: International Law 
and How We Use It,279 brought with it not only a radical new way of viewing 
international law, but also a radical new perspective on the objects or subjects 
debate arguing instead for the concept of participants within international law. This 
concept of participants in international law not only removes the minefield of the 
object or subject debate, and, therefore, the limitations of struggling to fit a positive 
or natural legal philosophy into those theoretical concepts, but allows the theoretical 
narrative to move into line with the realities of events happening on the ground.  
The traditional and majority body of thought currently is one which documents the 
trend of the individual as developing, or having, personality in international law. 
However, the traditional doctrine only addresses individuals as the end users of 
international law. However, scholars have given little thought to the role of the 
individual in drafting international law. Surely the question will arise whether the 
individual has personality as a participant in the process of international law. Surely 
individuals should have the right to take part in the drafting process; therefore, it 
should not just be state representatives undertaking any such drafting process. 
Using Higgins’s analysis, in which the individual would be an authorised decision 
maker in international law would give a stronger theoretical basis for an individual to 
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be present during drafting of international law, as individuals as participants could be 
present at any stage of events concerning international law much as they are entitled 
to with domestic law. This is a little intellectual leap but the analysis in the next four 
chapters will demonstrate its importance. 
The individual in international relations is, again, in the majority side lined to a 
spectator amongst the power of states. Certainly the dominant theories of realism, 
liberalism, and constructivism, only have a minor role for the individual to play. Some 
international relations works examining the psychological aspects of international 
relations focusing on the personality of individual leaders highlights the importance 
that individuals can have in the development of international relations. As such this 
idea can be transferred into international law that different personalities can create 
different aspects of international law. This would give a wider recognition to the role 
played by individuals, something as yet theoretically unacknowledged.  
By using influences and theories from other disciplines such as international 
relations a new picture and better understanding of what international law is, and 
what was intended by the drafters is gained. This will mean looking at pro-active 
individuals who have developed international law to analyse the effect that these 
individuals have had. In doing this it will mean a departure from the traditional 
theoretical narrative concerning the role of the individual within international law. 
This review of existing scholarship in the field of the individual within international law 
has identified a gap of the individual within a role as creator of international law. In 
order to fill this gap this work will introduce new representation of the individual as 
either, the authorised, independent authorised, and unauthorised individual.
79 | P a g e  
 
Chapter 2: - The Authorised Individual 
I. Introduction 
The ideological place of the individual within international law is a trapped and an 
uncomfortable one, stuck in a constant battle either as a subject or object of 
international law. George Manner states, “The highly controversial issue of the 
standing of the individual in international law is the theory that the individual is not a 
subject, but an object, of the law.”1 For Rosalyn Higgins states “We have all been 
held captive by a doctrine that stipulates that all international law is to be divided into 
‘subjects’ – that is, those elements bearing, without the need for municipal 
intervention, rights and responsibilities; and ‘objects’- that is, the rest.”2 This debate 
overshadows what individuals can actually achieve within international law, and 
especially during the formative stages of the international law process. The 
theoretical idea that international law is for states by states alone is not always 
reflected in reality. States are merely a legal construct to facilitate the convenience of 
international discourse. In practice, a state is a community which has leadership over 
an area of land, sea, and air, whether or not that leadership is chosen by democracy, 
or forced on the people in a dictatorship. Without the people a state is just a 
landmass. According to Article 1 of the Montevideo Convention on the Rights and 
Duties of States (1933) a state is defined as:  
“The state as a person of international law should possess the following 
qualifications: a) a permanent population; b) a defined territory; c) 
government; and d) capacity to enter into relations with the other states”3 
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A state is thus a label used to help define international relations. It does not have an 
independent identity except as a matter of legal doctrine, established as part of the 
state centric nature of international law as a simplification to aid development. In this 
respect, although a state can be a personification of the people that live within that 
state, it is the people, either as individuals or as groups, acting on behalf of the 
abstract entity of the state that ensures that the state may achieve its key attributes. 
This approach helps to increase our understanding of whom and how state 
representatives work and interact.  
This chapter, alongside the next two, assesses and sets out the role of three 
categories of individuals within international law, the authorised, independent-
authorised and unauthorised individual. The authorised individual may be defined as 
one who is formally nominated and appointed in accordance with national and 
international law as a government representative at international law making events. 
Such an individual may act on behalf of, and is often mandated by their government 
to perform certain roles and functions. They take strict instructions from the 
governments they represent and their limits are what the state expects them to 
include within an international law making process.   
Much of the material examples used in this chapter will take a historical perspective 
because of the time delay between the emergence of international rules and 
standards and the appreciation of the role played by particular individuals in the 
process leading to the development of the law. The role played by individuals tends 
to become evident as careers progress and, as they near their end, autobiographies 
are written, and documents have been de-classified. This has a knock on effect that 
many details concerning the roles of individuals in the drafting of recent international 
agreements, such as the Rome Statute creating the International Criminal Court 
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(ICC), or European Union expansion is only known sometime after the conclusion of 
the event. 
The chapter has a distinctive split, the first part considers the theoretical aspects of 
the authorised individual and how the concept has its roots in existing theory of 
diplomacy, representation, and legal sources. The second part considers the 
practice of the authorised individual, giving an examination of how authorised 
individuals are appointed. This examination of the practice of the authorised 
individuals will continue with a look at how they are controlled by governments, 
especially those authorised individuals involved in highly controlled discussion 
events. Finally, the chapter will move away from high profile individuals, and will 
consider the roles that the majority of authorised individuals take within this category 
of back room diplomats, legal advisors, or press officials. In using this approach it will 
demonstrate that the practical process of law creation means that this theory is 
always playing, to a certain extent, catch up. 
Section 1 – Theory of the Authorised Individual 
II. The Authorised Individual 
An authorised individual in its most simplistic form is an individual mandated, or 
authorised by law to perform a particular role on behalf of their home government or 
another authorised decision-maker actor within the international law making system. 
These individuals will have a particular role to perform within the international 
system. For example, they may make up part of a delegation to an international 
organisation, or be a diplomat taking part in bilateral discussions with another state, 
or most likely be a member of a delegation sent by a state to take part in the drafting 
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of a new international law document, or even an individual working for a non-state 
actor who has an influential role within talks.  
Throughout the history of international agreements and law making, individuals have 
always been selected to represent and take part in discussions on behalf of their 
state.4 The purpose of selecting individuals can be seen as a logical part of an 
international treaty making process, that heads of states cannot always be available 
for lengthy discussions on such details so it is logical to send a state representative 
who has the authority to take part in such discussions. The Treaty of Westphalia, so 
often seen as the foundation for modern international law,5 was negotiated and 
discussed not by the head of states, but by representatives and delegates consisting 
of lawyers and diplomats.6 Therefore, international treaties have always been 
conducted by appointed representatives with the power to make decisions for 
governments as has been seen in key treaties, The Treaty of Versailles (1919),7 the 
UN Charter,8 and the European Convention on Human Rights.9 This concept of 
sending representatives not only frees up time for the head of state or leader of 
government, but also ensures there is political distance between the international law 
making process and the state leader. Therefore, if it ends in failure or the treaty is a 
weak one it does not directly reflect upon the state leader.  
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The authorised, independent authorised, and unauthorised individual classifications 
may be seen on a spectrum, with some authorised individuals being far more 
regulated and directed than others. The authorised individual is not one particular 
type of individual where the classifications fit exactly, but is more likely to be found 
on a range of these classifications. If this individual is placed on a spectrum of ten to 
one, ten would be an individual very tightly controlled by that state government, with 
no freedom or flexibility in what they were doing and would have to follow 
government instructions to the letter. A five would score an authorised individual with 
moderate freedoms to negotiate as they wish, but they must still follow instructions 
and briefings of their home government closely. A one on the scale is an authorised 
individual who is almost within the independent authorised individual category, they 
have lots of freedom to achieve their government’s instructions, yet what stops them 
from becoming a full independent authorised individual is that the government still 
retains a higher level of control over them than the independent authorised category. 
An individual may move around on the spectrum starting as a very controlled 
individual, close to a nine or ten, but as negotiations process and the individual 
becomes more confident as an expert in the area, they may move down the 
spectrum towards being less controlled. This can certainly be seen with one of the 
examples to be considered in the section on Eleanor Roosevelt. 
III. Theory of Representation 
The theory of representation is a highly complex area. There is no simple definition 
to the concept, with notable scholars and their work on the subject ranging from 
Hanna Pitkin’s The Concept of Representation10, to Pennock and Chapman’s 
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Representation11 to Schwatz’s The Blue Guitar: Political Representation and 
Community12 to more modern scholars such as Ian Shipiro’s work Political 
Representation13. All of these scholars have one theme in common, that they do not 
agree to a definition of what exactly representation is, or how it should be used. 
Pitkin uses an accurate metaphor to explain why so many different political theorists 
treat representation differently. She states that it’s as if “the concept is a rather 
complicated, convoluted, three-dimensional structure in the middle of a dark 
enclosure. Political theorists give us, as it were, flash-bulb photographs of the 
structure akin from different angles, but each proceeds to treat his partial view as the 
complete structure.”14However, Pitkin’s work is often considered an important 
baseline and remains hugely influential within this subject matter.15Pitkin’s basic 
theory on representation is that to represent others is simply to “make present or 
manifest or to present again”16. In effect the ideal political representative’s role is to 
make the ideas, opinions, and voices of the citizens present in the public policy 
arena once more. With an important dividing line in a distinction between “standing 
for”17 and “acting for”18. Within Pitkin’s work she defines four different theories of 
representation; formalistic representation19, descriptive representation20 symbolic 
representation21, and substantive representation.22 Formalistic representation is split 
into two different elements, authorisation and accountability, and considers the 
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process and institutional arrangements. Authorisation representation refers primarily 
to how the representative obtained their position or office. This could be obtained 
through elections or through appointment on behalf of individuals. Within this form of 
representation there is no standard, to check how the representative performs, only 
how they obtained their position. The second part of accountability is how the 
constituents have the ability to punish their representative for failing to act with their 
wishes.23 For example, some states have the option to recall their elected politicians, 
while others have very little ability to impose sanctions upon individual 
representatives when they are in power.  
Descriptive representation is the idea that elected representatives in democracies 
should represent the descriptive characteristics of those within their constituencies 
such as geographical area of birth, ethnicity, or gender. The elected body, as a 
whole, should resemble the characteristics of the nation.24 Therefore, a highly 
controlled system of proportional representation which requires the legislature to 
match the composition of the population would be an example of this concept of 
representation. 
Symbolic representation is that in which the representative stands for those being 
represented. They may not be elected and may only assume the position. The 
degree to which they are accepted by the represented will determine how successful 
they have been.25 For example, the image of Che Guevara has come to symbolise 
Marxist revolution and left wing politics.  
Substantive representation according to Pitkin is the representation on behalf of a 
certain group, often in the area of advocacy and is in contrast to the background of 
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those undertaking the representation. For example, Senator Edward Kennedy often 
spoke up for the poor, even though he was personally from a wealthy and privileged 
background.26 
These four different categories provide the backbone for all further discussion on 
representation and have stood the test of time over the last fifty years. These 
theories all provide different theoretical lines for representation. However, Pitkin 
gives an interesting analysis of the modern representative in the final chapter of her 
work in arguing that within the modern political system the representative is required 
to act independently in using their discretion and judgement, while those being 
represented must also be capable of independent action and judgement. Not merely 
being taken care of by the representative. While these may seem contradictory in 
nature, the resulting conflict between the representative and represented must be 
managed in such a way that it must not normally occur.27 
Monica Brito Vieira and David Runicman provide a different consideration of the 
theory of representation. In taking a chronological view, they use this as a tool for 
explaining why there are so many different concepts on the term. Representation is 
understood to mean political representative, in the UK, that of being a MP’s, MEP’s, 
County Councillors, or even Parish Councillors. Prior to this modern meaning, 
representation was more commonly associated with pictorial representation, 
theatrical representation and juridical representation.28 The use of representation as 
we understand it today came into its own within Thomas Hobbes’ work Leviathan: 
“What Hobbes showed was that representation could provide the foundation 
for a stable form of politics because it was a concept that might transcend the 
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disputes that were tearing the English State apart. Representation, in 
Hobbes’s hands, turned out to be the idea that could hold the state – any 
state – together.”29 
From Hobbes’ work on representation, a line can be traced from him to other 
enlightenment era scholars and philosophers building and arguing beyond their initial 
starting point. This beginning was followed by Rousseau,30 Sieyes,31 Burke,32 James 
Mill,33 and John Stuart Mill.34 On examination of these philosophers Vieria and 
Runciman conclude that throughout the history of representation there is no single 
model of the concept that was subsequently developed or elaborated to produce 
more complex versions.35 They suggest the reverse that “Representation began life 
as a complicated, multifaceted idea that has been progressively pared down by 
political theorists searching for a clarified understanding of what it can do.”36 Perhaps 
this idea that political representation has been increasingly simplified by scholars 
means that the most simplistic analysis of the term is one that is being followed. As 
with any unclear term, there is a constant desire for scholars to change the term to 
suit whatever they are currently arguing for, therefore, the term representation is in 
constant flux.        
As the very term has been changing constantly, perhaps a better way of examining 
representation is through what representatives actually do. What defines modern 
politics is that of the role representative’s play in shaping the modern state. They act 
at all levels of government, forming the government, opposition, and act in the name 
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of the people. Without this level of representation, no matter what form that 
representation takes, it is unavoidable that political institutions on the scale and 
power of the modern state would be impossible without it.37 
The modern political system gives rise to two main concepts of representation 
mechanical and trustees. The mechanical representative acts as a passive extension 
of a communities’ principles, they are the mechanism by which that communities 
channel their ideas and thoughts. This process is not completely without input from 
the representative who will check the ideas against their own principles to ensure 
they are acting in a manner which they personally agree with. The issue is that this 
model is, as the name suggests, very mechanical.38  
The trusteeship model refers to a representative who speaks on behalf of those that 
they claim to represent. They do not claim to be acting under direct instructions from 
individuals whose interests they represent instead they are asked to do whatever 
they think best.39 The issue is that the represented parties are not able to object, 
which turns the model into simple paternalism.40  
Both of these models seem like extremes. Representation is needed for the modern 
state to function, and for individuals to feel as if they have a sense in how the state is 
being managed. Representation as a modern concept sits somewhere between this 
mechanical and trusteeship model, expecting representatives to consult with those 
being represented, but also use their own judgement at times. However, 
representatives are also used in states without democracy, and democracy should 
not be seen as essential or a direct link to representation. Even in western 
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democracies such as the UK, at local government level, individuals can be brought 
onto Parish Councils to represent others within the local community by co-option 
without an election in the event that electors do not petition for a bye election.41 In 
states without a western democratic style of government, officials can still represent 
individuals within the state although those being represented cannot choose who the 
representative is. This does not prevent the representative from undertaking a role 
on behalf of those individuals.  
As seen within domestic representation, representation does not necessarily need to 
have a direct link with democracy. Democracy can bring benefits to representation, 
but does not necessarily link the two concepts indefinitely. Vieira points out that 
some writers, including Przeworksi and Shapiro, have concluded that the term 
‘representation’ is too vague to help make sense of democratic politics.42 One type of 
representation is when individuals share a similar cause. They may never have 
spoken but as they have a common cause and are both seeking the same solution 
one can be considered the representative for all parties that have this common 
concern. 
Representation can be broken in this system when the representative and those 
being represented no longer share a common cause or agree with each other. Within 
this relationship the two individuals may never have any contact or one may never 
authorise the other to represent them but that does not prevent representation from 
occurring.43 Therefore, representatives do not necessarily require an elected link. 
The lack of a need for an electoral link between representative and represented can 
be seen within international representation. Where representatives are not directly 
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elected by individuals within a state, they still derive legitimacy from being appointed 
to position by the elected government. What is decided by these representatives has 
an impact on the individuals, and they make arguments to ensure that the issue 
being discussed has a benefit or limited impact upon the individuals within the state. 
The relationship between international representatives and the individual within the 
state is a secondary one at best. Therefore, international representation and 
democracy have a very limited connection. This distinguishes the domestic 
representation that has a relationship between the representative and democracy.  
No theory of representation is prefect; the concept is still as Pitkin observed that the 
view different scholars give us are just a flash-bulb photograph for a difficult three-
dimensional structure.44 The authorised individual, therefore, is a mixture of different 
theories, partly substantive representation and partly mechanical and trustee. The 
mix of these three different theories does not adequately cover the authorised 
individual, to fully understand the representative role they perform. The practice of 
identified individuals will give a more elaborate idea of how they function in terms of 
representation. 
III.1. NGOs and representation 
As the state centric nature of international law has decreased, as seen in the rise of 
non-state actors, the role of NGO representation has increased. This representation 
sees those working for NGOs and representing an interest or the interests of a 
collection of ideas. This reflects what Pitkin sets out within symbolic representation 
category.45 NGO representation on behalf of individuals is far more radical than 
international representation, and demonstrates how far and wide the concept has 
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developed and been stretched. Within an increasingly globalised society there is a 
need for representation, especially for those unable to represent themselves, such 
as refugees or an issue unable to represent itself such as global warming.  
“Leaders of nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) like the International Red 
Cross purportedly represent the interests of prisoners of war even when those 
individuals have had no say in the selection of their representatives.”46 
In effect, we have people claiming to represent the best interests of others, who have 
had no say in the choice of representative. This cuts any links to democracy, and 
couples with the likelihood that these representatives are unlikely to be in the same 
situation or circumstances with those that they claim to represent. They are 
representatives who have chosen to take it upon themselves to fight for others who 
are unable to do so themselves. This form of representation is completely new and 
different from anything that Hobbes,47 Rousseau48 or Mills49 proposed, but it appears 
to be a logical extension of the idea of representation. Wider NGOs such as global 
social movements, transnational advocacy networks, and global public policy 
networks should also be considered as increasing their role, all forming part of a new 
civil society, having the ability to represent an increasingly mobilised world public 
forum.50 
Technology is also allowing individuals to represent themselves on the global stage, 
using social media such as Twitter and Facebook. The impact and use of social 
media has had a significant impact on the Arab Spring.51 Activists could not only get 
their message out to the local and regional community but also the global 
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community, gaining widespread international support. These two social media sites 
allow individuals to express their views directly to global organisations, other 
individuals and states, in effect reversing over 3000 years of representation and 
going back to the original Greek idea of individuals talking for themselves to a public 
forum to persuade and discuss issues affecting them.  
NGO representation can at times be complex, with the NGO representing the views 
and interests of its members, but also representing itself. The interests that it may 
represent may be a small group or because it wishes to support; these may not be 
an active intelligence such as the environment or a group protecting an endangered 
species. While NGOs may have no direct actor to report to, the NGO is responsible 
to and accountable to its members, donors, and even governments who support 
NGOs with resources.52 
The general theory of representation has been developing over thousands of years, 
ever since civilisation realised that not everybody could be involved in making every 
decision to ensure that an effective system of control and governance was able to 
develop. Authorised individuals from non-government actors slot into the theory of 
representation quite easily when considered alongside other non-state actors who 
represent other interests. The general theory of representation will continue to 
develop with the current trend to simplify what is understood by representation, the 
term will change and continue to encompass more individuals working on behalf of 
others, who have either delegated power, or are unable to speak on their own behalf.  
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III.2. Constructivism and Representation of the State 
The individual needs to be distinguished from the state itself. One theory that will aid 
this is Constructivist theory. While Constructivism is a social theory, not a 
substantive international politics theory,53 it will provide a useful framework to justify 
the difference between the state as an entity and an individual who is acting as a 
representative of the state. Constructivism, not regarded as a political theory, 
consequently has attracted a broad area of research. This attraction is partly due to 
the previous dominating theories of neo-realism and neo-liberalism failing to predict 
the end of the Cold War. This has caused constructivism to become a dominant 
theory, the issue being that this broad appeal has meant that constructivism is 
increasingly in “danger of becoming all things to all scholars, finally suffering the fate 
of all fads.”54 This is certainly reflected when attempting to define constructivism; 
however, one broad area of theory is concerned with how the world interacts, 
especially “how normative structures construct the identities and interest of actors, 
and how actors are rule-following”.55 This interaction between norms, actors and 
process can provide useful insight to this body of work.  
Part of this interaction is that which relates to the use of agents by states. Within this 
doctrine, States deal with each other through agents whose status is determined by 
the state.56 I.e. they are representatives of the state, therefore, separate from the 
state but accountable to it. Due to the formalities of statehood this limits the number 
of state agents and, by extension, the agency that can be undertaken.57 The agency 
of the state certainly has dominance over non-state actors within the theoretical 
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narrative. The inter-relationship between state and agent is set out by Nicholas 
Greenwood Onuf: 
“State agents take the formalities of their relations exceedingly seriously. They 
are always careful to justify their conduct by claiming to act on behalf, and in 
the interest, of their states. By doing so, they make the preoccupations of their 
small world weighty and impersonal. They have access to resources not 
otherwise available in any world.”58  
The state agent certainly enjoys the privilege of working on behalf of the state but, 
importantly, the agent claims to be working on behalf of the state, and not the state 
itself – an important distinction. In being a sovereign state, the state actors have 
certain rights and privileges which are not enjoyed by other non-state actors or their 
agents cause states to have significant advantages59 over non-state actors, and, as 
such, a significant advantage to the power that their agents may exert. The state, the 
state agents, and the agents of non-state actors all have interlinking and different 
powers, and levels of legitimacy set by the norms of the international system. Part of 
the strength of the approach used by constructivists is that by understanding how 
actors develop interest has the effect to help explain a wide range of international 
political phenomenon. 60 This relationship between states and states agents also 
extends the relationship between agents and structure; notably, the international 
structure and normative frameworks in which these agents operate.61 Alexander 
Wendt, one of the fathers of constructivism, in the Social Theory of International 
Politics defines the relationship between the state and individuals as:  
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“concrete individuals play an essential role in state action, instantiating and 
carrying it forward in time, but state action is no more reducible to those 
individuals than their action is reducible to neurons in the brain.”62 
It is at this point where the argument within this work and constructivist theory 
separate. Because, while within constructivism the individual and the state are 
notably inter-linked, this work will maintain the argument that the individual is 
centrally important to the state. While being linked, the actions of the state and the 
individual can be separated, a minor but important distinction. Constructivist theory is 
certainly useful in distinguishing between the state, and state agents. But the theory 
overlooks the importance of the individual as the state agent.  
IV. Diplomatic Theory and the Authorised Individual 
Diplomacy is the representation and communication between global actors.63 This 
can be directly between heads of governments, indirectly through the intermediary of 
written correspondence or of an ambassador.64 The diplomat is the work horse of the 
authorised individual; they are the individuals who represent the state every day. “In 
the classical, Westphalia notion of diplomacy, who counted as a diplomatic actor was 
inseparable from the idea of what counted as a nation-state. Both rested on the 
notion of sovereignty...”65 Diplomats work all over the world in different roles; from 
ambassador for the UK posted in Washington DC to providing holiday makers with 
emergency travel documents in Poland, to undertaking administrative duties within 
the foreign office. The international system requires individuals to seek help from the 
state, yet the state is an abstract idea and, therefore, requires agents to act on its 
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behalf. Why and how we have created these agents to act on behalf of the abstract 
state is part of diplomatic history. The power to act on behalf of the state gives the 
authorised individual far more power than they possess as an individual.  
The reality of a diplomat is that they no longer are the high power deal makers that 
prevent all-out war between states. The professional diplomat is now focused on 
much more low level diplomacy, “issues of detail, such as building networks aimed at 
specific areas, trade and other economic agreements, public diplomacy, image 
building, contacts with influential non-officials, consular diplomacy, education, S&T 
[science and technology] and the like.”66 The majority of those working in the 
diplomatic services are directly employed by state actors and perform these low level 
roles. Their work may be vital to the overall interests of the state but although 
unglamorous they are still undertaking the instructions and acting upon them. For the 
majority of states, high level ambassadors and diplomats are appointed on a political 
basis, with those of the USA approved by Senate.67 For the majority of diplomats, 
entry into the service is through application, requiring high entry standards. Although, 
a diverse range of individuals are selected, on account of subjects studied, regional 
and personal background,68 as well as age which has increased in recent years.69 
Those taken on by the diplomatic services are elites in talented quality, chosen from 
the best of a large number of high graded applicants, with efficient human resource 
management being the hallmark of the best services.70 The training of a diplomatic 
service is key to the efficient running of the service. In the past an apprenticeship 
was seen as the best method of training diplomatic staff, however this is no longer 
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considered enough to meet the high skill levels required.71An increasing number of 
services, from a variety of states, now give training course and have specific training 
for particular activities and career levels.72 This in house training is supplemented by 
the offering of external programs of study, including MBA’s. This is all aimed at 
meeting the functional expertise required of the modern diplomat.73 A distance 
learning course for diplomats to enhance craft skills is also offered by specialist 
institutions such as DiploFoundation.74 
Until the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations in 1961, diplomatic law was 
derived from customary international law75 which traces its roots back to the advent 
of civilisation: 
“… [It] is often and correctly observed that the beginnings of diplomacy 
occurred when the first human societies decided that it was better to hear a 
message, than to eat the messenger.”76 
Alongside this new willingness to listen to the message, the messenger was also 
granted safety from danger while undertaking this role, firmly establishing the 
principle of diplomatic immunity within the concept of diplomacy from the 
beginning.77 This early form of diplomatic relations, while sharing core values with 
that of today, has been left far behind as a more sophisticated and complex system, 
often seen to originate from the Italian City states of the fifteenth century.78 This 
initial diplomacy was much the same as the caveman diplomacy without any 
formalised code of conduct as to what a diplomat was, their role, or even their legal 
position within states.  
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Keith Hamilton and Richard Langhorne’s classic text The Practice of Diplomacy; Its 
Evolution, Theory and Administration79 breaks down this ebb and flow of the 
international system, in relation to diplomatic theory, into five different phases since 
1815 as to how the role of diplomat has changed. These five phases are old 
diplomacy,80 new diplomacy,81 total diplomacy,82 diplomacy diffused83 and diplomacy 
transformed and transcended.84 In essence Hamilton and Langhorne stated that the 
role of the diplomat has changed greatly since the start of the eighteenth century. As 
the international system has changed, the role of the diplomat has evolved in 
reflection to these events. For instance the advent of the League of Nations was a 
turning point within diplomatic theory, and brought in the new diplomacy phases. Out 
went the classic diplomat of the nineteenth century and in came a new breed of 
diplomat engaged after the League of Nations,85 based within an international 
organisation which would dominate the next phase of total diplomacy. This overview 
of the development of the diplomat indicates the state centric nature of diplomacy, 
until the arrival of transnational corporations. These corporations had operating 
profits similar to many GDP’s whose state actors have an influence on diplomatic 
practice.86 The striking conclusion from Hamilton and Langhorne’s work is that the 
diplomats not only influences events, but are also affected by them. 
The traditional idea of the diplomat, one born of inter-state relations under the 
Westphalia system, is now a dated one. Diplomacy covers far more than the official 
exchange of ambassadors and embassies. Within modern diplomacy there are non-
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state actors, business leaders, and global and transnational firms, civil society 
organisations, international and regional organisations, and eminent people,87 all 
have the ability to play a role. Diplomacy is, as much, about economic, social, 
cultural, and military process88 as it is about foreign relations. The increase in new 
diplomatic actors, considered above, demonstrates diplomacy to be becoming much 
more of a process between actors as how they conduct relations. This is in contrast 
to the traditional positivist concept of ambassadors undertaking foreign policy 
exchanges with members of the hosting state government. 
IV.1.Multilateral institutions  
Perhaps the biggest switch for the traditional diplomat is the multilateral institutions, 
such as the European Union, United Nations, African Union, and World Trade 
Organisation. A sole diplomat has limited power. Multilateral diplomacy requires the 
building and managing of coalitions before, during and after negotiations.89 The 
complexity of coalition building allows for an informal consensus amongst 
stakeholders with how to manage an issue before presenting a decision for a 
resolution and vote within an institutional organisation.90 
Multilateral institutions do not just provide an arena for diplomats to engage in the 
process of diplomacy, but the institutions have the ability to become diplomatic 
actors in their own right. This emergence of these new institutional diplomatic actors 
is “as a result of the technologically driven processes through which more and more 
of the world’s resources, population and economic activity have become 
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interdependent”.91 The inter-relationship between the multilateral institutions who 
actively engage in diplomatic relations with non-state actors does not need any 
contact with a diplomat from a state. These circumstances, whereby diplomatic 
actors have discussions without the involvement of any states, sum up current 
diplomatic practice. 
Even amongst multilateral diplomacy there are great differences between 
organisations in terms of personnel and location, “At one extreme, the G7/G8 
operates with minimal institutional structure and a Secretariat that rotates amongst 
its members, whereas other bodies maybe highly institutionalised with permanent 
structures and professional staffs.”92 Also in terms of the role that a particular 
institution is providing, knowledge based institutions, such as the Organisation for 
Economic Cooperation and Development and the International Chamber of 
Commerce, are focused on knowledge-generating and sharing and information 
services.93 
The consideration of who a diplomat is has developed, along with the process of 
diplomacy that has also evolved, alongside the multilateral organisation creating new 
actors who inter-act with each other without necessarily interacting directly with a 
state. Within this evolution, the core function of diplomacy remains as representation 
and communication.94 Diplomacy should be considered as the process of 
relationship management on behalf of the state, towards all actors. Diplomacy has 
become more complex, as seen in the growth of actors, and yet Pigman argues that 
some generalisations can still be made about the process: 
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“Although diplomacy, by encompassing more types of actors, becomes more 
complex, some generalizations about outcomes are still possible. 
Governments and firms increasingly may share particular interests, such as 
facilitating a particular investment or acquisition, or building a factory that will 
create a significant number of highly paid jobs. Hence, in a broad sense, 
state-firm diplomacy in individual instances are not necessarily becoming 
more predictable.” 95 
There has been conflict between governments and business for example the EU’s 
antitrust charges against Microsoft.96 
IV.2. Economic Diplomacy  
Economic diplomacy is a significant part of the process of modern diplomacy. 
Former ambassador Kishan S. Rana has suggested that “Economic diplomacy 
began to emerge as a major component of external relations, in some ways 
overshadowing political diplomacy; export promotion and foreign direct investment 
(FDI) mobilization became the priority activities of the diplomatic system.”97 While the 
state actor diplomat can use influence to gain trade deals, economic diplomacy from 
non-state actors also has a role. For example, when Microsoft CEO Bill Gates 
announced a $400 million investment in India by Microsoft he was treated in the 
same manner as a head of state, meeting the Prime Minister, A.B. Vajpayee, and a 
range of India’s political and business leaders.98 This visit from Gates and 
investment from Microsoft can be seen to have a link to the request of world and 
Indian technology firms to put pressure on the Indian government regarding the 
disputed Kashmir region which had threatened stability only months before. 99 The 
Gates visit can be seen as economic diplomacy at work. 
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IV.3. Cultural Diplomacy  
Cultural diplomacy’s main focus is not so much on the individual diplomat but how 
the abstract state represents itself. The culture of the state is used as a tool to 
promote the identity of the state and as a means of overcoming alienation from 
others, and this may include sporting events or cultural exchanges.100 This can also 
extend to global firms with brand building extending into new markets with little brand 
awareness.101 The use of cultural diplomacy can be seen in what has become known 
as panda diplomacy, the use of giving or loaning giant pandas to states has become 
a notable feature of Chinese diplomacy. While the system has developed since its 
inception by Chairman Moa, it is now characterised by panda loans to nations 
supplying China with valuable resources and technology.102 “In the case of 
Edinburgh, Scotland, the panda loan deal was overseen by China’s deputy premier 
while negotiating contracts valued at £2.6 billion for supply to China of Salmon meat, 
Land Rover cars, and petrochemical and renewable energy technology.”103 The 
cultural role in diplomacy is just as important to the overall process to that of political 
relationship building.  
The process of diplomacy does not prevent any actor from being considered as an 
actor within the field, much along Higgins participants within wider international law, 
the reality of diplomacy is that if an actor is involved they are recognised. Therefore, 
even a private individual, who had a role within sensitive or difficult diplomatic 
negotiations between estranged states, should be recognised.104 For example, Bono, 
alongside former US Treasury secretary Paul O’Neill, undertook what became 
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known as the “Odd-Couple Tour of Africa”. During which Bono attempted to raise the 
knowledge of various issues facing Africa.105 
Technology has been the major catalyst for change, much communication and 
negotiation can be undertaken without leaving the office, via video-conference, 
phone, and email. The relevant principal individuals can be involved within all areas 
of negotiation, using these methods, making agreements far less time consuming.106 
The second impact of technological change is that of pre-negotiation talks, i.e. 
agenda setting can be undertaken far more efficiently. How diplomats work has 
changed drastically due to instant technology instructions between government and 
diplomats. Diplomatic input may come from a range of departments, not just the 
foreign office.107 With technology being used for behind the scenes pre-talks and 
negotiation the growth of the diplomatic summit meetings between heads of 
government have become increasingly important. Summit meetings are seen as the 
substantive end of negotiation when the tough decisions and final agreements can 
be made.108 
The rise of technology has another side effect, especially with inter-state relations, 
that when a face-to-face meeting is undertaken it has greater emphasis than before. 
For example, following the recent trouble in the Crimean region of Ukraine, the UK 
Foreign Secretary, William Hague, summoned the Ambassador of the Russian 
Federation, Alexander Vladimirovich Yakovenko, for talks at the Foreign Office.109 
This summoning of the Ambassador demonstrated the great importance given to the 
issue that could not be expressed via electronic communication. These throw backs 
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to the old days of diplomacy still remain but have taken a renewed significance when 
the situation arises. The disadvantage of technology is that diplomacy loses that 
personal touch to relationships, or the tiny switch in perception towards an idea or 
position that is not perceivable over electronic communications.  
The rise of technology allows for easier communication between actors. The effect 
on diplomacy and the need for diplomatic actors to check with governments during 
negotiation has limited the role of freedom and independent judgement required. For 
example, when the USA undertook the Louisiana Purchase the representatives of 
the USA, James Monroe and Robert Livingstone, felt no need to contact the US 
government. When, instead of buying just New Orleans and its adjacent territory they 
were offered the whole of the Louisiana territory for only 5 million dollars more than 
the original 10 million they had been authorised to spend.110 
V. Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations 
The traditional notion of diplomacy is between states and is covered by the Vienna 
Convention on Diplomatic Relations,111 which entered into force in 1964, is the 
codification of diplomatic practices of states held in customary international law. The 
convention has been described as the “bedrock of interstate diplomacy”.112 The 
process for codification had started in the nineteenth century; becoming urgent as a 
result of complaints made by the Yugoslav government about the activities of the 
Soviet embassy in Belgrade.113The Convention provides for privileges and 
immunities under local criminal and civil law to allow for diplomats to undertake their 
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work without interference or influences from the host state. For example, article 34114 
exempts members of diplomatic teams from local taxation, article 26115 concerns 
freedom of movement, and article 31.1 covers immunity from jurisdiction.116 The 
shortcoming with the convention is that it only deals with traditional bilateral 
diplomacy and, therefore, excludes relations with international organisations and 
special missions.117 This is covered by a lesser known treaty, the Vienna Convention 
on the Representation of States in their Relations with International Organizations of 
a Universal Character.118 Combined with modern diplomacy which also involves non-
state actors, in the 21st century the convention seemed less relevant than during the 
height of the cold war.  
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One of the most significant immunities within the Convention is article 22, the 
inviolability of mission premises.119 This protection is vital to the on-going diplomatic 
process knowing that diplomats have a safe area to conduct work without the 
interference of the host state or other actors. The influence of this article has been 
disseminated to the wider public as seen within the fictional world of Ian Fleming’s 
James Bond, during the film version of Casino Royale120 when Bond charges into an 
Embassy and kills a known terrorist, “M” is disgusted by her agent’s behaviour 
saying: 
“M: You stormed into an embassy. 
 You violated the only absolutely inviolate rule...of international relationships. 
 And why?”121 
Therefore the symbolic status of the convention cannot be underestimated, yet in 
reality the Convention provided the additional clarification for both states and 
diplomats that was missing from customary law. 
One significant unforeseen aspect of diplomatic powers, which demonstrates the 
effect that these individuals can have, is the abuse of these powers, especially 
diplomatic immunities from criminal charges.122Often there is an area of uncertainty 
as to when diplomatic immunity should be allowed and when it is clearly outside the 
working areas of a diplomat. However, the convention gives the diplomatic 
delegation immunity from all acts, criminal or civil, whether inside their working remit 
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or not.123 The range of offences that diplomats and their dependants have committed 
in the UK since 2003 range from shoplifting, drink-driving, to being accused of 
robbery, human trafficking, and sexual assault.124 All attempts by the police in asking 
the sending governments to waive immunity were declined, although in some cases 
the home government of the individual withdraw them from working within the UK.125 
Within the UK the most controversial use of diplomatic immunity for an individual 
appears to be in avoiding the congestion charge in central London and in parking 
tickets. Since 2003126 the USA, Russia, and Japan have all run up debts of £4m with 
Germany owing over £3m.127 This aspect of misuse of the convention underlines the 
unfortunate side effect that individuals can play, by committing an illegal act within a 
state and claiming immunity. This can cause international repercussions for that 
inter-state relationship, while the individual remains relatively unscathed by the act 
which they have committed. This means that the individual can have an unplanned 
and opportunistic effect on relations within the international system. 
VI. Legal Framework of the Authorised Individual 
The authorised individual operates within the international legal framework, primarily 
within the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties 1969, Rule 27 of the rules of 
procedure of the General Assembly of the United Nations,128 and Article 38 of the 
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International Court of Justice.129 Within this framework, established to govern 
international law creation in different forums, the authorised individual can be found.  
“[T]treaties have always been an indispensable tool of diplomacy”,130 the Vienna 
Convention on the Law of Treaties131 codified customary process of treaty creation. 
While the convention should be read as a whole, Article 7 defines someone with “Full 
Powers” as “A person is considered as representing a state for the purpose of 
adopting or authenticating the text of a treaty”.132 A similar article can also be seen at 
the UN by Rule 27133 of the rules of procedure of the General Assembly of the United 
Nations. These two instruments set down that in order to be authorised to discuss 
and sign international treaties the individual must submit credentials from his or her 
government. Without these credentials individuals are not permitted to sign or 
negotiate treaties. Under this system of full powers there are circumstances when 
state practice is slightly more flexible than would be expected, for example: 
“United Kingdom practice distinguishes between “general full powers” and 
“special full powers”. “General Full Powers” which are at present held by the 
Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs (notwithstanding 
paragraph 2 of Article 7), Ministers of State and Parliamentary Under-
secretaries in the Foreign and Commonwealth office, and by the United 
Kingdom Permanent Representatives to the United Nations, to the European 
Communities and to the GATT, entitle the holder to negotiate and sign any 
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treaty. “Special full Powers” are directed to a particular named individual 
authorising him to negotiate and sign a specified treaty. On occasion, 
telegraphic authority to sign a treaty may be given by a Foreign Ministry to 
one of its ambassadors or permanent representatives, but it must be followed 
by the presentation of the formal full power.”134 
As the Vienna Convention provides a contextualised account of who can legally 
negotiate and sign treaties, it retains an element of customary international law as to 
how states interpret and practise these requirements. This allows states to give 
different levels of full powers to aid different officials in their particular area of 
expertise. The convention practice allows for flexibility to accommodate future 
developments,135 and provides that, if states wish, they can depart from the rules of 
conventions keeping power in the hands of states.136 
Article 38 of the International Court of Justice is regarded by scholars, such as 
H.W.A. Thirlway,137 to define the “traditional sources”138 of international law. These 
sources are the only valid rules that the International Court of Justice will recognise 
as legitimate methods by which international law can be created and, therefore, 
applied by the court. These being international treaty, 139 customary international 
law,140 the general principles of civilized nations,141 and the decisions reached by the 
Court itself.142 Thirlway argues that not only can the only sources of international law 
be seen within Article 38, but all international law must come from these sources. 
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Any new source would not be valid unless it was able to prove a genealogical link to 
one of the sources mentioned within Article 38.143 However, Higgins takes a different 
line of argument, stemming from her notion of international law is a process in her 
review: 
“International law has to be identified by reference to what the actors (most 
often states), often without benefit of pronouncement by the International 
Court of Justice, believe normative in their relations with each other.”144 
Therefore, Article 38 and the ICJ set down what some scholars and practisers 
believe valid international law to be. However, what is far more important is what the 
actors consider to be international law. This is just purely a reflection on the 
workability and practicality of international law. For example, the Norms on the 
Responsibilities of Transnational Corporations and other Business Enterprises with 
Regard to Human Rights145 have been rejected by states and non-state actors alike 
as they would have been unworkable.146 Even Thirlway hints towards the power of 
states in the acceptance of international law when setting out: 
“The notorious incompleteness of customary law is of less importance in a 
world in which ultimately solutions to differences are likely to be imposed by 
the stronger party than in one in which it will be the task of a judge or 
arbitrator to apply legal principles so far as he can ascertain them.”147 
This recognition is important in that it sets out the realities of international law and 
that politics does play a major part, not just within the creation, but also the 
enforcement of law. 
Article 38 provides the legitimacy for the work of the authorised individuals when 
creating treaties to be formally recognised by the international community; however, 
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this should not be considered as the final say of which international law is valid. The 
will and power of states is as important as the Statute of the International Court of 
Justice, therefore, the role of the authorised individual in the creation of new 
international law is important and the choice of the representative can be critical in 
the success or failure of a particular, new international law. 
The legal basis of the evident, authorised individual is a legal positivist one based 
around the needs of the state. This is a reflection that while other actors, especially 
non-state actors, can influence the law the international legal system requires 
international law to be confirmed by states. Legal process theory would dictate that 
any participants recognised by the authorised decision makers are able to undertake 
international law creation.148 Certainly the present international law creation system 
allows for participants to have an influence, but the final act and recognition of the 
law requires state consent. 
Section 2: Practice & Process of the Authorised Individual 
In the second section of this chapter the practice and characteristics of the 
authorised individual will be explored in depth. There will be an assessment of how 
the authorised individual within the process of international law creation actually 
functions and the different structures that the authorised individual is required to 
work under. The authorised individual is, in essence, a representative and so in 
examining the practice of how they work this section will explore the idea of the 
authorised individual as an agent of the abstract notion of the state. Eleanor 
Roosevelt has been chosen as the epitome of the authorised individual, having been 
active at the United Nations during the drafting of the Universal Declaration on 
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Human Rights149 and at the beginning of the drafting of the two UN Covenants on 
Human Rights.150Other authorised individuals provide a comparison to Roosevelt, 
including members of the UK and French delegations to the drafting of the European 
Convention on Human Rights. From the UK, the Earl of Kilmuir, David Patrick 
Maxwell-Fyfe, and Pierre-Henri Teitgen151 of France, both acted on behalf of their 
respective governments.152 Finally, as an example of highly controlled authorised 
individuals of arms limitation talks, Gerard Smith is an authorised individual under 
strong government control.  
VII. Nomination and Appointment 
The authorised individuals considered in this chapter are representatives of the 
state. This should not mean that individuals who work for non-state actors cannot be 
considered as authorised individuals. Any authorised decision makers that are 
participants within the international system should be considered as authorised 
individuals. The diplomat provides an excellent example of the authorised individual, 
but one should remember that the authorised individual can be a representative from 
a wider group of organisations, such as the international civil servant within the 
European Union, the negotiators for the Taliban within Pakistan, and employees of 
big TNC’s such as Coca-Cola. In order to become an authorised individual, one must 
be selected and appointed by the state or actor to perform that particular role.  
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Eleanor Roosevelt was selected by President Truman to be part of the US 
delegation to the UN. In order to take up this position, her nomination had to be 
approved by the Senate, which was achieved with only a few votes against. Her 
nomination can be considered in a number of different ways. Firstly, as a measure to 
keep the Roosevelt name associated with the United Nations, after Franklin 
Roosevelt had put so much effort into setting up the initial meetings, and plans for 
this new international organisation,153 both within his four freedoms and at 
international conferences at Dumbarton Oaks154 and San Francisco155. Having the 
Roosevelt name associated with the US delegation linked it with those initial plans 
and provided a sense of continuity. Along with this rationale was her genuine ability 
as a liberal thinker; having been associated with civil rights issues most of her adult 
life.156 For instance, during a radio broadcast with her daughter Anna in November 
1948 she spoke of her support for the Civil Rights Bill of 1948157 and in her 
newspaper column “My Day” in October 1945 she spoke out against racial 
discrimination.158 In American society during the 40s these views would have been 
especially liberal and as such her inclusion to the UN would bring a different mind-
set to the US delegation. She was able to bring a new way of working and thinking to 
a new international organisation. Finally, it may have been the need for Truman to 
stay associated with the Roosevelt name for his re-election campaign. This 
association gave him the ability to call on Roosevelt for support and demonstrate 
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that the Roosevelt legacy continued with Eleanor working within the United Nations 
as part of the US team.159 
The British approach to appointing Maxwell-Fyfe to the British team working on the 
ECHR was similar to that of Roosevelt, if not a bit less formal and far more within a 
British style of governance. Maxwell-Fyfe was approached by Churchill in the House 
of Commons smoking-room to ask him to join his committee on United European 
Movement, of which Churchill was chair. Maxwell-Fyfe agreed.160 This committee 
formed the backbone of the government appointed delegation that was announced 
and selected by Prime Minister Eden to the European Movement that went on to 
prepare a draft of the ECHR.161 Alongside Teitgen, Maxwell-Fyfe is widely credited 
as being one of the key drafters of the convention.162 
Authorised individuals may also be selected by a single member of government, 
without ratification. For instance a lawyer or civil servant may be asked to join part of 
a delegation to the UN, but as they are not expected to take a leading role their 
positions will be authorised by the foreign secretary alone. As discussed earlier, 
diplomatic appointments below the highest level are made on an application basis, 
yet authorised individuals within terrorist non-state actors may also be on an 
appointment assigned by the group leader. Other authorised individuals, especially 
participants such as members of international organisations, are again undertaken 
on an application bases.  
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VIII. Control Over the Authorised Individual 
A key element of being an authorised individual is that they follow instructions of 
government and state policy as a matter of course; therefore, they can be appointed 
and deselected at a whim. If government policy is not followed they cannot be 
considered as a representative with a mandate from the state or actor. This does not 
mean they are not given any freedom to do as they wish, but they are instructed to 
ensure that certain limits are kept and certain ideas or concepts included or excluded 
from discussions. This role may be easily performed if the authorised individual is in 
a high position of power at the international discussion such as chairman and, 
therefore, controlling the agenda. This was an advantage that Eleanor Roosevelt 
enjoyed as chair of the Human Rights drafting sub-committee and also Maxwell-Fyfe 
who was chair of the Legal and Administrative Committee, to which the question of 
human rights was referred in Europe.163 
Authorised individuals are under sufficient levels of control from their home 
governments to follow the instructions they have received. They act, not in their own 
personal best interest, or the perceived best interest, but in the best interest of the 
government and state they represent. An incident highlighting the level of control that 
the US government had over its authorised individuals, especially Eleanor 
Roosevelt, occurred during the negotiations for the Covenants of Human Rights. In a 
New York Times article, Michael L. Hoffman sets states:  
“It was learned that there had been changes in the instructions to the United 
States delegation on the matter of seeking an immediate convention. Mrs. 
Roosevelt has opposed trying to draft a convention at this session, arguing 
that it was enough to draft a declaration of rights. Now, however, it is 
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understood, the United States’ position is that the efforts to complete both 
should be supported.”164 
Roosevelt had felt and argued for one position on the covenants but the US 
government instructed her to undertake an action that she disagreed with.165 This, of 
course, is the negative side of being an authorised individual. The individual must 
undertake all actions that the actor, to whom they report, asks them to undertake, 
even if it is against their own judgment. This is an example of Roosevelt moving 
closer to being highly controlled. At this stage of her career as an authorised 
individual, while being unhappy with the decision from the government she followed 
the instructions. This system of accountability, with the authorised individual having 
to follow the government’s instructions on a particular issue shows the 
consequences of the role. It is a key part of being an authorised individual and, 
therefore, a fundamental point of difference between them and the independent 
authorised individual.  
While Eleanor Roosevelt may have started out as a highly controlled authorised 
individual ranging between a nine to seven on the controlled scale,166 as she 
developed in confidence and style, especially in her role as chair of the human rights 
commission and the sub drafting committee she gradually became more 
independent, moving lower down the controlled scale. Examples of her move down 
the scale are seen at numerous points during her time as a delegate. She was able 
to influence US policy into accepting the inclusion of social and economic rights in 
the draft UDHR, which she felt should be included in any such document. This was 
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against the official US position which was to seek a document which only had civil 
and political rights.167 
Roosevelt’s desire to move the draft UDHR through the drafting phase to be adopted 
by the General Assembly displayed what her independence could do. This personal 
desire to move things forward as quickly as possible is recorded in John 
Humphrey’s168 diaries when he was called to Roosevelt’s hotel suite to discuss the 
best way to move the draft through the third committee169.170 Another example of her 
move down the scale is seen with her work towards the Human Rights Covenants, in 
which she was determined to oppose any document that could not pass muster in 
the US Senate.171 This desire to ensure that any future document could pass through 
the senate was not US policy, but a personal goal to ensure that the USA would 
actually ratify the document.  
Eleanor Roosevelt’s growing independence away from the control of the State 
Department is further demonstrated with her personal disagreement with the 
government over the Palestine question which arose in 1948. In disagreeing with the 
US government’s stance on the issue she was prepared to speak publicly against 
the government, and as a consequence she placed her role as an American 
representative on the line. Truman would not accept her resignation as he felt she 
was too valuable to the human rights program to lose at such an important 
moment.172 She retained her position within the USA’s UN delegation despite the 
major disagreement over US policy which demonstrates her growing independence 
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away from detailed instructions. This independence allowed her the ability to 
disagree, and with it moved her down the scale towards the independent authorised 
category. Eleanor Roosevelt’s movement down the scale happened as she gained 
more confidence in her role, both within the delegation and within the UN. This 
demonstration of flexibility within the authorised individual role indicates that not all 
authorised individuals are under the same levels of control, with the same individual 
being under different levels of control at different points in time.  
The authorised individual has an inherent risk and tension, as with many government 
positions, between when they represent themselves as private individuals, their 
home government’s position, or the organisation in which they also play a significant 
role. This tension can cause issues on many different levels, primarily being in the 
authorised individual’s public position. When do they represent their government’s 
position on an issue, or their own personal viewpoint? This may also depend on the 
position of the individual on the spectrum. A tightly controlled individual may give a 
speech written by the government, while a less controlled individual may give a 
speech representing their own views on a particular matter. This issue can be further 
complicated by the invitation and event at which the individual is speaking. An 
invitation may request an authorised individual as the ambassador of a state, or the 
Chairperson of a UN body, or even as a private internationally recognised individual. 
Part of the skills of the authorised individual is in knowing which hat to wear when, 
and at what time. In Eleanor Roosevelt’s role as an authorised individual she, at 
times, appears to have been unable to know when to act within her capacity as an 
authorised individual and when as an individual representing herself or as the chair 
of the Human Rights Commission or as chair of the sub-committee drafting the 
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UDHR.173 In a speech at the Sorbonne, Paris, entitled "The Struggle for Human 
Rights",174 Eleanor Roosevelt strongly attacks the Soviet Union, on a number of 
occasions: 
"The USSR Representatives assert that they already have achieved many 
things which we, in what they call the "bourgeois democracies" cannot 
achieve because their government controls the accomplishment of these 
things. Our government seems powerless to them because, in the last 
analysis, it is controlled by the people."175  
"I think the best example one can give of this basic difference of the use of 
terms is "the right to work". The Soviet Union insists that this is a basic right 
which it alone can guarantee because it alone provides full employment by 
the government. But the right to work in the Soviet Union means the 
assignment of workers to do whatever task is given to them by the 
government without an opportunity for the people to participate in the decision 
that the government should do this. A society in which everyone works is not 
necessarily a free society and may indeed be a slave society; on the other 
hand, a society in which there is widespread economic insecurity can turn 
freedom into a barren and vapid right for millions of people."176 
"The world at large is aware of the tragic consequences for human beings 
ruled by totalitarian systems. If we examine Hitler's rise to power, we see how 
the chains are forged which keep the individual a slave and we can see many 
similarities in the way things are accomplished in other countries."177 
The question of what role Eleanor Roosevelt held, as authorised individual or private 
person, when asked to give her address to the Sorbonne is quite difficult to answer. 
The root of the speech can be found in August 1948 at a meeting to discuss the 
future of US human rights policy with President Truman and Secretary Marshall in 
Washington. At this time, tensions between the emerging superpowers were growing 
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with the on-going Berlin Blockade. At this meeting, Marshall urged Roosevelt to give 
a “major address in Paris” that would set out the US position.178 With this pressure 
from above, she contacted Rene Cassin asking if he was still anxious for her to 
speak in Paris about Human Rights, Cassin was still keen and set up the address at 
the Sorbonne.179 Roosevelt appears to have invited herself to give this speech, 
without it ever being made clear in what capacity she would be speaking. James 
MacGregor Burns and Susan Dunn argue that it was Cassin who sent the invitation 
and Truman and Marshall who urged her to accept.180 This would change the view 
on this event that Cassin would naturally invite her in the capacity as Chair of the 
Human Rights Commission, being the role he would see her perform every day. This 
speech certainly underlines the difficulties of an authorised individual being invited to 
speak at a public lecture and in what capacity they would speak in.  
These attacks on the Soviet Union were a new approach and out of character for 
Roosevelt as a review of the meeting records and of previous published works, such 
as in her newspaper column, show that she had not attacked the Soviet Union in 
such terms before.181 Mary Ann Glendon notes this speech for its 
“uncharacteristically harsh remarks”182 towards the Soviet Union. Even fellow 
authorised individuals from the USA to the UN had been critical of Soviet internal 
policy towards its citizens. John Peter Humphrey wrote in his personal diary that 
evening: 
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"The crowd had come to hear the Chairman of the Human Rights Commission 
and the widow of a very great man. It heard a speech that had obviously been 
written by the state department and ninety per cent of which was devoted to 
an attack against the USSR. I do not blame the Americans for talking back; 
but I do regret that they are using Mrs R. as their spokesman in these 
polemics."183 
Humphrey believed that Roosevelt was not speaking as the Chairperson of the 
Human Rights Commission or as a private individual, but instead gave a political 
speech for the US government, and, therefore, failed to act as a private individual 
when given the opportunity. However, this can also be interpreted as Humphrey 
failing to understand in which role Roosevelt had been invited to give the speech, 
which is unclear.  
These are the type of circumstances where the lines between being an authorised 
individual, representative of an international body and a private individual are hard to 
define. It was never made clear as to what role Roosevelt was asked to give her 
speech, mainly because she invited herself184 and, therefore, the State Department 
may have felt that as an authorised individual they should use this time to hit back at 
the Soviets as relations broke down. Furthermore, by acting as a controlled 
authorised individual and representing the official line of the government she 
overlooked her growing independence away from the detailed briefings and 
instructions of the US state department and moved down the spectrum towards the 
one to three range, which had been a feature of her time during the UDHR drafting. 
In giving this speech, which had been drafted in the State Department and pre-
approved by Secretary Marshall,185 Eleanor Roosevelt moved back up the 
authorised individual range towards the higher ends of spectrum. The obvious 
danger of this swing back towards being a tightly controlled authorised individual is 
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that it can undermine an individual’s creditability, or position within an international 
organisation. Humphrey certainly felt that the speech had undermined Roosevelt’s 
position. Henri Laugier agreed that her position had been “compromised” and she no 
longer stood as a symbol “above this quarrel”.186 
Did being an authorised individual prevent her from thinking she was able to give a 
speech independently of her role as an authorised individual, without seeking 
clarification from the state department? With anti-Soviet feelings building in America 
and the continual break down of east-west relations, it is likely that the US 
government used Roosevelt, exploiting her position as an authorised individual, by 
bringing her more closely under state department control and reducing her 
independence in order to provide an ideal platform to attack the Soviet Union. 
Therefore, the boundaries as to when an authorised individual speaks as a 
government representative and when they speak as an independent individual can 
easily become blurred, especially when pressures from home governments are 
placed on the authorised individual. This can affect both the authorised individual 
and their government. The danger of the authorised individual towards the individual 
themselves is that the control held by the actor places their reputation in jeopardy.  
IX. Mechanism for Control of the Authorised Individual 
Seeing the effect that controlling actors have over representatives, how control is 
exerted will now be considered. The authorised individual is controlled using a 
system of briefings and instructions. For example, Roosevelt was also briefed and 
given instructions from the US State Department. Glendon argues that Eleanor was 
nervous about her new role within the UN, having written in her “My Day” column "I 
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am told we will be "briefed" (whatever this may mean) during the trip".187 This 
indicates that she was unsure as to her own independence that she would have as a 
delegate and a little unsure as to what her role would be within the delegation party. 
There is an important difference between briefings and instructions, which at this 
point should be clarified.  
When an authorised individual is briefed by their home government they are being 
given the government’s general position on a particular issue of the day, and the 
stance that they would like the individual to express within any meeting. Briefing 
gives the delegate some room to manoeuvre which can be very useful with the 
negotiations. This is likely to happen to an authorised individual who has a degree of 
freedom within their role. Glendon notes that on a day-to-day basis Eleanor 
Roosevelt relied on her state department advisers to keep her well supplied with 
briefings.188 While Burns and Dunn note that she sometimes felt that she was 
walking on egg shells during her first few daily briefings being given the government 
positions of the issue of the day.189 Therefore, briefings are far more general in 
nature and provide the authorised individual some room for interpretation when 
taking them into the day’s discussions. When an authorised individual is instructed to 
do something they must take the position or make the argument which their 
government has asked. This means that they are not given any space to adjust the 
position during the course of negotiations.  
Instructions or briefings to delegates may not always be positions to take on certain 
elements of document text within an agreement, but may also be how a delegate 
should act within a given situation. For example, when the head of the US delegation 
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to the UN in London gave Eleanor Roosevelt instructions that she needed to vote 
quicker during the committee meetings when votes were called to ensure that as a 
leading state, other state delegates were aware of the USA’s position.190 Roosevelt 
followed these instructions, often formulating which way she would vote before the 
vote was called.191 
Roosevelt’s briefings started almost as soon as she embarked on her first UN 
delegation meeting, while on the voyage to England with the delegation she was 
presented with briefing documents and meetings:        
“The first thing I noticed in my stateroom was a pile of blue sheets of paper on 
the table. These blue sheets turned out to be documents, most of them 
marked “secret,” that apparently related to the work of delegates. I had no 
idea where they had come from but assumed they were meant for me so I 
looked through them. The language was complicated but they obviously 
contained background information on the work to be taken up by the General 
Assembly as well as statements of our government’s position on various 
problems.”192 
As well as paper briefings sent by the State Department, in which the US position on 
certain issues was made clear, there were also regular briefing sessions from the 
State Department.193 In their briefings the head of delegation and experts on the 
day’s issues would guide delegates and would actively discuss the US position in the 
various UN committees. 
“Thereafter we had regular briefing sessions in which State Department 
experts – or perhaps Edward R. Stettinius, who later succeeded Mr Byrnes as 
head of the delegation – discussed each morning the important items on the 
day’s program. These meetings were often held in a large room where around 
nine o’clock in the morning all the US delegates and their advisers would 
gather, perhaps forty or fifty persons in all. Normally the head of the 
delegation would preside and outline the high points of the work to be done 
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while the rest of us followed his remarks by reference to the printed or 
mimeographed documents that had been prepared for by the experts before 
the meeting. Then, when certain complicated problems were to be discussed 
in detail a State Department official with special knowledge of the subject 
would take over. If any points were not clear, the five delegates or their 
alternates would ask questions.”194 
These meetings were clearly an important aspect of the US delegations briefing 
procedure as they quickly become part of Roosevelt’s routine throughout her time at 
the UN; meaning that no matter which UN facility or meeting she was attending there 
was always a connection to the US government’s latest position on any particular 
issue. This level of connection is vital to the authorised individual as it allows for 
policy to be updated and for changes in strategy to be considered by the 
administration and, therefore, relayed to the authorised individual. 
A further system of control used to keep authorised individuals in constant contact 
with the wider delegation is for them to be accompanied by technical, legal, and 
other delegation members to meetings. The influence of these assistants was 
certainly felt by Roosevelt, in a meeting of the Human Rights Commission it was 
noted that:  
“These assistants [members of the USA delegation] sometimes overstepped 
their duties, Humphrey observed, in advising her how to conduct meetings. 
Once he was tempted to leave the chamber, embarrassed by her treatment of 
Dr. Pavlov. “I did not want the commission to think that the chairman was 
getting her advice from me” he wrote.”195 
This demonstration of influence of other delegate members and level of control 
expands the understanding of the authorised individual that their actions and words 
are always being monitored by other delegation members and that they can be 
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overly influenced by the advice that they are receiving from these members, be it 
good or in this case poor.   
Information passed from actor to authorised individuals is not just a one way flow, 
with the authorised individual passing information back to the actor in order to help 
them make better informed decisions. This relationship between the authorised 
individual and the actor is vital, as without a good flow of information regarding 
events that the authorised individual has attended it makes it difficult for the actor to 
give clear, updated instructions to the authorised individual as how to best respond 
to situations that have developed within the on-going discussions. Eleanor Roosevelt 
had an advantage when compared to other delegates as she was able to feed 
information back at the highest level, “Her access to President Truman, however, 
gave her more influence over her country’s policy than most other delegates could 
ever hope to enjoy.”196 For example, this happened with the inclusion of economic 
and social rights within the UDHR.197 
Without this, the limits and goals of the authorised individual would remain static; 
thus discussions would become very difficult with other states as no authorised 
individual would be in a position to compromise and start to form a broad 
international agreement based on consensus. Eleanor Roosevelt provides an insight 
into what happens when an authorised individual disagreed with their government:   
“Of course, a delegate cannot express his disagreement publicly unless he 
resigns since obviously it would be impossible to have representatives of the 
same nation saying different things in the United Nations. But he may 
exercise his right to disagree during the private briefings. Before the start of a 
session we were told what subjects would be on the agenda. If you disagreed 
with the government’s attitude you had the right to say so and to try to get the 
official attitude changed or modified. You could, if necessary, appeal to the 
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President to intervene and you could, if there was no solution, resign in 
protest.”198 
Neither an authorised individual nor a government really wants a delegate to resign, 
as it looks bad both nationally and internationally, especially if the true reasons for 
the resignation are made public. The cost and difficulty in finding a replacement can 
be tough, especially when someone of similar experience may not be available or 
reluctant to take over. Therefore, both the authorised individual and government are 
likely to work hard to find a solution before the authorised individual resigns. The 
authorised individual is also unlikely to want to resign due to their position at the 
heart of their states international relations, even if they strongly disagree with the 
government’s position on any particular policy aspect.  
This system of accountability and relationship between governing actor and 
authorised individual means that the individual is not directly accountable for what 
they have been instructed to undertake. The independent authorised individual bears 
responsibility for the action undertaken. Therefore, the relationship between the 
authorised individual and their governing actor requires both to take on board 
information from one another, with the authorised individual always required to 
undertake the actions of the actor even if they are not entirely supportive of the 
policy. The relationship between governing actor and representing authorised 
individual is as much a process as the actual international law creation. 
X. Highly Controlled Authorised Individual 
Highly Controlled authorised individuals may be needed when important matters of 
state are at stake. Often, issues of national security, questions that are of important 
self-interest or political ideology may require highly controlled individuals to provide a 
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function on behalf of the government. Nowhere in the world of international relations 
and treaty negotiations can a more controlled authorised individual, ranking as a nine 
or ten on the scale, be more visible than during talks regarding international arms 
control amongst states.  
This section will examine the highly controlled authorised individuals of the ABMT,199 
SALT200, SALT II201 and START202 treaty negotiations between the USA and the 
USSR throughout the latter part of the twentieth century. These treaty negotiations 
have been selected because of the availability of material and individuals now willing 
to talk regarding their experiences during the negotiation process. For reasons of 
national security, modern arms limitations talks are not usually disclosed, and due to 
the end of the cold war no longer occur as often, nor in as a high profile manner as 
during the discussions being evaluated here.  
This paper will use examples from both the American and Soviet delegations from 
the SALT negotiating teams. The focus will be on the head of the American SALT 
delegation, and the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA) Gerard C. 
Smith, and from the Soviet side the role of Deputy Foreign Minister Vladimir 
Semenov. Due to the nature of the talks and the large amount of individuals within 
both delegation teams included advisors, interpreters, administrators and guards. 
The American team to the first round of SALT discussions consisted of close to 100 
people, while the Soviet delegation was roughly the same size and composition as 
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its American counterpart.203 The size of delegation is an indication that the highly 
controlled authorised individuals extend into the back room staff.  
In having an increased understanding of the higher end of the scale of the levels of 
control that governments can have over their authorised individuals it is important in 
understanding the level of influence that both governments and individuals can have 
in the highly sensitive process of international law creation. Control of authorised 
individuals can be broken down into different elements, each showing the control of 
the individual at each stage of negotiations. When authorised individuals are placed 
under a high level of control by their home governments the lines of communication 
are even more vital than in normal circumstances. As governments, often 
government leaders are making the decisions they need to be kept very well 
informed of what is going on during the actual talks. This required close discussions 
between the team on the ground and their government leaders. During the SALT I 
discussions, information was wired to Washington from secure, tap-proof conference 
rooms under Marine Guard. These communications would be information on the 
formal and informal talks between the two delegations.204 Informal talks were 
recorded and in being harder to verify, such documents were written up in the form 
of Memoranda of Conversation, during the two and half years of SALT some five 
hundred were written.205 The Soviet approach was very similar to the American 
approach, if not more detailed with in-depth reports written up on the progress of the 
talks, and actual transcripts of bilateral meetings being sent back to Moscow for 
analysis, the results being fed into reviewing the delegate’s instructions.206 
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Having a tight control on an authorised individual is not just on what they are saying 
but also how they are acted towards the other states delegation. Within the SALT II 
negotiations the Americans imposed a strict mandate on their authorised individuals 
saying that they must always be accompanied by a fellow delegate member to 
ensure that they did not exceed the instructions they had been given. This rule was 
also important in ensuring that reports were accurate and that information passed 
back was correct.207 
The Soviet delegation was also given strict instructions on how to behave during 
these talks. One of their key strategies was the way that the authorised individuals 
were asked to perform within the opening rounds of SALT to give away as little 
information about the force structure, numbers, or quality of Soviet arms.208 This 
concern resulted from the insecurity that the Americans would use the additional 
information about Soviet military capability to seek some form of advantage.209 Being 
asked to undertake this action is difficult when you are trying to discuss an arms 
limitation treaty, as the information is vital to progress. Therefore, the authorised 
individual has to tread a careful path to ensure that they stick to what their 
government is asking them to do and appearing to move the discussions forward. If 
they failed in this later task the talks could easily collapse under the assumption that 
one side is unwilling to take a full and active part in discussions. The Soviet example 
here should be considered within the context of the early SALT rounds where trust 
and bridges had to be built between the delegations, and also the highly controlling 
governments on both side.  
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One of the most difficult elements of being so highly controlled is in having to follow 
instructions even when it’s against the judgement of those actually on the ground. 
Gerard Smith notes this point when the White House issued instructions to him 
concerning the proposed arrangement for ABM and submarine-launched ballistic 
missile (SLBMs). These instructions proposed the Americans would accept the two-
and-two arrangement210 on ABMs if the Soviets agreed to put SLBMs into the 
agreement. The delegation was given no fall-back position from which they would be 
able to form an agreement if the proposal failed. Should this take place Smith and 
his team were instructed to return to Washington to make new recommendations.211 
Even though he disagreed with these instructions on a personal level, feeling that a 
prepared fall-back would be of benefit he was forced to follow the instructions due to 
the nature of his position and the stage at which this occurred during the concluding 
round of the SALT I talks.  
The final element of being a highly controlled authorised individual is in the ability to 
receive updated instructions from the state and acting upon it, even in the event that 
they are not the personal view of the delegate, or that they work against the position 
that a delegate has previously been asked to take, undermining their own 
creditability. On particularly divisive issues faced by the respective sides, updating 
was most likely to happen between sessions of talks, allowing both sides to consider 
where concession could be made. However, back channels can sometimes be used 
in order to make progress and then update those on the front channel discussions. 
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This occurred on the ICBM issue when a back channel working group made up of 
Andrey Gromyko, Henry Kissinger and Paul Nitze met several times to find solutions. 
Once agreement was reached at this level both sides sent updated instructions to 
their delegations who updated the draft text of the SALT agreement.212 This 
approach of updating can mean undermining the position of those in the room, and 
make them look poorly informed about an issue, especially if parallel back channel 
negotiations are taking place. These updated instructions to delegates can mean 
that the talks move forward in a constructive way, therefore, back channel 
negotiations should not necessarily be considered as negative if they can have an 
overall positive result. 
Updated instructions may not be what a delegation wants to hear or receive. For 
instance, when seeking updating instructions the delegations are told to hold the 
current position, thereby preventing progression. During the opening round of SALT 
the Soviet delegation were instructed to maintain a position on the issue that the 
Americans would agree to account for delivery vehicles on the basis of data supplied 
by soviet states. The Soviet delegation held out on this point for a considerable time 
making it a non-negotiable point until they heard a different update from central 
government.213 This meant that the delegates on the ground had to suffer some 
difficult moments without any progress being made on the issue. Therefore, updates 
to authorised individuals may not always be a good sign for those on the ground and 
cause difficulties in trying to reach agreement. The highly controlled, authorised 
individual is a mechanical form of representation. 
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XI. Mechanism for Control of Highly Controlled Authorised Individuals 
Having considered the mechanism of control for the standard authorised individual, 
the mechanism for the highly controlled authorised individual is slightly different and 
worthy of examination. Both the USA and USSR mechanisms for controlling their 
delegations and decision making process will be considered here. Even though each 
represents a different ideological approach, they are surprisingly similar as to how 
they functioned.  
Initially the Soviet Union lacked a mechanism for the rapid implementation of issues 
raised by the SALT talks. All the documents to support talks were prepared by the 
Ministries of Defence and Foreign Affairs, at the request of the Politburo which 
requested that proposals be ready by set deadlines.214 This gave rise to an 
ineffective process “all initiatives came from the top down, rather than from the 
bottom up.”215 This mechanism was ineffective as different departments needed to 
have input into the discussions especially when detailed reports from the delegates 
arrived from Helsinki. These reports were sent to Central Committee, the Council of 
Ministers, the Foreign and Defence Ministries, and the Committee for State Security, 
and the KGB.  
It became clear that a coordinated approach needed to be taken with so many 
agencies needing to have input into instructions. The Politburo proposed a 
recommendation in November 1969 to form a Commission of the Central Committee 
of the Politburo for the Supervision of the Negotiations on Strategic Arms 
Limitations.216 This commission had representatives from the five departments the 
Central Committee of the CPSU; the Ministry of Foreign Affairs the Ministry of 
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Defence: the KGB; and the Military Industrial Commission (the VPK). This 
commission soon became known as the Big Five and took the important decisions 
regarding arms limitation and gave instructions directly to the highly controlled 
authorised individual.217 This commission fitted into the centralised structures of 
Soviet government organs and, therefore, a direct and efficient mechanism of control 
was established within the Soviet State for the purpose of arms limitation talks.  
The structure of control of the Soviet authorised individual was a three part structure 
of Politburo-Big Five- Soviet Delegation to SALT. The only significant development 
that the Soviet mechanism underwent was the introduction of the little five, or five. 
This was a working group of the Big Five and included representatives from the 
departments of the Big Five. This group was very much in a supporting role of the 
Big Five allowing for more in depth discussions without taking up department leaders 
time with basic questions of policy coordination.218 The effectiveness and 
mechanism of the Soviet methods may be surprising in that the instructions did not 
come from the very top, but instead from committees and discussions. The 
mechanism is nicely summed up when Aleksandr’ G. Savel’yev and Nikolay N. 
Detinov state: 
“That mechanism drew upon the advice and expertise of all the agencies 
involved. The recommendations it produced were almost never questioned by 
the national leaders, including the General Secretary of the Communist 
Party.”219 
In contrast the American system was far more centralised from the President and his 
special advisers. The American mechanism, like the Soviet system had a committee 
that brought different departments together to formulate policy called the Verification 
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Panel. This panel consisted of Chair Henry Kissinger, Elliot Richardson, the then 
Under Secretary of State; David Packard, the Deputy Secretary of Defence; the 
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, Admiral Thomas Moorer; CIA Director Richard Helms; 
Gerard Smith; and John Mitchell then Attorney General.220 The verification panel 
took many but not all the decisions, with some of the most difficult ones passed to 
the National Security Council (NSC) a pre-established body in American security 
policy. However, many of these decisions would already have been made by the 
President and Henry Kissinger before a NSC meeting. An unidentified source quoted 
in John Newhouse identifies the process as:  
“Kissinger presents the NSC with a review of the Verification Panel 
discussions, after which Nixon raises a few questions, offers some comments, 
and conveys a mood. Then everyone goes away, and a decision is 
announced in the form of an NSDM. The decision is rarely announced in the 
meeting itself.”221 
Through this mechanism of control the really important decisions were not being 
made by experts such as in the Soviet system, but by the political figure of the 
President and his adviser, Kissinger. This process extended to the negotiating 
options given to the delegates. They were given four options with two more following 
later as to what would be acceptable to the White House and what the Soviet’s had 
to agree to at each stage.222 The expert committees did not have a direct link to the 
authorised individual, a clear weakness, and allowed for political rather than expert 
input. Therefore, while they were given options they were not given freedom to pick 
and choose between options in order to get the best overall agreement. The 
American mechanism was a far more centralised system than that of the Soviets, 
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with decisions being made by the President and select advisers rather than experts 
in the areas affected by the SALT treaties.  
XII. Challenges of highly controlled authorised individual 
When authorised individuals are controlled as tightly as seen with these authorised 
individuals it can create issues and problems, from both the authorised individual 
perspective and that of the government. One particular issue, especially for this type 
of authorised individual, is that of deadlock within talks. With both sides being heavily 
controlled, those at the negotiating table are not in a position to give ground and find 
agreement. This happened during SALT when the American position of four-to-one 
on ABM sites223 was rejected out of hand by Semenov. The US delegation was not 
given instructions to change position, and were left with the only option of just having 
to repeat the offer that had already been rejected.224 The effect is that the authorised 
individuals were forced into an embarrassing time wasting situation. Due to their lack 
of freedom to move the talks forward it appears unprofessional and the discussions 
can quickly lose momentum225 which can be vital in treaty creation.  
Further issues with controlling authorised individuals so closely is that human nature 
means that they will act in unauthorised ways thinking they are doing so for the good 
of the delegation. This can mean breaking protocol put in place to protect the 
secrecy of the talks and prevent significant leaks, or keep control of individuals 
centralised so they are not receiving instructions from elsewhere. An example of 
breaking communication protocols occurred when Paul Nitze wired the Pentagon to 
report that Smith had been negotiating face-to-face with Semenov without 
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authorisation or instructions.226 This was not true and in doing this Nitze had broken 
the delegation rules regarding individual and separate communications to 
Washington. This was not the first instance of Nitze breaking the rules, but with the 
American delegation operating a three strikes rule; he could no longer afford to break 
any further rules.227 
A further frustration for this type of authorised individual is that it may appear that 
they spend just as long negotiating with their own government over concessions as 
with their opposite number across the table. This was an issue that Gerard Smith 
struggled with. While willing to follow instructions and not to embarrass Washington 
he found it hard to fight with the bureaucracy for a position of importance that 
needed to be changed. His anger was also aimed at the decision making at the top 
in Nixon and Kissinger who he found extremely difficult to deal with, as they made 
decisions without consulting experts and were very distrustful of nearly all the civil 
servants within Washington.228 
Smith, the insider to the talks, agrees with John Newhouse’s229 assessment that 
Kissinger “functioned as a kind of prime minister rather than a senior adviser.”230 
This Kissinger-Nixon controlling partnership also irritated Smith when the back 
channel negotiations between Kissinger and Dobrynin started producing draft 
documents and inputs into the SALT talks. In one instance when a new proposal was 
handed to Smith prior to a NSC meeting he noticed that the language and tone of the 
introductory clause had been changed without prior knowledge, therefore, 
undermining the original document produced during talks. On questioning this 
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change by Kissinger, Nixon expressed anger towards the representative, expressing 
the questions of language were unimportant to them.231 This level of control clearly 
caused issues for the American delegation they had operated within such a tight 
framework that it caused conflict when there was disagreement in view taken by the 
Kissinger-Nixon partnership.   
Even when authorised individuals are highly controlled they can sometimes still slide 
down the scale towards the six to eight range in showing and demonstrating a 
certain amount of independence. Within the SALT II meetings, Paul Nitze’s, 
independent nature got him in trouble by sending unauthorised communications to 
Washington during SALT I. He undertook a walk in the woods with the Soviet 
representative, Kvitsinsky, where he was acting on his own initiative and without the 
knowledge of the Reagan Administration. He reported that he had opened a new 
channel and acted in this way and was asked to keep the line of communication with 
Kvitsinsky open until a future change in discussions closed it off.232 A highly 
controlled individual, who was acting more independently than their controllers would 
have liked, was responsible for a positive action, therefore, showing that even highly 
controlled individuals acting independently can assist treaty talks.  
At other times both delegations broke away from being so highly controlled moving 
down the scale. This was during the informal probing and exchanges between sides 
at long luncheons and dinners preceding meetings. These dinners proved invaluable 
in terms of getting information from the opposition that would not normally come to 
the surface during formal talks.233 This type of authorised individual is useful in the 
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formal settings of discussions when states want or need to maintain a high level of 
control. However, it’s important to allow those on the ground a certain level of 
flexibility and independence as this will allow delegations to exchange information 
which would otherwise be held back or not shared as relevant during the more 
formal exchanges. 
The final area that needs to be considered in line with the highly controlled 
authorised individual is that of the effect that using back channels and by-passing 
authorised individuals can have. The role of Kissinger during the SALT talks has 
been hinted at,234 but now the effect of his work will be fully discussed. Even within 
authorised back channels individuals must act within a framework set down from the 
top of government. Therefore, these individuals are fairly controlled, yet have more 
flexibility than highly controlled authorised individuals. 
Kissinger’s back channel during the SALT talks was with the Soviet Ambassador 
Anatoliy F. Dobrynin and was opened after Kissinger had gone to Moscow to discuss 
other business with Soviet officials. Dobrynin had no official role with SALT but 
discussions with Kissinger were given a special role in relation to the on-going 
negotiations. Even in this back channel Dobrynin always acted with the instructions 
that he received from the big five control committee, never giving away more than he 
was allowed to.235 Kissinger, of course, was not under such controls as he was part 
of the partnership with Nixon that was controlling the American side of discussions 
and, therefore, he had far more flexibility than any other negotiator who acted within 
the SALT talks. The danger of the back channels is that they can undermine the 
efforts and work being undertaken by the authorised individuals on the front channel. 
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Gerard Smith, in his memoires, writes about the issues he had with Kissinger’s work. 
Smith argues that Kissinger, instead of creating a great breakthrough in May 1971 
using negotiations undertaken on the back channel, had insisted “pushing on an 
open door” as the Soviets had placed a similar agreement which Kissinger 
introduced in December 1970, but Nixon and Kissinger had turned it down.236 Smith 
goes on to argue that the back channel not only cost time but was actually to the 
detriment of US interests due to Kissinger not being an expert in arms control. For 
instance, Kissinger told Dobrynin that Submarine Launched Ballistic Missiles 
(SLBMs) would not be included in any offensive arms agreement. This was against 
US government agencies who opposed this idea and which were eventually 
reversed in 1972 at the price of inclusion with Soviet forces gaining a numeric 
advantage in the number of SLBMs permitted.237 Smith sets out that while this did 
not cause any strategic difficulties for US forces, it did cost the US in a political 
sense that the strategic balance being largely psychological would come back to 
cause issues with the later SALT talks.238 While back channels may cause issues for 
the front channel authorised individuals they can also have a psychological impact 
that the authorised individual is no longer as valuable to the process as prior to the 
existence of the back channel. 
The highly controlled authorised individual, ranking from nine to ten on the scale, has 
both its benefits and draw backs for governments. It allows for close control by 
government leadership while also given detachment from the talks in case they 
collapse, consequently saving the government leader from political embarrassment. 
However, the drawback of the tight control is that it requires an effective control 
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system with the ability to give updates to those delegates actually taking part. Taking 
away delegates’ freedom can have negative effects on the authorised individual who 
may not be using all their abilities due to the levels of control, leaving opportunities 
unexplored and missed. Despite the obvious drawbacks, as long as governments 
require extensive control over treaty talks, there will be a place for such controlled 
authorised individuals.  
XIII. Low Profile Authorised Individuals 
So far, in exploring the different elements of the authorised individual there has been 
focus on the characteristics and policy of leading figures within important delegations 
as authorised individual. Focus will now switch to exploring authorised individuals 
who are members of delegations, but do not have the high public profile of those 
discussed above. By understanding who these individuals are, it will help build an 
understanding regarding their role. Authorised individuals form part of state 
delegations and, therefore, they come from backgrounds of civil servants, lawyers, 
diplomats, politicians, and even from specialist fields under discussion. State 
delegations tend to be increasingly made up of all these individuals. The first USA 
delegation to the UN that Eleanor Roosevelt was part of consisted of 120 advisers, 
secretaries, and technical experts.239 During the 2009 Copenhagen climate talks, the 
UK sent a 38 member team240 to the conference. Sadly, no breakdown of the 
individual’s professions is available, yet it can be inferred from a press release by the 
British government241 prior to the conference that seven of these individuals were 
high-level politicians, a further five were press officers, with the remaining 26 
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individuals coming from three other professions. The press release also indicates 
towards the hierarchy and different roles performed by the authorised individuals 
who made up the delegation by the statement in the press release outlining that:  
“All comments by UK Ministers (Ed Miliband, Joan Ruddock, and Prime 
Minister) will be on-the-record, unless explicitly stated otherwise.  
All comments by other members of the delegation, including negotiators and 
advisors will be off-the-record; they should not be quoted or attributed.”242 
This indication underlines the different elements and strengths of various types of 
authorised individual that make up a delegation team sent to develop international 
law, in this case the aim being a binding environmental agreement. The composition 
of the delegation is created to give them a strategic advantage within the discussions 
by having enough authorised individuals of sufficient ability to be able to wield a 
political advantage. 
These low profile authorised individuals make up the vast majority of individuals at 
international discussions. This is simply due to the amount of state delegations 
usually taking part in international negotiations. At the Copenhagen climate 
conference in 2009, there were between 3,500243  and 10,500244 government officials 
representing different states. Australia took a delegation of 114 individuals to 
Copenhagen but were heavily criticised in their national press.245 Bryony 
Worthington a senior labour peer identified the advantages of taking large 
delegations to international conferences and drafting negotiations: 
“Negotiators for small countries will be at an automatic disadvantage with 
fewer people to cover all the negotiating sessions. It's a recognised strategy to 
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win people round by wearing the opposition down through exhaustion. Large 
delegations can operate like a wrestling tag team. But small delegations just 
have to stick it out to the early hours when all the important decisions are 
likely to be made.”246 
The larger delegations have the ability to outmanoeuvre those from smaller states. 
The side effect of the need to bring ever larger delegations is that states will continue 
to grow their delegation side in order to seek an advantage, and maximise any 
advantages at the negotiating table. This is understandable as negotiations can 
cause states to have to make fundamental changes to comply with international law. 
A typical move by smaller states is, therefore, to put time limits on discussions 
stopping the larger states from utilising an advantage with the amount of authorised 
individuals that they bring to negotiations.  
The United Nations General Assembly attempts to put limits on the number of 
authorised individuals that a state can bring. Under Rule 25 of The Rules of 
Procedure of the General Assembly of the United Nations a state delegation shall 
consist of no more than five representatives and five alternate representatives. 
However, this rule also allows for as many technical and expert advisers, and 
persons of similar status as may be required by the delegation.247 So, while limiting 
the number of representatives, states are free to bring as many expert advisers as 
they want, thus allowing the more powerful states to bring larger delegations to gain 
an advantage. This exploitation of bigger states to bring more authorised individuals 
is sadly a continued imbalance of the international system, and international law 
making. When treaty making can affect states in numerous ways, it will be inevitable 
that states will seek every available route to secure an advantage. Closing off one 
route will just push states to find an alternative method to exploit their position. With 
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technology making communications ever easier the actual size of a delegation at 
talks is no longer a limitation, as individuals can have input to authorised individuals 
from anywhere on the globe. 
XIV. Conclusion 
An authorised individual within International law is, in its most simple form, a person 
who is authorised or mandated by an actor to perform a role in forming international 
legal agreements with other authorised individuals from one or more other actors. 
They usually state the shape that international law should take. These individuals are 
mandated, and usually briefed and prepared by their home governments as to the 
best outcome that, a particular government wishes the form of discussions, and 
eventually international law, to take. These authorised individuals usually take part in 
this type of discussion at international organisations such as the United Nations. 
They can also undertake discussions with other authorised individuals on a state-to-
state basis, whereby no international organisation hosts the discussions, usually in 
the formation of bilateral treaties.  
Authorised individuals usually have strict mandates to which they are expected to 
conform, and certain lines that they must not cross in discussions with other 
authorised individuals. However, this does not mean that they are unable to make 
certain concessions when they are in discussions with other authorised individuals, 
but it means that these concessions would have already been pre-decided by the 
authorised individual’s home government in advance, or the authorised individual 
would be informed to make concessions during a briefing during the discussion 
process.  
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Authorised individuals make up the vast majority of those, taking part in discussions 
by states as to the development of international law through treaty agreements. This 
is simply through the number of governments and representatives that are needed 
for an international agreement by consensus to be reached by the international 
community, therefore, representatives from states are sent to undertake these 
discussions as to the shape of the agreement. The importance of the authorised 
individual with full powers is summed up by Aust when he states: 
“Admittedly, it [Article 7] is not the most thrilling aspect of the law of treaties, 
but failure to follow the complex, but clear, rules on full powers can lead to 
much needless extra work, vexation and, indeed, even embarrassment.”248 
This statement can equally apply to many other aspects of the authorised individual, 
if the state gets it wrong with selection, control, or they pick an ineffective individual. 
The work done may reflect negatively on the controlling actor of the authorised 
individual. Consequently, the traditional concept that international law is state centric 
is maintained as these authorised individuals are, generally, representatives of the 
traditional actor, the state. 
The authorised individual has a strict mandate from their home government with 
specific aims and goals that they are attempting to achieve. Any changes in the 
position of the authorised individual have to be given authorisation from that 
government; therefore, a close relationship must exist between the individual and the 
government, leaving little room for disagreement between the two. The authorised 
individual is not strictly defined by a single position, but should be seen on a sliding 
scale. At the far end are tightly controlled individuals, such as those seen in the 
SALT negotiations, where governments require tight control over the individuals, as 
the result of the talks can have such an impact on domestic policy. On the other end 
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of the scale is a loosely controlled authorised individual such as Eleanor Roosevelt 
at times, whereby the government control gave much more freedom in what 
instructions had to be followed. Overall control for actions and outcomes still remains 
with the government or controlling actor, and their desired conclusions.   
The roots and philosophical background of the authorised individual can be seen 
within the development of diplomatic theory constantly evolving to reflect the 
international system, alongside the theory of representation and the legal basis for 
international actors. The diplomatic theory provides the background to how the 
system of authorised individuals has been constructed. Diplomatic theory is the basis 
for which the authorised individual has grown out of the development of the modern 
system of diplomacy in which international relations are conducted. Coupled with the 
theory of representation in which the authorised individual is a mixture of the 
substantive and mechanism theories of representation. These theories provide a 
theoretical framework which gives the authorised individual legitimacy for the work 
they undertake on behalf of the state and also gives some explanation to how they 
work in relation to instructions given by governments, whether it be a mechanical or 
trustee relationship.  
The legal framework of the authorised individual comes from Article 7 of the Vienna 
Convention on the Law of Treaties. This article gives the authorised individual the 
ability to act in the name of the state for the creation of new international treaties. 
Article 38 of the Statue of the ICJ gives legal strength to the work that they undertake 
in the creation of treaties, however, still primarily important for any international law 
document is the backing of states. If states do not like, or disagree with part of 
international law they will not support it and, therefore, no matter what a court or any 
other international body does they will not conform to the measure.  
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The appointment of authorised individual is a process that, while similar, is unique to 
each state, such as Eleanor Roosevelt’s appointment had to be ratified by the 
Senate, whereas Maxwell-Fyfe was appointed by the Prime Minister. However, the 
common process that gives them the authority to act is that they are appointed by 
the state to act on the states’ behalf. The selection of low profile individuals, which 
make up the bulk of a delegation, is far less significant with them usually being 
requested to perform the role as part of their job within the civil service or 
government employment.  
Control over authorised individuals varies and depends on where any given 
individual is placed on the sliding scale, whether highly or loosely controlled. The 
more highly controlled the individual, the more control that the government has over 
their actions during discussions. The very highly controlled authorised individuals, as 
seen in the SALT talks, had several briefings a day and could always contact high 
level government officials by phone to seek advice and query ideas. The less 
controlled the authorised individual, the fewer contact events and briefings that they 
would have with government officials. Authorised individuals may move up and down 
the scale depending on what stage of discussions they are involved in. The 
authorised individual may also move into a completely different category, therefore, 
they might be given so much freedom from their government that after a period of 
time they move on to become an independent authorised individual.  
With international law creation, even in its most traditional conception, the law 
making process only uses states as a process of convenience; instead the individual 
in the guise of the state is the most important element of the international law 
creation process. In accepting this, it opens up the possibility of the individual with 
law creation. Within the next chapter the authorised individual will be taken a step 
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further with consideration of the independent authorised individual. The independent 
authorised individual is an individual appointed for by a state or government but has 
far greater independence than anything explored within this chapter on the 
authorised individual. Independent authorised individuals include Charles Malik, 
Rene Cassin and John Ruggie. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Chapter 3:- The Independent Authorised Individual 
I. Introduction 
The authorised individual chapter sets out the theoretical concept for individuals 
under control from their state or another authorised decision making actor. Even the 
freest, authorised individual is still controlled and takes instructions from their 
controlling actor in some manner. This leaves a theoretical gap between the 
authorised individual and the unauthorised individual, for those individuals more 
loosely controlled than the authorised individual category allows for, but not so far as 
the unauthorised individuals. This gap is filled by the independent authorised 
individual. These individuals tend to base their mandate to act on an authorised 
decision maker’s authority but are given broad aims to accomplish within 
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international law creation. Often, these individuals may perform their roles as 
independent experts, or be representatives given a free hand to negotiate outcomes. 
Within this category are individuals such as international judges1 or members of 
supervisory oversight bodies such as treaty body experts2, special procedure 
mandate holders3 and some representatives to international talks4. 
The first section will consider both individuals and organisations where this type of 
individual can be found undertaking a law creation role. These individuals vary 
between those given only a little amount of independence from their home state to 
those given vast amounts of freedom where the home state of the individual has no 
influence over the outcomes of their work. Charles Malik will be used as an example 
of an individual at the top of the scale and closest to being an authorised individual. 
His time at the UN and the independence given to him by Lebanon, as their 
representative in the drafting of the UDHR and the subsequent UN Covenants on 
human rights will be explored.   
                                                          
1
 Please see Article 2 of the Statute of the International Court of Justice: 
The Court shall be composed of a body of independent judges, elected regardless of their nationality 
from among persons of high moral character, who possess the qualifications required in their respective 
countries for appointment to the highest judicial offices, or are jurisconsults of recognized competence in 
international law. 
Or Article 21(2) of the European Convention on Human Rights: 
 The judges shall sit on the Court in their individual capacity 
2
 Please see Article 17 (1) of the UN Convention against Torture: 
There shall be established a Committee against Torture (hereinafter referred to as the Committee) 
which shall carry out the functions hereinafter provided. The Committee shall consist of ten experts of 
high moral standing and recognized competence in the field of human rights, who shall serve in their 
personal capacity. The experts shall be elected by the States Parties, consideration being given to 
equitable geographical distribution and to the usefulness of the participation of some persons having 
legal experience. 
Or Article 29 (3) of the Un International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights  
The members of the Committee shall be elected and shall serve in their personal capacity. 
 
3
 Please see UN resolution 5/2 Code of Conduct for Special Procedures Mandate-Holders of the Human Rights 
Council, Annex Article 3 (a) General Principles of Conduct  
Act in an independent capacity, and exercise their functions in accordance with their mandate, through a 
professional, impartial assessment of facts based on internationally recognized human rights standards, 
and free from any kind of extraneous influence, incitement, pressure, threat or interference, either direct 
or indirect, on the part of any party, whether stakeholder or not, for any reason whatsoever, the notion of 
independence being linked to the status of mandate-holders, and to their freedom to assess the human 
rights questions that they are called upon to examine under their mandate; 
 
4
 For example delegates to the UN, such as Rene Cassin, and Charles Malik 
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Rene Cassin provides an excellent example of someone who had moved around 
within this categorisation on the scale5 during his career. Cassin provides a unique 
example of an individual who served at three different international organisations 
and, therefore, provides an excellent comparison of different levels of independence 
between institutions. This encompasses his time as part of the French delegation to 
the League of Nations representing the Veterans movement, to his role within the 
post-war human rights movement at the UN, and, finally, as one of the first judges of 
the European Court of Human Rights. 
One area where the Independent authorised individual can be found en masse is in 
the area of international courts and tribunals. Within these international bodies these 
individuals take up the role of judges and independent experts within the process of 
international law. In considering these individuals to have a significant role within law 
creation, the notion of international judges as law making accepts the reality on the 
ground which some scholarly and theoretical narratives reject. The European Court 
of Human Rights judges and UN human rights treaty body experts will provide 
excellent examples of independent authorised individuals which are at the lower end 
of the scale and are the most independent individuals considered within this chapter. 
UN special procedures mandate holders provide a rich area of independent 
authorised individuals, where most are appointed by the collective will of states and 
mandated to work independently. Their input from the development of norms and UN 
guidelines will be considered to examine their law making competences.  
                                                          
5
 The scale refers to the scale of freedom, i.e. it will be shown within Rene Cassin’s career that he become more 
independent of control from the French government over the course of his career.  
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II. The Independent Authorised Individual 
Having considered the authorised individual in its most classical form, a closely 
related but separate category of the authorised individual must also be considered 
with that of the independent authorised individual. An independent authorised 
individual is similar to that of the authorised individual, in that they have been 
mandated by a government or another authorised decision maker to perform a role 
within international law. The independent authorised individuals are different in three 
major respects. First, they are only given broad aims by their authorised decision 
maker, quite regularly a home government. Second, they have far more freedom in 
acting on broad aims in the creation of international law. Thirdly, while in the 
authorised individual category, these independent authorised individuals possess far 
more freedom than even the most free authorised individual.  
There are some clear advantages to the independent authorised individual both for 
the state and for the international law making system, specifically in the drafting of 
international law and treaties. The primary advantage to the law creation process 
with the independent authorised individual is that they receive very little instruction 
from their government. They may be initially instructed about what aims the state 
has, but, generally, they have much more freedom to use their expertise, experience 
and instincts to get a good agreement for their state. This has benefits for the group 
as it allows for a state to make concessions and have far more room to manoeuvre 
around those politically and morally delicate issues. These concessions can help to 
move discussions forward and, therefore, are useful when negotiating the wording of 
new treaties as it can add momentum. This freedom means that the home 
government of the independent authorised individual must place a lot of trust and 
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faith with their representative, not only must they be politically aware, but also legally 
aware, of the implications of the treaty they are working upon. 
The success or failure of the independent authorised individual is subject to the 
interpretation of the finished document against the original aims given by the state to 
the individual. Not only is a high level of trust needed by the state in the individual to 
deliver those aims, but also that it delivers against those original aims set out by the 
authorised decision maker. A strong two way trust is fundamental to a successful 
independent authorised individual. The independent authorised individual’s own 
credibility is at stake by taking on this role as a perceived failure on his or her part 
may create discontent with how they performed, and, therefore, may exclude them 
from being asked to perform this role again in future. 
The international judiciary is another area in which the independent authorised 
individual can be observed in law creation. In this role the independent authorised 
individual is nominated and elected by states to take on a role in which to judge their 
conduct against international law. Within these roles the independent authorised 
individual is highly independent and usually serving within an expert or personal 
capacity.  
Due to the nature of the work these individuals are asked to perform in this capacity 
and the requirement to be significantly independent from state control ensures that 
these individuals acting in this capacity are usually uncommon. Generally, when 
important issues are being discussed states feel a need to control and influence from 
the centre as fully as possible. This tends to mean that this type of individual is, 
therefore, part of a large delegation and has a specific specialised role to perform, 
i.e. they may be an international law expert trying to draft the terms of the treaty. This 
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would require highly specialised knowledge with which the state may only hold 
general aims and ambitions to protect themselves from unnecessary burdens of 
conforming to the future document. Having less control on certain, perceived less 
important parts of treaties, i.e. the preamble or implementation, gives states the 
ability to focus resources and control in areas which they may understand as being 
central to defending interest or pushing for greater restrictions. The effect on the 
independent authorised individual is that they can be left to get on with the specific 
area and allows for better resources allocation at treaty and international negotiation 
events. These individuals are often difficult to find, and the role may be given to civil 
servants or low ranking diplomats. Classic examples of independent authorised 
individual within the drafting of international law can be demonstrated in Charles 
Malik and Rene Cassin, two contemporaries of the authorised individual Eleanor 
Roosevelt.  
III. Charles Malik 
“Indeed, few accounts of the development of the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights (UDHR) have ignored Malik’s decisive influence, whether in 
shaping the specific language of any number of articles, or in sheparding the 
Declaration through the polarized Cold War bureaucracy of the United 
Nations.”6 
Charles Malik, was the representative from Lebanon during the drafting of the UDHR 
and the UN Covenants on Human Rights7staying at the UN until 1960, when he 
returned to an academic career. Malik’s independence, his substantive work, and his 
skill at managing procedures will be considered. Malik’s independence is recognised 
at numerous points by his colleague at the UN, John Peters Humphrey8. A biography 
                                                          
6
 Glenn Mitoma, “Charles H. Malik and Human Rights: notes on a Biography”, Biography, Volume 33, Number 1, 
Winter 2010, p222 
7
 Mary Ann Glendon, The Forum and the Tower: How scholars and Politicians have imagined the world, from 
Plato to Eleanor Roosevelt, (Oxford University Press: Oxford: 2011) p202 
8
 John Peters Humphrey will be discussed at great length as an unauthorised individual within chapter 4 
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of Malik writes: “largely an independent operator in the HRC [Human Rights 
Commission], as the small and nascent Lebanese government saw fit to give him 
very limited instructions on human rights.”9 Humphrey was a prolific dairy writer, 
giving a unique insight into events at which Malik attended. Humphrey wrote of 
Malik: 
“Malik believed that his chosen philosophy provided the answers to most, if 
not all, questions, and his thinking was apt to carry him to rigid conclusions. 
But he was one of the most independent people ever to sit on the 
Commission and he was dedicated to human rights.”10 
“Some were more independent than their colleagues and some operated 
without precise or any instructions from their governments; and these were 
not the least useful representatives. One such representative was Charles 
Malik of Lebanon.”11 
While his independence was noted by Humphrey and he even considered it a useful 
trait to find in a representative as they would be willing to put forward ideas from the 
secretariat, Malik’s independence clearly had a negative side in a note scribbled to 
himself one evening:  
“I went to the Council room this morning in the car alone. I sat there at the 
Council table alone. I almost sat at lunch alone, but for the kindness of the 
Yugoslav delegate who asked me to sit with him. Last evening I was all alone 
back at the hotel. When I returned this afternoon I returned in the car alone. I 
am now all alone eating at the restaurant of the hotel. A feeling of void and 
blankness overtakes me. I must bear my loneliness.”12 
Malik’s loneliness is significant is two ways. First, it indicates that he was acting on 
his own at the United Nations and did not have significant support from a delegation. 
In accepting that this note is taken from the first few weeks of his time at the UN it 
demonstrates the lack of support that he faced and yet Glendon notes that this 
                                                          
9
 Glenn Mitoma (2010) p225 
10
 John P. Humphrey, Human Rights & the United Nations: a Great adventure, (Transnational Publishers INC, 
New York, 1984), p23 
11
 John P. Humphrey(1984) pp.17-18 
12
 Mary Ann Glendon, The Forum and the Tower: How scholars and Politicians have imagined the world, from 
Plato to Eleanor Roosevelt, (Oxford University Press: Oxford: 2011), p212 
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loneliness was a source of strength to Malik and helped his reputation for 
independence.13 Second, it demonstrates that he did not have extensive contact with 
the Lebanese government. If he had, surely this link to his state and culture would 
have made him feel less alone? It would have given him someone to talk to, which 
surely would have changed his feeling of isolation.  
Having established Malik’s independence from the Lebanese government, his 
substantive work within international law creation will now be considered. Malik’s 
influence in the scope of the UDHR is especially apparent in Article 1614when his 
neo-thomist philosophy is seen within the part of the article: “The family is the natural 
and fundamental group unit of society and is entitled to protection by society and the 
State.”15Malik, by profession, was a Philosopher-cum-Diplomat, whose own 
conceptualisation of human rights was neo-thomist. Curle16 and Morsink17 argue, 
Malik was the individual responsible for these concepts being seen within the UDHR. 
Perhaps the Lebanese government chose Malik as their representative due to his 
expertise within philosophy and, therefore, gave no instructions to pursue the 
document in any other way to what he sought fit. Alongside Article 16, Malik 
attempted to use the independence in other areas of the document, for example in 
discussions for Article 1: 
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 Mary Ann Glendon (2011) pp.212-3 
14
 Article 16 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights  
 (1) Men and women of full age, without any limitation due to race, nationality or religion, have the right to 
marry and to found a family. They are entitled to equal rights as to marriage, during marriage and at its 
dissolution. 
 (2) Marriage shall be entered into only with the free and full consent of the intending spouses. 
 (3) The family is the natural and fundamental group unit of society and is entitled to protection by society 
and the State. 
15
 Johannes Morsink, The Universal Declaration of Human Rights: Origins, Drafting, and Intent, (University of 
Pennsylvania Press: Philadelphia: 1999) p30 
16
 Clinton Timothy Curle, Humanité: John Humphrey’s Alternative Account of Human Rights, (University of 
Toronto Press: Toronto: 2007) p36 & p101 
17
 Johannes Morsink (1999) p30 
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“…it was decided that the first sentence of article would read: ‘all human 
beings are born equal in dignity and rights’. The committee also decided that 
the words ‘by nature’ would be eliminated from the sentence: ‘they are 
endowed by nature with reason and conscience’. This represents a defeat for 
Malik to whom all these Thomist concepts in the draft can be traced. The 
question, however, is not finally settled; for following the vote there was a 
good deal of discussion regarding translations, etc., of this phrase; and an 
attempt will be made to introduce the phrase ‘by their nature’. That, of course, 
is precisely what Malik meant by the expression ‘by nature’.”18 
The state does not appear to be considered by these neo-thomist references which 
give two possible conclusions, the first is that they gave Malik independence to work 
as he felt best. The second was the support of neo-thomist conception of human 
rights and Malik, being the philosopher, was allowed to use his judgement to 
incorporate these views in the UDHR.  
Malik’s contribution also extended to other articles, notably in being the primary 
sponsor for Article 2819 which he willing accepted and had, to a certain extent, 
already been expressed in the previously adopted Preamble.20 Article 28 caused 
further conflict with Article 22 in which Malik felt that special reference to the 
economic, social and cultural rights should not be picked out as this would show a 
level of favouritism towards one type of right over another.21 This created a bias in 
favour of economic, social and cultural rights.22 Malik’s final major influence in the 
substance of the UDHR was his support for Article 30.23 Perhaps the most important 
influence Malik had was the contribution to give the UDHR some standing in 
                                                          
18
 A.J. Hobbins (ed), On the Edge of Greatness: The Diaries of John Humphrey, First Director of the United 
Nations Division of Human Rights Volume 1,(McGill University Libraries, Montreal, 1994) p58-59 (October 11
th
 
1948) 
19
 Morsink Inherent Human Rights pp.214-215 
20
 UN Document SR.67/5 as cited in Johannes Morsink, Inherent Human Rights: Philosphical Roots of the 
Universal Declaration, (University of Pennsylvania Press: Philadelphia:2009) p212 
21
 UN Document SR.67/5 as cited in Johannes Morsink (2009) p212 
22
 UN Document SR.72/5 as cited in Johannes Morsink (2009) p212 
23
 Johannes Morsink (1999) p273 
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international law by positioning the declaration as an amendment to the UN 
Charter.24 
Malik’s independence was a useful link for others to make a contribution to the 
document, especially when they did not have a direct right to contribute. The UN 
Secretariat and John Peters Humphrey would often supply information and points for 
debate into the discussion for which they had no official capacity to provide, for 
example Humphrey writes in his diary: 
“I had lunch with Malik chez Anna and discussed the speech (most of which is 
being prepared in the Division) that he will deliver during the debate. He was 
expansive and elated; but the speech we have prepared for him is anything if 
not sober.”25 
Because Malik was not being directly instructed by his government he could take on 
information from others sources that would not usually be able to give input into 
meetings. Malik was not alone with the ability to receive ideas from the secretariat, 
writing in his autobiography Humphrey writes: 
“The Secretariat has always worked very closely with him (Malik) and 
continued to do so. Representing a small country, he did not have rigid 
instructions and usually welcomed a good idea. When I or someone else in 
the Division had one, I often took it to him, and more often than not he picked 
it up.”26 
Malik was not a traditional diplomat when he entered the UN; he was a philosopher 
and teacher by trade. This background is not one grounded in taking instructions 
from governments; his independence seems to stem from this usual background, 
with the Lebanese government more or less telling him to do his best but refraining 
from anything that might damage the state.  
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 Glenn Mitoma (2010) p225 
25
 A.J. Hobbins (ed), On the edge of greatness: The Diaries of John Humphrey First Director of the United 
Nations Division of Human Rights Volume 1,(McGill University Libraries: Montreal: 1994) p90 
26
 John P. Humphrey (1984) p141 
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Malik was a bridge between different cultures during his time at the UN, having 
grown up in Lebanon as a Greek Orthodox Arab, in a small village where his father 
was the local doctor. The Lebanon of the day was roughly equally divided between 
Christians and Moslems with a unique blend of Islamic, Christian, Arabic, and French 
cultures.27 This background allowed him to understand different ideas and cultural 
concepts which would allow him to charm and bring fellow delegates around to his 
perspective. Fluency in Arabic, French, German and English28 were an important 
part of his trade as a diplomat, he could, therefore, not only bridge nations with 
cultural similarities and knowledge but also without the need for interpretation. 
Importantly, these skills gave him an advantage in mastering the process of UN 
procedural bureaucracy within the various committees and assemblies. This mastery 
of the process is perhaps more important than Malik’s direct contribution to the 
articles. Malik was appointed Rapporteur for the Human Rights Commission; within 
this role he became responsible for preparing official reports on the group’s work and 
its conclusions.29 Within this role, Malik would have an important role in controlling 
the process of the Commissions by having an important administrative role in how 
reports were presented and having input into the conclusions. Malik’s chairmanship 
of the influential General Assembly’s Third Committee, was perhaps more 
strategically30 important than his other roles within the successful completion of the 
UDHR. The importance of the Third Committee was that it securitised the draft 
document with a fine comb.31In chairing the Third Committee he managed to control 
an unruly body and produce a reasonably well drafted text.32 Malik’s skill within the 
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 Mary Ann Glendon (2011) p209 
28
 Mary Ann Glendon (2011) p215 
29
 Mary Ann Glendon (2011) p202  
30
 William Korey, NGOs and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, (Palgrave: Basingstoke: 2001) p43 
31
 Johannes Morsink (1999) p30 
32
 A.W. Brian Simpson, Human Rights and the End of Empire: Britain and the Genesis of the European 
Convention, (Oxford University Press: Oxford:2004) p362 
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committee processing and controlling the committee and ensured that process was 
made by holding members to time limits with the use of a stopwatch33 and 
mercilessly limiting speeches to only three minutes.34 He succeeded in fighting off 
the idea of work starting on a whole new draft of the declaration using procedural 
rules effectively. Brian Simpson summarises: 
 “Without Malik it is difficult to believe that a coherent document would ever 
have been produced.”35 
Malik’s origins became more important as he looked to marshal support and use UN 
procedure to great effect for the UDHR in the Third Committee. He struggled to point 
out to follow delegates the places in which the declaration took influence from their 
country, region or culture.36 With time his loneliness started to recede as he become 
a true diplomat inviting colleagues and others for lunch and dinner, building personal 
relationships which could be used when it mattered later on.37 Malik was the 
independent authorised individual being able to explore personal ideas and imprint 
philosophy onto the UDHR, much to the annoyance of some colleagues who 
preferred a much more pragmatic approach.38 
Just as with the authorised individual the independent authorised individual, can be 
seen on a scale of independence, with some being relatively more controlled than 
others. Malik is at the upper end of such a scale for the independent authorised 
individual, if the Lebanese government had felt he had become too independent they 
could revoke his authorisation at any moment. Malik was given far more freedom 
than any authorised individual can ever have, being able to imprint his own ideas, 
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 A.W. Brian Simpson (2004) p449 
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 A.W. Brian Simpson (2004) p449 
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 Mary Ann Glendon (2011) p215 
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 Mary Ann Glendon (2011) p213 
38
 Mary Ann Glendon (2011) pp.205-206 
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and take on board speeches and memos from the UN secretariat at his own 
choosing. In summary, Malik was an independent authorised individual but one that 
was still aware that he was the representative of a state and understanding this 
responsibility, but also he felt that the state had placed trust in his judgement to 
create the UDHR into the best, feasible document.  
IV. Rene Cassin 
Rene Cassin was one of the most experienced delegates to international bodies of 
all time, having vast experience of not only international organisations but also 
having served on a multitude of international bodies such as the League of Nations, 
the United Nations, and as a judge at the European Court of Human Rights. Cassin 
provides an ideal example of how the process and evolution of the independent 
authorised individual can develop throughout a career, and how international law can 
be evolved at various points in time by the same individual. When working within 
these international organisations he had a hand in the development of the UDHR, 
the two UN covenants on Human Rights, and played a fundamental role within the 
creation of the rules of procedure for the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR).  
Much debate between scholars such as Winter and Prost,39 Morsink,40 Glendon,41 
Hobbins,42 and Curle43 surrounds who wrote the UDHR, and at this junction it may 
be helpful to wade into this argument. Morsink supports the Humphrey claim to be 
the primary drafter, and shunning Cassin’s claim with the statement that “Cassin did 
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not really enter the room until after the baby was born”.44 However, Winter and Prost 
support Cassin’s claim, but also argue that “These paternity tests must stop”,45the 
primary evidence supports the conclusion that the original collections of rights was 
indeed Humphrey’s.46 The subsequent work done by many other members of the 
Human Rights Commission as the draft document changed and evolved into the 
document that is recognisable as the UDHR. Cassin was indeed one of these 
members and while he was not present at the birth, if the Morsink metaphor is 
extended, he certainly schooled and shaped the document into what we now 
recognise as the UDHR. The Nobel Peace Prize was awarded to Cassin for his 
contribution to the Universal Declaration47 but also a lifetime in serving not only 
human rights, but also veterans, and others disfigured by war48 he was more than a 
worthy winner when all of contributions towards these causes are considered. When 
considering Cassin’s credentials as an independent authorised individual he is a 
classic individual that moves around on the scale depending on his career stage and 
what is being discussed. It is clear from early in his career as a teacher and diplomat 
that he was a free thinker and ready to voice his own viewpoint, irrespective of any 
briefings or instructions. This section will explore how Cassin evolved to become 
more independent within his work at different international organisations, and how 
this independence was important to the process of international law creation. His 
work at international organisations will be broken into three different phases, Cassin 
before and during his time at the League of Nations, Cassin at the United Nations, 
and finally during his time at the ECtHR.    
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IV.1. League of Nations 
Cassin’s education in international law creation started when he entered the League 
of Nations in1924 as part of the French delegation. Being a relative minor member of 
the delegation, his place at the table was as the official representative of the French 
Veteran’s movement.49 Each year until 1938, when the League was effectively 
ended as a workable international organisation he would travel to Geneva to work on 
League business. Cassin’s place within the French delegation was, specifically, to 
represent French veterans’ opinion within the League. He was in a different position 
to his colleagues who spoke in the name of France. Being a minor member of the 
delegation gave him freedom to explore ideas, but he was aware that he did not 
have the full support of the French state.50This gave him great freedom to explore 
veterans’ issues in ways that the French government would not necessarily have 
asked him to adopt, especially during his involvement with the international 
disarmament conference.51 The disadvantage being that he did not have the 
legitimacy to explore ideas outside of the veterans’ cause. Cassin was learning the 
process of international law creation, seeing how international organisations 
functioned and how delegates interacted with each other.  
While at the League, Cassin created a direct relationship between his work at the 
League and the veterans groups52, doing this created an unusual relationship for the 
time between members of civil society and an international organisation. This direct 
relationship between international organisation and the civil society is roughly similar 
to that seen with UN Special Procedural Mandate Holders and domestic 
stakeholders.  
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While at the League of Nations, Cassin was under much more control during this 
phase of his career, this level of control from the French government was such that 
he was an authorised individual, albeit an authorised individual with plenty of 
freedom, but still an authorised individual. He gained a valuable education at the 
League about the workings and make up of international organisation and no area 
was more important than the area of absolute state sovereignty: 
“Working in the League, Cassin saw clearly why the theory of absolute state 
sovereignty was in need of fundamental revision. In the 1920s, in the glow of 
the Locarno agreements, there seemed to be a commonality of interest 
among sovereign states in finding alternatives to war as a means of settling 
conflicts between states. But after the economic crisis of 1929, the consensus 
– always precarious, though palpable enough in the Kellogg-Briand Pact of 
1928 – evaporated. The Japanese invasion of Manchuria in 1931 opened a 
decade of disasters for the League of Nations, a sorry spectacle Cassin saw 
at first hand. While he and his colleagues continued to work on disarmament 
and other matters of common concern, the League crumbled, and then 
collapsed after the Munich accords of 1938.”53 
From the failure of the League, Cassin took a valuable lesson regarding the absolute 
concept of state sovereignty, seeing that the state should no longer be the sole 
arbiters of the rights of its own citizens, instead seeing rights as the common 
property of humanity.54 The implementation of these lessons would become the 
primary focus during the next phase of his career. 
IV.2. United Nations 
Present at all sessions of the Human Rights Commission and the two meetings of 
the drafting sub-commission during the UDHR drafting process, Cassin would later 
go on to become vice-chair of the Commission in 1949, and chair in 1955 and 
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leaving the HRC in 1971.55 The Cassin who became the French delegate to the 
United Nations Human Rights Commission was much changed from when he had 
been a representative at the League of Nations. Cassin’s work on the UDHR only 
truly began when he was asked to re-draft the Humphrey text56 into a more logical 
arrangement. Morsink observes that the differences between the Humphrey and 
Cassin drafts57 were minor and that they were roughly the same, apart from three 
new articles of Cassin’s own invention.58 The three new Cassin articles59 included 
Article 29 in which Cassin attempted to introduce a super-state police force for the 
protection of human rights with the requirement for “the protection of human rights 
requires a public force. Such force shall be instituted for the service of all and not for 
the private use of those to whom it is entrusted.”60 Simpson calls this article an 
example of Cassin’s “Loquacious style and bizarre thinking”61 and indeed it is an 
idea which was certainly ahead of its time. When considered in light of Cassin’s 
desire to limit the sovereignty of states it begins to make more sense as a rather 
crude, almost Orwellian method of achieving this outcome. Article 40 introduced for 
those systems of social security: “Mothers and children have the right to special 
attention, care and resources”.62 Cassin’s final new article was Article 43 which 
introduced the moral rights of the author into the draft document.63 Article 38 was not 
a wholly new article but did give a clear protection to Trade Union rights, which had 
been generally covered in the Humphrey draft but were now given greater clarity in 
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the Cassin draft.64 The work undertaken by Cassin in re-drafting and organising the 
UDHR giving it a sensible structure, reframing and merging similar articles helped 
give the Human Rights Commission and later Third Committee a good structured 
and logical document from which future discussions and changes were made. These 
technical skills gave the document a workable form and style in “an exemplary 
product of continental European methods of legislative drafting”.65 Comparable to 
Malik’s procedural role, Cassin’s work should not be overlooked in the process of the 
UDHR creation. 
The most disappointing element of his time at the UN was his attempt to place an 
effective limitation of the power of state sovereignty and learn from the lessons of the 
League’s failure.66 His support for the individual right of petition during the drafting of 
the two UN Covenants caused conflict with the French government. While Cassin 
was deeply in favour of the right of petition, the French Foreign office opposed the 
measure believing it could be used as a tool by those in French colonies to protest 
over alleged human rights abuses. The opposition from the French government was 
not sufficient to prevent Cassin tabling a draft covenant including the right of petition 
at the Human Rights Commission in 1949, at odds with his government’s 
instructions.67 With the freedom that Cassin had been given, he pushed forward an 
idea that personally meant a lot to him but with which his government disagreed. 
This pushed Cassin down the scale as a highly independent authorised individual. 
This disagreement between delegate and government, in the authorised individual 
would result in the delegate being sacked, however, due to Cassin’s independence 
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and expertise he had this freedom to pursue ideas which he personally felt benefited 
a new human rights document.  
Despite the on-going conflict, he was re-nominated as the French delegate to the 
Human Rights Commission for a further three years in 1950. The French 
government issued instructions to the delegation to block the right of petition as this 
was not in their interest.68 Cassin’s freedom was, therefore, not total at times. The 
French government instructed him back towards the authorised individual end of the 
scale, as John Humphrey notes in his diary from 25th October 1950:  
“Cassin is full of ideas, talk and enthusiasm. But this position must be 
maddening because his instructions do not permit him to do the things which 
he believes should be done. A less loyal Frenchman would take fewer pains 
to hide the fact that the position of France in this business of human rights is 
as reactionary as the worst of the other governments.”69 
Cassin’s freedom was not unlimited; the French government always had a sufficient 
level of control that ensured Cassin would follow particular instructions when 
required. This pull towards government control ensured that he did not enter into 
becoming an unauthorised individual, going against his own government’s 
instructions in the pursuit of his own held beliefs and ideas. 
Cassin was often seen as the individual on the various committees who could find 
compromise when it could be sought, often finding the right words to secure the 
support and approval of the Commission.70 This ability, developed from experience 
of working at international organisations, made him vital to the process of ensuring 
the document did not stumble. In a similar fashion to substantive content, this role is 
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vital within international law creation, as a document that loses momentum can 
easily fail.  
Cassin’s time at the UN was similar to Malik in that he was an instructed delegate 
with substantial freedom in achieving those broad instructions from the French 
government. Prost and Winter make the claim that Cassin served as an independent 
member of the Human Rights Commission up until the summer of 1947. ECOSOC 
changed the rules and members then served as state representatives.71 This would 
be an ideal time to correct this error, which appears to be a result of a 
misunderstanding, from an article by Loveday72 who states: 
“Early last summer the Economic and Social Council of the United Nations 
took a decision which in the course of years is likely to have a very 
considerable and, in my opinion, a very damaging effect on its work and its 
efficiency. After a lengthy discussion it resolved by a majority vote that all its 
advisory commissions should be composed of government representatives — 
of persons, therefore, acting on government instructions rather than of 
persons acting in their individual capacity.”73 
The article, published in June 1947, makes references to the previous summer, i.e. 
1946; therefore, with the Human Rights Commission not holding its first session until 
January 194774 Cassin would have already been a government delegate and never 
served in a personal capacity on the Human Rights Commission. This mix up may 
have been a result of Cassin having served as vice-chair75 on the nuclear 
commission76 for the making of recommendations concerning the structure and 
                                                          
71
 Jay Winter & Antoine Prost (2013) p247 
72
 A. Loveday, “An Unfortunate Decision”, International Organization, June 1947, Issue 02, p247 
73
 Jay Winter & Antoine Prost (2013) p279 
74
 Mary Ann Glendon (2001) p35 
75
 Johannes Morsink (1999) p29 
76 The UN Nuclear Commission was set up as at the first session of the UN Economic and Social Council. The 
Committees role was to propose terms of reference, term limits, size of membership and member status for the 
new Commission on Human Rights. For more on this committee please see 
http://www.un.org/Depts/dhl/udhr/meetings_1946_nuclear.shtml  
168 | P a g e  
 
functions of the permanent commission of human rights,77 in which members served 
in their personal capacity. During Cassin’s time on the nuclear commission in 
preparation for the full Human Rights Commission he was very much towards the 
lower end of the independent authorised individual scale, he even made the 
recommendation that individuals on the Human Rights Commission served as 
independent experts appointed by states, this was not to be the case.78 
Cassin’s independence was also double edged, much like Malik, while being a 
delegate on behalf of the French government he felt isolated and without support. In 
a letter to Parodi he stated “he was working virtually alone, and the French foreign 
office seemed unwilling to send another delegate to ease his burden.”79 This lack of 
control certainly granted him the freedom to undertake actions which he personally 
agreed with. This gave him the opportunity to attempt to implement some of the 
lessons he had learnt from his time at the League of Nations, especially the limitation 
of state sovereignty.  
IV.3. UN Human Rights Commission and the ECtHR 
Cassin’s career as an independent authorised individual took another step to 
becoming more independent. Still maintaining a position within the UN Human 
Rights Commission until 1971, he also served as a judge on the newly formed 
European Court of Human Rights becoming one of the founding judges from 1959 to 
1968. During his time as first vice president of the court from 1959 to 1965 and later 
as president he was primarily involved in setting up the courts rules, procedures and 
competence playing a vital role within their creation.80 Cassin was, at this time, the 
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most independent that an independent authorised individual can be, he was now 
serving in a position within his individual capacity at the nomination of the French 
State. Cassin’s time as a judge was not marked with a profound judgement on the 
nature of human rights, his contribution on the three cases he heard, Lawless v 
Ireland,81 de Becker v Belgium,82 and “Relating to Certain Aspects of the Laws on 
the use of Languages in Education in Belgium” v Belgium83 were rather minor. Just 
by hearing the cases and giving judgements he was acting in a wholly new fashion 
helping set the future course of the Court. By hearing these cases he undertook an 
active role in limiting the absolute concept of state sovereignty, giving individuals an 
international body to take complaints to, with the power to make awards against the 
state. The effect of this was to go against the last 400 years of international legal 
practice, since the Treaty of Westphalia, and should not be underestimated as to its 
significance. His time at the ECtHR is summarised in: 
“His achievements on the Strasbourg Court, though, was substantial. As in 
the case of the Universal Declaration, Cassin had helped establish the 
foundations of a new kind of international law, one in which the individual had 
standing to compel states to account for their actions.”84 
In effect Cassin had at least managed to implement the lessons that he had learnt 
from the League’s failings in the 1930s, and for which he had so campaigned for 
during the drafting of the UN covenants in the 1950s. 
Cassin had three different, but important, phases within the process and evolution of 
international organisations and himself growing more independent. His time at the 
League of Nations was the ideal apprenticeship in the workings and internal politics 
of international organisation. The benefits of independence within delegations were 
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learnt alongside the political workings of the relationship between representative and 
government. These important factors allowed Cassin to be a wiser delegate when he 
joined the UN. His independence can be seen within his re-drafting of the UDHR, 
putting his own stylistic changes into the document, and later coming into direct 
conflict with his own government over the inclusion of the right of petition in the UN 
Covenants. The final phase is that as a judge at the ECtHR in setting up of the 
courts rules and procedures and hearing the first cases Cassin quietly revolutionised 
the role of the individual within international law. In hearing these first cases the 
process of international law evolved with state sovereignty limited in effect. The 
process of learning from the League’s failure, the failed attempt at the UN for the 
right of petition, had been achieved by hearing cases within an international court.  
V. The Independent Authorised Individual within International Courts 
Authorised independent individuals are also found within the role of judicial officers 
at international courts. The independent authorised individual can be found in this 
environment as they are mandated and nominated by states to take up the position 
as a judge within international courts but act independently of state control. Many 
theoretical narratives assert that international judicial bodies are not law making 
bodies.85 This ignores the realities that many international courts, especially the ICJ, 
play a major role within law making.86 The growth in international courts and tribunals 
since the end of the Second World War is surprising; the 2004 Project on 
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International Courts and Tribunals found that there were some 125 bodies with a 
wide range of judicial activities.87 
The role of an international judge requires that states give individuals the 
independence to perform in the role of the judiciary. Within the European Court of 
Human Rights each state party nominates an individual with necessary experience 
to become a judge.88 The independent authorised individual requirement for being a 
government nominee is satisfied alongside the second criteria of broad aims. This 
broad aim criterion is satisfied as the state is asking them to perform the role of the 
judiciary, for example within the ECHR Article 21 (2): 
“The judges shall sit on the Court in their individual capacity”89 
 
Or Article 2 of the Statute of the International Court of Justice: 
“The Court shall be composed of a body of independent judges, elected 
regardless of their nationality from among persons of high moral character, 
who possess the qualifications required in their respective countries for 
appointment to the highest judicial offices, or are jurisconsults of recognized 
competence in international law.”90 
Within the process of international law, the judiciary are becoming law makers, 
despite theoretical objections that when the judiciary become law makers it is 
contrary to the rule of law and consent of states. The importance of law making of 
international judges is also observed within the ICJ as Higgins argues: 
“Far from being treated as a subsidiary source of international law, the 
judgements and opinions of the Court are treated as authoritative 
pronouncements upon the current state of international law.”91 
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Boyle and Chinkin make a similar argument that international courts do make 
law.92By acknowledging the role of the judiciary as law makers the realities of the 
process of international law making will be more accurately reflected in the 
theoretical narrative. The impact of international courts and tribunals on the evolution 
of international law largely depends upon the number of cases brought before them 
and the significance of those cases in changing the existing law. Boyle and Chinkin 
conclude that the logical insight is that the greater the number of international courts, 
judges and cases, the larger the amount of judge made law that will supplement 
other sources of law.93 How different international judges have developed 
international law will be considered below. 
V.1.European Court of Human Rights 
Judgements from the European Court of Human Right (ECtHR) have not only kept 
the Convention modern but also have used the Convention in ways the original 
drafters, such as Maxwell-Fyfe and Teitgen, could never have imagined. The ECtHR 
case law points to numerous examples of this, the most fundamental to this 
interpretation is Tyrer v. The United Kingdom, which gave the principle of the 
convention as “a living instrument which... must be interpreted in the light of present-
day conditions”.94 Marckx v. Belgium,95 Dugeon v. The United Kingdom,96 and 
Malone v. The United Kingdom,97 all required the judiciary to interpret the convention 
in an unforeseen manner. The meaning of articles have been re-interrupted and, 
therefore, expanded over the life time of the convention, for example the judiciary 
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have read a positive obligation for states under Article 3, Environmental Rights under 
Article 898 and, controversial in the UK, given prisoners the right to vote under 
Protocol 1 Article 3.99 These examples illustrate that these independent authorised 
individuals within the international court are not interpreting international law, but 
actually law making institutions. The development of the ECHR has evolved further 
than before in the last ten years, this development has been extended to include 
extraterritorial jurisdiction of the convention outside Europe. The leading case on 
extraterritorial application is Al-Skeini and Others v. The United Kingdom100, within 
this case the UK government advocated the previous standard for extraterritorial 
application being Banković and Others v. Belgium and Others101 which outlined that 
for extraterritorial jurisdiction by the State party the “effective control of the relevant 
territory and its inhabitants abroad as a consequence of military occupation or 
through the consent … exercises all or some of the public powers normally to be 
exercised by that Government.”102 In Al-Skeini the court modified its position on 
extra-territorial application in this case extending convention rights to individuals 
during the British occupation of Southern Iraq: 
“…the United Kingdom assumed authority and responsibility for the 
maintenance of security in South East Iraq. In these exceptional 
circumstances, the Court considers that the United Kingdom, through its 
soldiers engaged in security operations in Basrah during the period in 
question, exercised authority and control over individuals killed in the course 
of such security operations, so as to establish a jurisdictional link between the 
deceased and the United Kingdom for the purposes of Article 1 of the 
Convention.”103 
“It is clear that, whenever the State through its agents exercises control and 
authority over an individual, and thus jurisdiction, the State is under an 
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obligation under Article 1 to secure to that individual the rights and freedoms 
under Section 1 of the Convention that are relevant to the situation of that 
individual.”104 
The court stated that in exceptional circumstances deriving from being the authority 
for maintaining the security in a given area the convention should apply. At a stroke 
the Court had extended the range of the Convention to an area outside of its 
traditional geographic remit, i.e. Europe. This issue was further explored in Al-Jedda 
v. The United Kingdom105 in which the concept of jurisdiction applying to individuals 
held in Iraqi detention centres ran by British Forces was explored. The Court 
concluded that “The internment took place within a detention facility in Basrah City, 
controlled exclusively by British forces, and the applicant was therefore within the 
authority and control of the United Kingdom throughout”.106 This had the effect that 
the court agreed with the House of Lords that the “applicant fell within the jurisdiction 
of the United Kingdom for the purposes of Article 1 of the Convention.”107 These two 
cases demonstrate that the judges have given effect to the Convention in unforeseen 
ways, to give extraterritorial effect changes a significant approach to the application 
of human rights moving away from a geographic sphere of accountability to one 
based on a sphere of influence for the actions of a state and its agents, and 
therefore a broader application of the ECHR.  
At times, the international judiciary and a particular idea may not be able to be 
pinned down to a single judge, but the majority opinions within the Court have 
agreed with this conception of rights application. In dissenting opinions that have 
later been followed, it is far easier to identify the role of a single individual member of 
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the judiciary who has had a role in law creation. Judge Françoise Tulkens108 notable 
for her significant dissenting opinions often against the majority view either in the 
court or society, and which always focused on the fundamental values of the 
convention.109 Some of these dissenting views have now become the majority view 
of the court in later cases. In the courts on-going attempts to grapple with the 
application of Article 6 in relation to those employed in public services Judge Tulkens 
joint dissenting opinion with Judge’s Fischbach, Casadevall and Thomassen within 
Pellegrin v. France110  has largely been followed in the later Vilho Eskeline and 
Others v. Finland111 giving public servants access to convention rights. Tulkens has 
given other significant dissenting opinions for example in N v. UK112 alongside 
Judges Bonello and Spielmann arguing that deporting an HIV positive Ugandan 
women to her home country would amount to two violations of Article 3.113 Also in 
the Austin and Others V. The United Kingdom114 Judges Tulkens alongside 
Spielmann and Garlicki argued that the indiscriminately applied tactic used in the 
practice of kettling did amount to a violation of Article 5. Judge Tulken’s dissenting 
opinions can be compared to Lord Denning’s within the UK domestic courts as to a 
prediction to the future development of the courts jurisprudence. Judge Tulkens is an 
excellent example of an independent authorised individual within the international 
judiciary, always keeping in mind the ideals of the convention, and prepared to 
develop the ideas of the court and the convention law to protect those fundamental 
principles. 
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V.2. International Court of Justice 
The International Court of Justice (ICJ) has heard 156115 cases as of April 2014 and 
has another 10116 cases pending. The ICJ is made up of 15 judges serving for a term 
of nine years; judges are elected to the Court with the process set out in Article 4-19 
of the ICJ statute, and as noted above serve in an independent capacity from the 
state. The ICJ and the judges serving have notably developed international law; 
some of the most significant developments will be evaluated.117 The South West 
Africa Cases118 set out the principle of respect for the protection of human rights on a 
non-discriminatory basis recognised by the court as part of international law. In terms 
of how the judges developed the law, the principle of racial discrimination already 
existed within human rights law, what was lacking was a “sound analysis of the 
principle of equality and the norm of discrimination in the international law 
literature.”119 In the judges individual opinions this is what they developed and, 
therefore, created international human rights law.120 The court has also developed 
environmental laws in the Gabčἱkovo-Nagymaros case121 which was the first 
contentious case in which, unrestrained by jurisdictional limits, the court pronounced 
on the importance of environmental protection, especially in light of aspect of 
international water law.122 The importance of the ICJ’s law making also extends to 
Advisory Opinions; while non-binding makes it clear how the court views the 
development of a particular area of the law. In Legal Consequences of the 
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Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory (Advisory Opinion) 
2004123 within this case the court formulated the standards of the territorial scope of 
treaties. In the Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons (Advisory Opinion) 
1996124 the court set out its views on the law prohibiting certain means of conduct. 
A criticism of the independent authorised individual in the international courts is 
when making judgements against their own states. This is already what appears to 
happen with ad hoc judges on International Court of Justice (ICJ) cases for example 
Maritime Delimitation in the Black Sea case.125 Under Article 31126 of the ICJ it sets 
out the procedure for ad hoc judges to sit on contentious cases, in which state 
parties may nominate a judge to sit on the case.127 The idea being the judge can 
provide local legal and cultural perspectives.128 These ad-hoc judges have 
developed a trend to usually favour their particular state; this normally has the effect 
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that the ad-hoc judges cancel one another out.129 This is not always a certainty, for 
instance in Application for Revision and Interpretation of the Judgement of 24th 
February 1982 concerning the Continental shelf made in the Tunisia/Libya case130 
1985 ad-hoc judge, Bastid, from Tunisia found against Tunisia in favour of Libya.131 
Also, in the Great Belt (Finland v. Denmark) case 1991132133 ad-hoc judge, Broms, 
found against Finland with the majority of the court.134 These two examples are, 
notably, the exceptions with the majority of ad-hoc judges favouring their home state. 
The cynical argument can be made that these ad-hoc judges are clearly under 
influence from their state to vote in a particular way to ensure their future careers are 
a success, Rosenne has argued that these judges are open to “concession to 
diplomatic susceptibilities”.135 The consequences for these ad-hoc judges are 
certainly questionable for an independent authorised individual, which needs the 
freedom of state interference to undertake the role assigned to them with full 
competence.  
V.3.European Court of Justice 
Judicial law creation can also be seen within the development of EU law and the 
principle of direct effect, established in Van Gend en Loos v Nederlandse 
Administratie der Belastingen (1963).136 
“The objective of the EEC Treaty, which is to establish a common market, the 
functioning of which is of direct concern to interested parties in the 
Community, implies that this treaty is more than an agreement which merely 
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creates mutual obligations between the contracting states. Thus view is 
confirmed by the Preamble to the Treaty which refers not only to governments 
by to peoples. It is also confirmed more specifically by the establishment of 
institutions endowed with sovereign rights, the exercise of which affects 
member states and also their citizens.”137 
The effect of this was: 
“The European Economic Community Constitutes a new legal order of 
international law for the Benefit of which the states have limited their 
sovereign rights, albeit within limited field, and the subjects of which comprise 
not only the member of states but also their nationals.  
Independently of the legislations of member states, community law not only 
imposes obligations on individuals but is also intended to confer upon them 
rights.”138 
The significance of this was that this was not a negotiated outcome by states, but the 
European Court of Justice established this principle within its own jurisprudence. 
This was a transformative case for the EU with a significant impact within the 
application of EU law both domestically and within the Union, with the court’s 
reasoning that the principle was necessary to ensure the compliance of member 
states with their obligations. The principle of direct effect demonstrates the lasting 
effect and fundamental change that judicial creativity and law making has given, that 
in this instance it gave EU law supremacy.  
The independent authorised individual within the role of the international judge can 
have a considerable law making role. The examples above, from a range of 
international courts, demonstrate some of those transformative cases and the role of 
judges within these significant changes to international law. 
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VI. The Independent Authorised Individual within UN Human Rights Treaty 
Bodies 
“The practice of these various committees represents one of the rare 
instances in which bodies whose members are formally independent of 
governments (but which are not courts) play a significant role in international 
law-making.”139 
Authorised independent individuals are also seen in another significant area of 
international law in that of the role of human rights experts on UN Treaty Bodies. In a 
similar way to the ECtHR judiciary, human rights treaty body experts are also 
independent authorised individuals appointed by states to take up a position as 
independent experts on UN Treaty Bodies. The terms of appointment which 
underlines their credentials as independent authorised individuals show that these 
individuals are nominated as human rights experts by states for a fixed term of four 
years which is renewable.140 They are mandated to perform the role of evaluating 
state performance when they come before the human rights treaty body committees 
on which the expert sits. This role requires that they evaluate reports from states, 
take NGO statements into account and question state officials on various issues to 
check compliance and how states are ensuring they meet human rights 
requirements set down in the various treaties to which they are party. These 
individuals are highly independent from the state and unlike the ICJ when examining 
their home state report will not take an active role. The effect is that these 
independent authorised experts have considerable law making competences in the 
area of the treaty that they serve. 
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The independent authorised individuals who sit on UN Human Rights Treaty Bodies 
create new ways in which human rights are interpreted.141 
“The UN human rights institutions provide a good example of how these 
independent specialist bodies can interact with states in evolving law 
making.”142 
This development of the law stems from the experts within their concluding 
observations. In which the human rights experts set out how the law should be 
applied and their interpretation of the standards within the articles. How a human 
rights expert interprets a particular treaty article, in part, depends on the state. For 
example, if it’s a more developed state they may hold the state to a higher standard 
as they have far more resources to comply with the Treaty, while less developed 
states appear to be held to a lower standard. This can be seen with the Committee 
on Economic, Social, and Cultural rights interpretation of Article 15,143 within 
sessions of the committee held in April and May 2012,144 and the same months a 
year later.145 These sessions involving Japan, Spain and Rwanda highlight the 
differences in interpretation, whereby in developing states, cultural impact is 
considered in light of protection and remedying, whereas in developed states article 
15 is seen in terms of respecting or promoting cultural rights. This difference means 
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that in Western states article 15 is interpreted positively and in developing states 
negatively. If we compare the concluding observations for these states:  
“While noting the position of the State party regarding the recognition of 
ethnic groups and indigenous peoples, the Committee is concerned at the 
possible adverse impact of the position of the State party. The Committee is 
also concerned at the lack of information on the impact of measures taken to 
ensure that different groups living in its territory enjoy full participation in 
cultural life as well as on measures aimed at promoting tolerance and 
understanding among the different groups living in its territory (art. 15).”146 
“The Committee thanks the State party for the information provided during the 
dialogue on the right to enjoy the benefits of scientific progress and its 
applications. In this context, the Committee requests the State party to include 
in its next periodic report more detailed information and specific examples on 
how this right is being implemented in practice.”147 
 “The Committee is concerned that, in the context of the economic and 
financial crisis, budget cuts are a threat to the maintenance and development 
of creative and research capacity in the State party, as well as to opportunities 
for all individuals and communities to have effective access to take part in 
cultural life (art. 15).”148 
The first extract is from the concluding observation of Rwanda, while the two below 
are from Japan and Spain. These extracts demonstrate the different approaches 
taken by the independent human rights experts; the differences within the language 
seem to indicate a two tier system whereby those developing nations are examined 
to a negative impact, and western states to a positive impact. This process of 
concluding observation and recommendations means that states are left with 
opinions and ways in which they should improve their ability to comply with the 
various human rights treaties. Should treaty bodies hear individual complaints the 
response to these can increase understanding of requirements of treaties in 
particular ways. The statements of the treaty body committee are certainly 
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interpretative of the treaty provisions, or even seen as going beyond this into the 
development of new soft law.149  
Boyle and Chinkin point towards a major example of when the use of 
recommendations and general comments has led to the development of human 
rights treaties, the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women 
adoption of General Recommendation number 19 on Violence against Women which 
prevented them from enjoyment of convention rights. This made up for the omission 
of the original drafters for a measure aimed at the area. The recommendation also 
ensures that its legal authority is derived from the Convention itself in how it was 
drafted, therefore, states are expected to report on how they conform to the 
measure.150 It is clear that none of these comments, observations, reports or 
recommendations are formally binding; however they do create a strong level of 
pressure that states would be unwise to ignore.  
While these treaties are soft law, mainly aimed at getting states to protect and 
respect rights, when the various treaty bodies provide a united front on issues it 
strengthens a particular rights based strategy common to all treaty bodies.151 
Therefore, the independent authorised individual, within the role of human rights 
treaty experts, has significant impact upon the development of the UN treaties on 
Human Rights. These individuals are fairly unique within the international system, 
largely down to their role within human rights law. This should not diminish from the 
impact that these individuals can have on the development of international law.  
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VII. UN Special Procedures Mandate Holders 
The criteria for becoming a special procedures mandate holder ensures that there is 
necessary independence for the individual to perform the role assigned to them 
which has been described as “crucial to their utility and influence”152 and for this 
particular categorisation. The UN Civil Society Handbook, published by the office of 
the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights,153 sets out the criteria for 
independence as paramount in their work: 
“Special procedures mandate-holders are either an individual (special 
rapporteur, special representative of the Secretary-General, representative of 
the Secretary-General or independent expert) or a group of individuals 
(working group). Mandate-holders serve in their personal capacity for a 
maximum of six years and do not receive salaries or any other financial 
compensation for their work. The independent status of mandate-holders is 
crucial to the impartial performance of their functions.”154 
Therefore, independent status is so vital that they do not receive salaries and serve 
within their personal capacity. While this ensures that they are independent, working 
under a particular mandate, it limits the amount of individuals that can perform this 
role as they must have another source of income in order to support themselves. 
The criteria for the selection of special procedures mandate holders is set down in 
UN Resolution 5/1 Section 39; it states that the individual must have the following 
“(a) expertise; (b) experience in the field of the mandate; (c) independence; (d) 
impartiality; (e) personal integrity; and (f) objectivity.”155 Section 40 of UN Resolution 
5/1 states that due consideration to mandate holders should be given to gender 
balance and geographic representation, as well as to an appropriate representation 
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of different legal systems.156 Finally, individuals can be excluded from becoming a 
special mandate holder under Section 46 if they have a conflict of interest such as 
holding a decision making position in governments or other organisations such as 
NGOs, national human rights institutions, or any related interest group.157 This has 
the effect to limit the eligibility of individuals as if they are an expert in a field as 
required, they are most likely to already be involved within the field in a decision 
making body. This creates a dilemma for individuals as they would be required to 
leave their existing work in order to become a special mandate holder. The 
independence can actually create further problems in limiting the quality and quantity 
of candidates open to taking up such a role. In the creation of the special mandate 
holders system they created a system that would encroach on state sovereignty in 
addressing sensitive domestic issues158 that could not necessarily be given enough 
inspection within open debate. 
With independence and expertise so important within this role, the following groups 
are able to nominate suitable candidates under section 42,159 governments, regional 
groups operating within the United Nations human rights system, international 
organisations such as the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, 
governmental organisations, other human rights bodies and finally individuals can 
nominate themselves. This criteria means that the individuals can still be selected 
knowing that they possess certain inherent views and objections by each of these 
organisations. The independence of these individuals can also create another 
problem of the resources needed to undertake their work, in this respect the 
OHCHR, provides mandate holders with personnel, logistical and research 
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assistance in order to support the work being undertaken.160 The levels of 
independence required by special mandate holders has the danger that these 
individuals could easily overstep the mark or worse “go rogue” and cause damage to 
the UN interest in which they have been tasked. In order to prevent this and give 
guidance to these individuals, the OHCHR has created a code of conduct which was 
adopted by the Human Rights Council in 2007. This code sets out the standards of 
ethical behaviour and professional conduct that those special procedures mandate 
holders must observe.161 The UN Manual of the Special Procedures162 sets out to 
provide those holding the roles with guidance and good practice in their efforts to 
promote and protect human rights. Special Procedures in using regular reports and 
recommendations to the Human Rights Council and the General Assembly have 
made a “significant contribution to the elaboration, interpretation, acceptance and 
internationalisation of those norms.”163 The effect of this is to influence the Council 
and Assemblies Resolutions and, in some cases, the production of UN guidelines, 
such as the UN Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement. This development of 
normative framework has filled in the gaps left within the human rights system, for 
example, with specific application to particular groups such as women, indigenous 
people and prisoners.164 In implementing these norms and guidelines it has made 
human rights accessible, and as one mandate holder has termed ‘the practicalisation 
of human rights.’165 
Special procedure mandate holders are individuals that are mandated to have a 
significant amount of independence in order to perform a role within one particular 
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area of international law, for example, John Ruggie on business and human rights or 
Olivier De Schutter on the right to food.166 They must work within a particular 
mandate but do not take instructions from any government or group. They might 
seek views from these organisations but are under no obligation to do this or even to 
meet within them. A significant drawback with the special procedures mandate 
system is “the independence and effectiveness of Special Procedures is dependent 
to a large degree on the political latitude provided to them by states, and the degree 
to which states are willing to cooperate with them.”167 This level of independence is 
far more than Charles Malik was given by Lebanon in the drafting of the UDHR, 
therefore, placing these special mandate holder individuals at the opposite end of the 
scale to Malik. The influence and success of these individuals highlights the 
importance that independent thinking can bring to international law in bringing ideas 
forward to difficult issues that states creating law by consensus and committee would 
fail to agree upon. In section two of this chapter a detailed investigation will be 
undertaken into the working methods and process of law creation as used by John 
Ruggie in the creation of the United Nations Guiding Principles on Business and 
Human Rights. 
VIII. Conclusion 
The independent authorised individual is an individual given a role within 
international law creation with the expectation that they will be independent, and at 
the most controlled only by being given sweeping aims from their authorised decision 
makers and at the far end of the scale have no interaction with authorised decision 
makers acting on their own judgement all the time. While these individuals only have 
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limited contact, if any, with governments, they do owe their position within the 
international system to governments which, with representatives given large 
amounts of freedom, can withdraw at any time.  
Those independent authorised individuals within a special procedures role or serving 
within a court or tribunal will be mandated to perform the role for a given length of 
time prior to needing state authorisation to continue. Any individual given so much 
freedom means that a gap has been created between their actions and the state, 
therefore, if things go wrong within the role the state can deny and cut off the 
individual as a political measure to ensure that damage is limited solely to that 
individual. This risk of personal reputation damage is one of the main risks in 
accepting the role of an independent authorised individual, if it goes wrong, such as 
with David Weissbrodt and the “Norms on the Responsibilities of Transnational 
Corporation and Other Business Enterprises with regard to Human Rights”, the 
individual’s credibility and questions over their judgement means that they are 
disregarded from the international system.  
Charles Malik is the ideal independent authorised individual that sits the nearest to 
being an authorised individual. Within his role as representative to the UN he was 
only given broad aims by Lebanon, and was very much working alone without a 
delegation to support his efforts, and provided a useful conduit for unauthorised 
individuals to pass information and argumentative points into debates regarding the 
development of the UN human rights treaties. Malik’s position allowed him to 
develop into the ideal international politician, being able to work a group to coming 
around to his point of view, but also knowing when to give others ground. Rene 
Cassin, while also an independent authorised individual at the same time as Malik, 
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provides a different insight. Cassin over his career gradually became more 
independent, as he worked within three different international organisations.  
Independent authorised Individuals given plenty of independence are those that work 
within international courts and tribunals, especially UN Human Rights Treaty bodies, 
the International Court of Justice and the European Court of Human Rights. These 
institutions have plenty of freedom to perform the role of the judiciary being able to 
interpret these documents as living instruments to ensure that these documents 
keep up with present day conditions. Of course this approach, at times, can infuriate 
states when the way an article is interpreted is changed in light of a new condition, 
as this is often seen as judges going too far in law creation which should be reserved 
for states. All independent authorised individuals, to a greater or lesser extent, owe 
their position to states. Therefore, they do have some influence over the individuals 
selected to these roles and should accept that these individuals will and do create 
law as they see fit. 
UN Special Procedures mandate holders are in place, especially for their 
independence. This independence is essential for their work in order to provide 
reports or other measures on a given subject. The mandates of these individuals is 
usually specialised, therefore, the holder of the mandate is usually also an expert 
within the area. John Ruggie was one such individual; within his role as United 
Nations Secretary-General's Special Representative for Business and Human Rights 
he created the Protect, Respect, Remedy Framework and the Guiding Principles 
which gave effect to the framework. In the creation of both the guiding principles and 
framework, Ruggie created something that states were unable to. These two 
instruments set down a new standard for what independent authorised individuals 
can do when given the resources and mandate to succeed. An in-depth analysis of 
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John Ruggie and his work in the creation of the UNGPs will be the focus of the next 
chapter.
 Chapter 4:- The Independent Authorised Individual: The Ruggie Process  
I. Introduction  
This chapter will take an in depth examination of one particular independent 
authorised individual, John Ruggie, within the creation of the UNGPs. Within this 
chapter this thesis will come the closet to methodologies used within International 
Relations (IR), however while this chapter examines the relationship between actors 
a notable feature of IR approaches. In this instance the methodical approach is 
always derived from the perspective of Legal Process Theory, with an additional 
focus on one particular individual with the goal of examining the formation of a set of 
international rules. Within this evolution the process of how Ruggie went about the 
creation of the guidelines will be the focus; this will provide insight as to how such 
individuals are able to create workable legal instruments in highly contentious areas.   
“All had failed, I reminded the Council, because governments could not reach 
consensus. Here, I said you have an instrument that you could never have 
negotiated yourselves, given the diverse and conflicting interests at stake. All 
stakeholder groups support it. So seize the opportunity, I urged. Endorse it, 
and then move on. They did.”1 
The focus is on a highly detailed examination of the independent authorised 
individual in the role of a UN special procedures mandate holder, John Ruggie, to 
see how he performed this role in the creation of the United Nations Guiding 
Principles on Business and Human Rights (UNGP).2 This closer look intends to set 
out the role of the modern independent authorised individual in the context of 
mastering a highly contentious human rights issue. It will expand on the ideas 
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expressed in chapter three looking at how independent authorised individuals have 
the ability to successfully use the law creation process.  
The chapter will be broken down into several sections, each exploring different 
elements of the process within the creation of the UNGPs. The first section will 
consider the background as to why the UNGPs were needed, due to the failure of all 
previous efforts to find a solution to the human rights and business issue. The 
second section will examine the substantive content of first, the framework and then 
the final Guiding Principles. It will consider all three pillars, giving an understanding 
of how Ruggie managed to find a workable solution.  
The third section will focus on why John Ruggie was chosen by former UN Secretary 
General Kofi Aanan to take up this role. What made him suited for the role, and why 
he was different to all those that had gone before him in attempting to find a solution 
to the issue. This will be followed by an examination of the mandates which were 
given to Ruggie. These mandates were open to interpretation due to the language 
used, this was taken as an advantage by Ruggie who often used this interpretation 
to support his argument whether the mandates gave him scope for his actions or not. 
Next will be sections on the approach taken by Ruggie, the language used, and they 
will finally explore the concept of how Principled Pragmatism was used by Ruggie. 
The approach taken by Ruggie was to engage with as many stakeholders as he 
could within the research phase of the project. Using inclusive language to 
encourage and engage stakeholders allowed him to bring them on-side with the 
project and its aims to create a workable legal instrument. The concept of Principled 
Pragmatism will require investigation to give a greater understanding of how this part 
methodology, part philosophy was used to ensure that the UNGPs were actually a 
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workable solution. This concept became one of the most important and central pillars 
of how the UNGPs were successfully created. 
Finally, will be sections looking at the resources, both financial and kind, the team he 
created, the open debate and a willingness to consider and accept new ideas. 
Looking at the resources that Ruggie managed to secure for the process is 
important, not only in understanding the scope of research that went into the UNGPs 
but also how he got business onside by allowing them to support the process 
financially. These resources allowed Ruggie to recruit a team from across the globe 
in order to aid his work. The need for the financial resources here is clear, due to the 
mandates giving very little financial support for the process. The team created 
allowed for specialised individuals to work on highly complex areas of the proposed 
soft law instrument, therefore, giving the process valuable expertise in the right 
areas. The willingness for an open debate and willingness to incorporate new ideas 
demonstrated the difference between the Ruggie process and that of how this issue 
had been tackled before. In allowing stakeholder input, especially from business, 
they had greater interest in ensuring the UNGPs were successful.  
II. Background to the Creation of the UNGPs 
In 2005, Secretary General Kofi Annan asked John Ruggie to become the Secretary-
General’s Special Representative for Business and Human Rights (SRSG).3 In doing 
this, Ruggie took on a challenge which had faced the UN for the best part of twenty 
years4 that had polarised debate between States, Transnational Companies, and 
NGOs on how best to align human rights with business practice within a globalised 
                                                          
3
 UN Human Rights Resolution 2005/69 
4
 Larry Cata Backer, “On the Evolution of the UN Protect, Respect Remedy project: The state, the Corporation 
and Human Rights in a Global Governance Context”, Santa Clara Journal of International Law, 38, 201, pp.45-50 
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business environment. A simplistic, yet worthwhile, analysis indicates that 
transnational companies can, in part, achieve bigger profits by the exploitation of 
workers and host states. Therefore, addressing this issue required that a new 
solution or strategy be decided upon to ensure that the balance was re-defined and 
that the resources were no longer subject to such over exploitation.  
The issue of setting new international standards for business and human rights had 
caused nothing but trouble for all parties involved.5 Prior to Ruggie’s mandate, 
several attempts had been made, including the United Nations Commission on 
Transnational Corporations established in 1973, to investigate the effects of 
transitional corporations and strengthen the negotiation capacity of countries in 
which they operated.6 This resulted in the unsuccessful attempt to draft an 
international code of conduct for business in the 1970s and 1980s.7 The 
Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) undertook a 
similar effort in 1976 establishing its first Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises,8 
which have been revised five times most recently in 2011.9 In 1977 the International 
Labour Organization adopted its Tripartite Declaration of Principles Concerning 
Multinational Enterprises.10 Finally, the Global Compact in 1999 asked businesses to 
voluntarily adopt ten core principles, dealing with issues such as human rights, 
labour standards, environmental protection and the later added anti-corruption.11The 
                                                          
5
 See Larry Cata Backer, “On the Evolution of the UN Protect, Respect Remedy project: The state, the 
Corporation and Human Rights in a Global Governance Context”, Santa Clara Journal of International Law, 38, 
201, p45-50 also see John Gerard Ruggie (2013), pp.xvi-xviii and pp.46-55 
6
 Patricia Feeney, “Business and Human rights: The struggle for Accountability in the UN and the Future 
Direction of the Advocacy Agenda”, International Journal on Human Rights, Vol.6, N. 11, Dec 2009, p162 
7
 UN Document E/1990/94  
8
 http://www.oecd.org accessed 12.02.013 
9
 http://www.oecd.org/daf/inv/mne/2011update.htmlaccessed 29.04.13 
10
 http://www.ilo.org/empent/Publications/WCMS_094386/lang--en/index.htm 
11
http://www.unglobalcompact.org/aboutthegc/thetenprinciples/index.htmlaccessed 29.04.13 
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one underlining criticism of all these approaches is that “these various initiatives, 
however, failed to bind all businesses to follow a minimum human rights standard.”12 
A new approach was required to tackle this issue, the UN asking the sub-
commission on the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights to draft an 
international instrument based on human rights law to define the significance of 
human rights in the conduct of business. The sub-commission approved the “norms 
on the Responsibilities of Transnational Cooperation’s and Other Business 
Enterprises with Regard to Human Rights”13 otherwise known as “The Norms”. The 
Norms as a total failure cannot be understated: 
“The reaction of business, however, was largely hostile. The Norms quickly 
became a lightning rod for counter-lobbying, spearheaded by various 
business associations.”14 
“Several of the member states opposed holding non-state entities directly 
accountable for human rights violations as they felt this would dilute state 
responsibility.”15 
“This endeavour produced a train wreck because much of the business 
community was vehemently opposed to it, as were many governments. The 
process started out as an attempt to codify, in a non-legal sense, appropriate 
principles for companies with regard to human rights, but as it evolved it got 
carried away. One industry association official told me that his organization 
dropped out when the topic of discussion became the shape of the table in the 
tribunal chamber where companies would be tried. Whether this was 
hyperbole or not, the remark effectively symbolizes how negatively the effort 
came to be perceived. On top of that, the conceptual and legal foundations of 
the Norms were so poorly conceived that, if adopted, they would produce 
utterly perverse consequences on the ground.”16 
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 David Weissbrodt and Muria KIruger,“Norms on the Responsibilities of Transnational Corporations and Other 
Business Enterprises with regard to Human Rights”, The American Journal of International Law, Vol. 97, No 4, 
(Oct, 2003), p903 
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 UN Document E/CN.4/Sub.2/2003/12/Rev.2  
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 Patricia Feeney (2011) p165  
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 Larry Cata Backer (2011) p46 
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 Remarks by John Ruggie, Delivered at a Forum on Corporate Social Responsibility. June 14
th
 2006, as found 
at  http://www.reports-and-materials.org/Ruggie-remarks-to-Fair-Labor-Association-and-German-Network-of-
Business-Ethics-14-June-2006.pdf 
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The Norms were totally toxic; the Human Rights Commission let them die a quiet 
death. The main driving force behind the Norms, David Weissbrodt17 and members 
of the United Nations Sub-Commission on the Promotion and Protection of Human 
Rights were not given an opportunity to reform the norms in response to 
overwhelming criticism. The Sub-Commission was abolished alongside the Human 
Rights Commission in 200618 and replaced by an Advisory Committee to the new 
Human Rights Council. The failure of the Norms and other failed attempts left a gap 
within international human rights law, which was filled by the UNGPs which will be 
discussed in depth next. 
III. Substantive Work of John Ruggie 
Within the background leading to Ruggie’s appointment as Special Representative 
for Business and Human Rights is the substantive work with which Ruggie filled the 
gap within the human rights framework. Ruggie’s solution within this capacity as a 
special mandate holder and independent authorised individual was to create first, the 
Protect, Respect, and Remedy Framework and later build on them to create the 
UNGP.19 Simply put “the Framework addresses what should be done; the Guiding 
Principles how to do it.”20 In creating these two instruments Ruggie was the arch-
type modern independent authorised individual, being very independent and towards 
the highly independent end of the scale. At no stage was Ruggie expressly 
mandated by the UN to create either the framework or the Guiding Principles yet 
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 David Weissbrodt and Mira Kruger, “Norms on the Responsibilities of Transnational Corporations and Other 
Business Enterprises with Regard to Human Rights”, The American Journal of International law, Vol.97, No.4, 
Oct 2003,  pp.901 -903 
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http://www2.ohchr.org/english/bodies/subcom/ accessed 08-/10/13 
19
http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Publications/GuidingPrinciplesBusinessHR_EN.pdf accessed 14.01.13 
20
 John Gerard Ruggie (2013) p81 
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took it upon himself to interpret the mandate in this way.21 The 2005 mandate was 
primarily about:  
“…identifying and clarifying standards of corporate responsibility and 
accountability with regard to human rights.”22 
Ruggie is an individual who created soft international law, without mandate while 
being asked to perform a different function for an international organisation. He was 
not instructed by any state in what should be included or excluded from the UNGP, 
but he did have extensive consultations with all stakeholders.23 He demonstrated a 
great deal of independence in producing soft law instruments which would have 
been impossible to create if states had come together to negotiate a similar 
instrument using authorised individuals. 
Both the framework and the UNGPs rest on the same three pillar approach of 
Protect, Respect, and Remedy. Each of the Ruggie pillars, individually, require the 
other two to work effectively and they should all be taken as a whole. One pillar 
should not be pulled away from the others, as the tri-part structure is fundamental to 
the overall shape of the Framework and GPs. Should individual pillars be judged on 
their own merits the whole system is fundamentally being misunderstood. The 
fundamental goal of, first, the framework and later GPs was “to establish a common 
global normative platform and authoritative policy guidance as a basis for making 
cumulative step-by-step progress without foreclosing any other promising longer-
                                                          
21
A full evaluation of Ruggie’s mandates and how he actually how he went about creating new soft international 
law as an independent authorised individual can be seen in Chapter 6. This section on Ruggie intends to look at 
the substance of his creation. 
22
http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2005/sga934.doc.htm accessed 26.10.12 
23
 For examples with consultation with stakeholders please see John Gerard Ruggie (2013) pp. 23-24, 70, 74, 
99-100, 112-119, 125-126  
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term developments.”24 Therefore, the Framework and Guiding Principles are only the 
starting point for a wider long term program of human rights reform for this sector.  
All three pillars should be considered as part of a whole, this section will consider 
each pillar in turn to give a better understanding of what they propose. The first pillar, 
Protect, “refers to the protection by the state against human rights abuse by third 
parties – that is by private actors.”25 In many human rights documents, protection 
from third parties refers to protection from armed groups, or armed non-state actors; 
however, this definition equally applies to business groups. This duty to protect 
against third-party abuse, including business is based on international human rights 
law, both treaty and customary law.26 This duty to protect is highlighted in both the 
framework and implemented within the Guiding Principles under GP 3a27 which 
reminds states of the need to enforce existing laws that already regulate the 
business respect for human rights. Under GP 3c it states “Provide effective guidance 
to business enterprises on how to respect human rights throughout their operations” 
this GP may seem basic, however, it is important, as many businesses are not 
experts on human rights and do not have the ability to understand what they should 
be doing. With its inclusion, it demonstrates the basic level of prior knowledge that 
Ruggie felt had to be addressed through the protect pillar of the framework and 
UNGPs. The protect pillar, which is predominantly the first ten guiding principles set 
out “a series of regulatory and policy measures for states to consider in meeting this 
duty; stress the need to achieve better internal alignment among relevant national 
(and international) policy domains and institutions; and introduce the idea that in 
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 John Gerard Ruggie (2013) p81 
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 John Gerard Ruggie (2013) p83 
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 John Gerard Ruggie (2013) p84 
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 UNGPS 3a Enforce laws that are aimed at, or have the effect of, requiring business enterprises to respect 
human rights, and periodically to assess the adequacy of such laws and address any gaps” 
199 | P a g e  
 
some circumstance states should require companies to exercise human rights due 
diligence.”28 
While the first pillar “Protect” focuses on the state’s duty to protect human rights, the 
second pillar “Respect” is firmly aimed at businesses. As Ruggie argued in 2010: 
“The corporate responsibility to respect human rights cannot be met by words 
alone: it requires specific measures by means of which companies can “know 
and show” that they respect rights.”29 
Part of this “know and show” is the human rights due diligence process created by 
Ruggie, and is set out in GP 17 and further elaborated in guiding principles 18 to 21. 
The due diligence process sets out a formalised method of business engaging in 
positive action in order to prevent human rights abuses. The concept should address 
“Human rights risks are understood to be the business enterprise’s potential adverse 
human rights impacts. Potential impacts should be addressed through prevention or 
mitigation…”30Within this process the old adage of “Prevention is better than a cure” 
is mobilised; companies should ensure that they do not infringe rights even before 
they start their operations within a state. The benefits of the human rights due 
diligence is similar to that of financial due diligence undertaken by business when 
seeking a financial investment, as Ruggie states within the commentary of the 
UNGPs the benefit of undertaking such work:  
“Conducting appropriate human rights due diligence should help business 
enterprises address the risk of legal claims against them by showing that they 
took every step to avoid involvement with an alleged human rights abuse. 
However, business enterprises conducting such due diligence should not 
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assume that, by itself, this will automatically and fully absolve them from 
liability for causing or contributing to human rights abuses.”31 
While the concept of due diligence is useful from a business perspective being a 
term that is familiar to their vocabulary, nevertheless there has been criticism of its 
use, Deva sets out a criticism stating:    
“The SRSG rejected the Norms’ usage of ‘sphere of influence’ for being an 
imprecise concept and mooted ‘due diligence’ as an alternative. However, due 
diligence is merely an approach already well-known to companies; it does not 
settle the question of the scope or territory of responsibilities. A business 
entity is expected to conduct due diligence not in wilderness, but only in 
relation to its operation or entities connected to it. The commentary on the 
Guiding Principles, in effect, implies that due diligence will be relevant in the 
context of the sphere of influence of a company.”32 
Deva states that due diligence is merely a re-definition of the norms sphere of 
influence concept, it actually is a different concept and Deva is wrong with his 
assertion. Primarily, it sets out a physical process in which companies need to 
assess their impact, and it does this in language which is business friendly. 
Compared to the Norms, a legalistic approach may have sounded sensible to 
international human rights lawyers and activists but may as well have been written in 
hieroglyphics to a business that neither understood nor engaged with the concept. 
Therefore, the due diligence concept is far more accessible, easy to use, and 
transparent to the actual end users. The due diligence concept does form a major 
part of the respect pillar yet as Ruggie himself states the overall aim within this 
section was to:  
“Stress the need to engage affected individuals and communities in a 
meaningful way at several stages throughout the process, thereby 
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strengthening the links between businesses and their workers as well as 
businesses and the communities in which they operate.”33 
Stressed throughout this section, including and excluding the due diligence concept 
is this underlining desire to get businesses talking to the local communities to ensure 
that impact can be discussed and measures taken. Emphasis is also placed on 
business to be pro-active, therefore, shifting the focus from what businesses should 
do to help in the event that they have committed rights violation, to what businesses 
should do to prevent rights violation. This shift may seem basic, but is a fundamental 
change in how businesses have been considering human rights. The Respect pillar 
is perhaps the most eye-opening to businesses requiring them to be pro-active in 
measures to limit impact.  
The final pillar is that of “Remedy” covering Guiding Principles 25 to 31. Perhaps the 
most challenging pillar for Ruggie to create was in how to establish a mechanism for 
instances when the first two pillars have failed and rights have been violated. The 
principles in 26-30 cover various measures to encourage a remedy to a rights 
infringement situation these include state-based judicial mechanisms, and various 
non-state based non-judicial mechanisms, alongside non-state-based mechanisms 
and company-level grievance mechanism. Principle 31 states “In order to satisfy the 
effectiveness criteria, non-judicial mechanisms should be legitimate, accessible, 
predictable, equitable, transparent, right-compatible and a source of continuous 
learning.”34 The importance of this pillar is highlighted by Ruggie when he argues: 
“Unless States take appropriate steps to investigate, punish and redress 
business-related human rights abuses they do occur, the State duty to protect 
can be rendered weak or even meaningless.”35 
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This also underlines the important three part structure. Ruggie is aware that the 
remedy section is not as strong as it could be, yet he argues that “it was not possible 
to reach a consensus on it among governments at this time, and that my putting 
forward an overly prescriptive recommendation on the GPs could well jeopardize the 
entire initiative”.36 Ruggie has sacrificed a certain amount of remedy strength in order 
to get workability, i.e. he was pragmatic over a desire to sort the problem out in one 
effort. This underlines that the guiding principles are a start and not a final solution to 
the problem of business and human rights, and that they should not close off any 
future attempts for a more robust system of rights protection. This tri-part structure, 
created out of Ruggie’s own desire to produce an outcome, actually had a real world 
effect, far more than his original mandate was expected to have produced.  
The Ruggie Framework and UNGP’s, while voluntary, set new standards within the 
practice of Business and Human Rights. The importance of the new standards set 
down, can be seen within an effect that they are having on a new generation of 
Bilateral Investment Treaties (BIT). These treaties are drawn up between states and 
“Under the terms of these treaties the capital-importing country provides enforceable 
guarantees to investors from the capital-exporting country. The guarantees include 
standards of treatment to be applied to investors, and provisions for compensation in 
the case of expropriation.”37 They have proved to cause difficulties for human rights 
as the treaties have tended to favour the investor rather than the receiving state. In a 
binding decision reached by international arbitration a BIT between Italy, 
Luxembourg, and receiving South Africa found that provisions within the Black 
Economic Empowerment Act, one of the most significant acts adopted by post-
apartheid government was found not to comply with the BIT and, therefore, South 
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Africa was forced to pay monetary damages.38 While the UNGP’s haven’t had a 
direct effect on the BITs, they have had a secondary influence on them. In April 2012 
the US government issued a new model BIT that stressed the importance of 
protection for investment, but also striking that balance to allow for the receiving 
state government to regulate in the public interest.39 These changes to BITs through 
the influence of the UNGP’s help to prevent the modern gun boat diplomacy of 
TNCs. Whereby the TNC ensure they get their own way or threaten to remove 
investment within a state, or take it to a state willing to provide the conditions that 
they desire. This more responsible attitude towards BITs is an area that is indirectly 
linked to Ruggie’s work but an area that he highlights as one of the next steps that 
need to be taken to provide better human rights protection within business 
investments.40 
The primary issue remained how to bring together Business, States and NGOs to 
create a workable document on upholding human right in business. John Ruggie 
managed to master all of the different interest groups in creating his Guiding 
Principles on Business and Human Rights, which were the implementation of his 
earlier “Protect, Respect and Remedy” framework. No single element of Ruggie’s 
method in achieving this unparalleled success can be picked out and upheld as the 
magic key to the process of international law creation in difficult areas. By examining 
his working methods, mandate and skills we can build a picture of how he achieved 
the Guiding Principles, therefore, when all these elements are taken in combination 
we can see how Ruggie made so much progress.  
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IV. Selection 
The choice of John Ruggie as the SRSG on business and Human Rights was in 
itself an unorthodox selection by Kofi Annan. As Ruggie tells us in his 2005 speech 
at the Wilton Park Conference on Business and Human Rights: 
“I’m not trained as a human rights lawyer, or a lawyer of any kind. For better 
or worse, I am a political scientist who has spent much of his career trying to 
understand, and on a modest scale at the UN deal with, the impact of 
globalization on multilateral rule making and institutions.”41 
The selection of Ruggie, a non-lawyer, can be seen as the results of the UN learning 
from the failure of the Norms and the role of David Weissbrodt in their creation. 
Weissbrodt was the driving force behind the Norms,42 a trained lawyer, with a highly 
focused legalistic approach to the issue. In creating the Norms a supposedly binding 
set of rules on transnational companies and entering the murky issue of 
transnational corporations as subjects of international law, which in itself is highly 
contentious. The Norms failed to gain traction amongst states, and the business and 
human rights issue was increasingly bogged down in doctrinal debates split between 
for and against the Norms. It soon became obvious that for progress to be made a 
new figure would be needed to set a new course. Ruggie the academic in Political 
Science with some UN experience was, therefore, a vastly different choice.  
Ruggie’s CV43 showed he chiefly held academic positions, most significantly as 
Professor of International Relations and Pacific studies at University of California, 
and Professor of International Relations at Columbia University. Ruggie only took up 
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a position within Harvard Law School in 2005,44 around the same time in which he 
was appointed the SRSG. Ruggie as a pure academic is not strictly true either as he 
had experience working within the UN undertaking a role with the development of the 
UN Millennium Goals and UN Global Compact.45 Also working from 1997 to 2001 as 
the United Nations Assistant Secretary-General for Strategic Planning, a post 
created for him by Kofi Annan.46 Therefore, Ruggie was a different type of individual 
coming from a different background to David Weissbrodt, who while also an 
academic turned UN official, took a legalistic approach derived from his background 
within the law. This was in comparison to Ruggie, who took a practical policy based 
approach driven by his background within International Relations and re-affirmed by 
the successful work within the UN, under Secretary General Annan and in roles on 
the Global Compact and Millennium Goals. Ruggie sums up the situation so 
precisely in 2008 when stating: 
“As some of you know, I was appointed in 2005, to pick up the pieces from an 
impasse reached when an expert subsidiary body of the then UN Commission 
on Human Rights proposed a set of draft Norms on transnational corporations 
and other business enterprises.”47 
V. Open Mandates 
The 2005 Mandate,48 which was extended by an additional year in 2007 and the 
2008 Mandate 49 can both be seen as either a wide undefined mandate or narrow 
restrictive mandate. Ruggie appeared to consider it to be the former, but as will be 
seen was also prepared to see it as restrictive when the situation suited him. The 
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former approach was taken by him in a speech to a Business and Human Rights 
seminar at Old Billingsgate in London in 2005: 
“Those of you who have looked at my mandate know how vast in scope it is. I 
have started to carve out different components of it in order to understand 
them better, and to identify the directions in which achievable objectives may 
lie.”50 
Further, in his annual report in 2008 he describes the mandate as:  
“The mandate’s extensive, inclusive and transparent work programme has 
enabled the Special Representative to reflect on the challenges, hear and 
learn from diverse perspectives, and develop ideas about how best to 
proceed.”51 
Closer examination of the mandates does not tally with this analysis. The 2005 
mandate UN Human Rights Council resolution 2005/69 is, if anything, a very limited 
mandate of what is required from the SRSG. The substantive parts of the mandate 
are below: 
“(a) To identify and clarify standards of corporate responsibility and 
accountability for transnational corporations and other business enterprises 
with regard to human rights; 
(b) To elaborate on the role of States in effectively regulating and 
adjudicating the role of transnational corporations and other business 
enterprises with regard to human rights, including through international 
cooperation; 
(c) To research and clarify the implications for transnational corporations 
and other business enterprises of concepts such as “complicity” and “sphere 
of influence”; 
(d) To develop materials and methodologies for undertaking human rights 
impact assessments of the activities of transnational corporations and other 
business enterprises; 
(e) To compile a compendium of best practices of States and transnational 
corporations and other business enterprises;”52 
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Nothing on this mandate speaks of anything vast or extensive in scope, point "a" 
requires identification and clarification, point "d" requires two terms to be clarified. 
Nothing within the scope is that much of an issue. If anything, the mandate should be 
seen as too narrow to deal with the issue of human rights and business. The 2008 
mandate53 is even less well defined than that of the 2005 mandate; point "b" in the 
2008 mandate asks Ruggie “to elaborate further on the scope and content of the 
corporate responsibility to respect all human rights and to provide concrete guidance 
to business and other stakeholders.”54 Point "e" invited him “To Identify, exchange 
and promote best practices and lessons learned on the issue of transnational 
corporations and other business enterprises, in coordination with the efforts of the 
human rights working group of the Global Compact.”55 
Both of these points are fairly narrow but flexible in terms of language as to what is 
inside and what is outside the scope of the mandate. Ruggie’s genius was in taking 
these loose mandates and turning them into the framework and guiding principles. 
Ruggie’s status as an independent authorised individual is clear from an examination 
of both mandates and the results achieved. At no point in the original objectives in 
the 2005 mandate56 is there an express mandate for Ruggie to create a framework. 
At best, point “e” to compile a compendium of best practices of states and 
transnational corporations and other business enterprises” would, at a push, cover 
this achievement. As Ruggie set out in the Wilton Park Conference Speech “I don’t 
have a precise roadmap or even a fixed destination for the mandate”57 therefore, he 
created the Framework and because Ruggie had gained stakeholders’ trust it was 
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acceptable to all sides. The flexibility within the mandate has achieved a very 
positive constructive result. Ruggie even points this out himself when describing his 
mandate as: 
“I viewed the mandate not merely as a research and drafting exercise, but as 
a global campaign of sorts, to reframe a stalemated policy debate and 
establish global standards and authoritative policy guidance.”58 
Certainly, both mandates do not openly express these notions; therefore, Ruggie 
pushed his mandate to the limit in his capacity as an independent authorised 
individual. 
At other times, Ruggie also played down the scope of the mandate. In 2008 at a 
conference on Business and Human Rights, in a transcript from a discussion with 
Devin Stewart he sets out the appeal of taking the SGSR post: 
“The sucker lure was ‘this is a two-year assignment. It's basically desk-based. 
We want you to do some research on what are the prevailing standards out 
there, because there is great confusion. And then you'll be on your way.’”59 
Reinforcing this point in 2009 in a strongly worded letter to Jose Aylwin in response 
to the Buenos Aires NGO statement, stating that: 
“In 2005, I was given a two-year desk-based mandate, intended to “identify 
and clarify” existing standards and practices.”60 
Further, indicated in his response to Submission to the UN Special Representative of 
the Secretary-General from the Civil Society Groups across Asia out that his role 
was allegedly part time and was entirely pro bono, that he had a full-time job 
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teaching at Harvard61 on top of the UN commitments. Ruggie’s work was not as 
“desk-based” as he is making out above, but certainly from an examination of the 
mandates this conclusion could be reached.  
The confusion as to the scale of his mandate is broadened by Ruggie himself as 
whether he was meant to be creating a new framework, in his interim report he 
stated: 
“While the Special Representative of the Secretary-General indicated in his 
interim report that developing such materials and methodologies would be 
beyond the mandate’s time and resource constraints, this report describes 
principles and characteristics of human rights impact assessments for 
business, including similarities to environmental and social impact 
assessments, and provides updates on current initiatives.”62 
Later in 2009 in response to criticism that he was not doing enough, he argued: 
“In short, initially I was given what looked very much like an “academic” 
mandate, and I turned it into a step-by-step process of policy development—
quite the opposite of what you claim, as I hope you now see.”63 
These different notions of whether he went beyond the mandate or not, is not 
completely clear. In part, it appears that Ruggie used the different interpretations of 
the mandate to his own benefit when it suited him, therefore, when the critical Jose 
Aylwin wrote to him64 he was able to demonstrate he was doing far more than 
expected. From reviewing the mandates and what Ruggie created, it is clear that 
while his actions were within the spirit of the mandate he clearly went beyond what 
was expected of him. This was essential as it gave him the freedom to develop ideas 
and solutions without the pressure of expectation or the limits of a mandate holding 
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or pulling the work in one particular direction. The loose nature of the mandate feeds 
into the very difficult issue that Ruggie was trying to deal with and the failure of 
finding a pervious solution to human rights and business. In only giving a mandate 
open to the interpretation issues that can be seen above it gave him plenty of 
freedom to get the job done. 
VI. Approach 
Ruggie’s approach to finding a solution to the issue was innovative and forward 
facing. In taking a research “evidence-based approach”65 he addressed the concerns 
of all the stakeholders, i.e. Governments, TNC’s, NGOs and victims. All elements of 
his work required turning the mandate “into a step-by-step process of policy 
development”66 consultation with these different actors. Most important was reaching 
out to them all without alienating any particular group, across the globe, and 
ensuring that one particular group did not exert too much pressure upon the process. 
He held six regional consultations67 over the course of both mandates. These 
regional consultations brought together all stakeholders under one roof for up to two 
day events discussing various elements of the mandate, with each consultation 
taking a particular focus. The Asian Regional consultation, for example, “brought 
together 76 participants from 20 countries, representing 44 non-governmental 
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organisations and trade unions; 20 representatives from the private sector and 12 
“other” institutions.”68 Whereas the Latin American consultation “brought together 
more than 90 participants from 12 Latin American countries, representing 21 
different companies, 41 civil society organisations, trade unions and representatives 
of indigenous people, and 9 public institutions.”69 
Holding that many regional consultations is unprecedented by an SRSG mandate 
holder. This allowed him to reach out to all these stakeholders to build trust in the 
work that he was undertaking. It also allowed interaction, on a personal level, with 
many stakeholders, instead of creating policy from a distance in the academic ivory 
tower or the international organisation equivalent. This approach allowed for 
engagement which was open and honest, both from Ruggie’s perspective and those 
of the stakeholders.  
Specialised consultations for different business sectors, financial and extractive, 
alongside a further six legal workshops focusing on the legal elements of the 
mandate, each considered a different question raised by the mandates. Less 
specialised consultations were also held each year between 2007 and 2010. These 
specialised consultations let important, but highly technical issues, be discussed by 
those with interest in these areas in an attempt to find solutions, without the fear of 
interference from groups who did not have the expertise and, therefore, may have 
found the discussions hard to follow. The approach taken also incorporated a series 
of legal workshops which addressed the pros and cons of various legal strategies 
and remedies, based in various locations across the globe. For example, the 2006 
New York workshop discussed the principled basis for attributing human rights 
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obligations to companies under international law.70 These legal workshops were 
important for the non-lawyer Ruggie but also showed his willingness to interact with 
the variety of opinion, academic and practical on such a difficult and challenging 
question. In total, he conducted some forty-seven formal consultations around the 
world, alongside numerous visits to key capitals, and close informal links to 
governments and other stakeholders.71 Through the multi-stakeholder and global 
consultations he fulfilled the role of letting everyone have their input. This allowed 
Ruggie to then cherry pick the best ideas to come out of these meetings or follow up 
on the concerns raised.   
One theme that ran throughout the consultations was the willingness of the 
stakeholders to get involved within the consultations in order to produce a workable 
solution. The extent of the consultations was underlined in a letter from Ruggie to 
Jose Aylwin when he stated: 
“five regional consultations to date, all in developing countries; some fifteen 
multi-stakeholder expert consultations addressing specific subjects and 
drawing on participants from all sectors of society and all regions; numerous 
personal site visits to communities and company operations; and a massive 
research effort that has clarified for all actors some of the most critical and 
controversial issues pertaining to business and human rights.”72 
This engagement with the consultations was important on a different level that it 
lowered the metaphorical barriers between those proposing a new UN framework 
and those actually going to be affected by it. Therefore, by getting all those 
stakeholders involved meant that they had a reputational cost in the process. In 
essence reducing the hostility towards an end result, which would not be exactly 
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what one particular group envisaged, and as such they all felt like contributors 
towards the final document. If the reputational cost73 was significantly high enough, 
stakeholders would be more inclined to want a successful document, as no one 
wants (especially TNC’s after pumping millions of dollars into the process) to be 
associated with failure.  
A key stakeholder within the process was the victims of abuse. Therefore, special 
efforts were made to reach victims using relevant civil society networks, contacting 
national human rights institutions about the consultation and invited participants.74 
This extended to his personal involvement in meeting different groups and was 
underlined in a speech to the UN General Assembly in October 2008:  
“I have met personally with indigenous peoples groups and other affected 
communities, with workers in global supply chains, and with labor leaders 
whose colleagues were killed by paramilitaries protecting company assets.”75 
Therefore, his consultations were not just with the TNC’s and NGOs but also victims, 
giving a broad range of views and seeing the issue affecting people first hand.  
Ruggie’s approach was just one of many that he could have taken; the main other 
would have been to attempt to bring states together to create a new treaty on 
Business and Human Rights, especially after completion of the first mandate in 
2008. In a May 2008 article to Ethical Corporation Magazine, Ruggie sets out why 
this would not be a great idea:  
“But it is my carefully considered view that negotiations on an overarching 
treaty now would be unlikely to get off the ground, and even if they did the 
outcome could well leave us worse off than we are today.”76 
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“First, treaty-making can be painfully slow, while the challenges of business 
and human rights are immediate and urgent. Second, and worse, a treaty-
making process now risks under mining effective shorter-term measures to 
raise business standards on human rights. And third, even if treaty obligations 
were imposed on companies, serious questions remain about how they would 
be enforced.”77 
“Even if we were to go down the treaty route, we still need immediate 
solutions to the escalating challenge of corporate human rights abuses. UN 
high commissioner for human rights Louise Arbour has put this well, saying: “it 
would be frankly very ambitions to promote only binding norms considering 
how long this would take and how much damage could be done in the 
meantime.””78 
The indication in this article appears that he believed the treaty creation process 
would be more of a hindrance than a practical help at this time. It would detract too 
much from his work and also place too much work on states having to take the lead, 
whereas if he maintained his previous approach of consultation and recommendation 
making he would retain far more control over the document produced.  
The approach was not particularly innovative in terms of a radical departure from 
what might be expected, but was innovative in terms of an almost academic 
research project being undertaken, producing workable documents, the 2005 
mandate creating the “Protect, Respect, and Remedy” framework. The desire for a 
common framework was underlined by Ruggie when at the UN General Assembly he 
stated: 
“One theme ran throughout my consultations. Every stakeholder group, 
despite their other differences, expressed the urgent need for a common 
framework of understanding, a foundation on which thinking and action can 
build in a cumulative fashion going forward.”79 
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This whole approach was centrally controlled by Ruggie and his team as they 
conducted and managed the process.80 The team determined where and when 
consultations happened, how they happened, controlled the agendas of discussions, 
spoke to the NGO groups he wanted to listen to, produced the summary of 
discussions and decided who and when would undertake research. Therefore, he 
centrally controlled what issues were tackled, and which solutions best fitted into his 
conceptual solution. This meant the framework and guiding principles were a product 
of his educated view and refined by the research undertaken, though with the level of 
control he could push the process in the direction he desired.  
VII. Language 
As important as the consultations and approach to the work was the language, 
phrases and ability that Ruggie has as an orator. This section will explore some of 
the themes and choices of language that Ruggie used during his time as SRSG, 
considering how his choice of language and the charisma that he brought was 
fundamental to the success of the mandate. One of the key language based 
concepts Ruggie uses is reiteration. This happens numerous times through his work, 
often when speaking to different audiences and at different times during the 
mandates. This helped to reinforce the messages to the audience, a key tool to keep 
the focus on the work being undertaken, e.g. reminding people about the failure of 
the Norms. 
One example of reiteration Ruggie points to is the importance of the mandate in 
making a comparison between the Victorian era variant of globalisation and the 
collapse of Laissez-faire politics with the rise of ugly “isms” which were bad for 
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business and human rights. This is similar to a concern that a failure to fill the gap 
between global markets and workers concerns could fuel a similar rise of intolerant 
nationalism.81 He later uses the same argument in his Interim Report82 in 2006, also 
using a very similar, but re-phrased argument in remarks delivered at a forum on 
Corporate Social Responsibility in Germany 2006.83 He, again, used the same 
argument in his conclusion in the 2007 report.84 
One of Ruggie’s favoured phrases to remind people that while he is the SRSG he 
does not have a magic solution to the issues of business and human rights, he uses 
the term “Silver Bullet”. The importance of this phrase is underlined in Chapter 2 of 
his book reviewing his own work is entitled “No Silver Bullet”85. Examples of its use in 
reminding people are: 
“The extensive research and consultations conducted for this mandate 
demonstrate that no single silver bullet can resolve the business and human 
rights challenge. A broad array of measures is required, by all relevant actors. 
Mapping existing and emerging standards and practices was an essential first 
step.”86 
“There is no single silver bullet solution to closing the global governance gaps 
in the business and human rights domain. But for the sake of the victims of 
corporate-related human rights abuse, and to sustain globalization itself as a 
positive force, they must be closed.”87 
This phrasing is used throughout both mandates, at various different times in order 
to remind individuals that his work will take time, often tailoring it towards a particular 
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group for instance in Copenhagen 2009 at a consultation on “The role of States in 
Effectively Regulating and Adjudicating the Activities of Corporations with respect to 
Human Rights” he stated: 
“The SRSG explained in his opening remarks that he saw no “single silver 
bullet” solution to the many issues raised in his mandate, including states’ 
roles.” 88 
It was also used in UN reports in 200889 and 2009,90 additionally at the public 
hearing on business and human rights sub-committee on Human Rights European 
Parliament in Brussels.91 Further, it was used in speeches at the Yale Law School,92 
in a keynote address in Atlanta,93 and at the Trygve Lie Symposium on Fundamental 
Freedoms.94 In using this phrase time and time again it helps to reinforce the idea 
that finding a solution is not easy or clear cut. By using the imagery of the silver 
bullet it brings to mind tough and difficult challenges, often silver bullets being 
associated with mythology. Ruggie is underlining that while the expectation levels 
are high, he is doing the best he can, and yet no easy solution is available to him 
and his team.  
A different element of Ruggie’s skill as an orator is the charisma that he brings to 
public speaking, this is done in a number of different ways, but he is highly skilled 
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within this field. One method that he uses to break barriers down with audiences is to 
use humour, or a personal remark. In Montreal he uses a joke about supporting 
funding for himself: 
“Among my favorite “actionable ideas” from previous roundtables is No. 5.4. I 
quote: “Canada should continue its ongoing financial support of the work of 
John Ruggie…Canada should also promote and extend diplomatic support to 
the outcomes of his mandate.” After careful review and consideration, I find 
myself able wholeheartedly to endorse that recommendation! All kidding 
aside, the government of Canada has been supportive right from the start, for 
which I am deeply grateful.”95 
A different example of the humour that he gives across is in explaining to an 
audience how he accepted the position of special representative. 
“On the principle that no good deed should go unpunished, after I left the UN 
and Kofi Annan was asked to find a special representative for business and 
human rights, he called me up, right after I'd had serious surgery and was 
under the influence of drugs, and said, "I have just the job for you. You need 
to become my Special Representative for Business and Human Rights." And, 
not knowing any better, I said yes. That's how I got involved in this.”96 
Without really explaining his personal motivation behind taking the position, he again 
lowers barriers, telling them something personal, and then giving a humorous 
reasoning as to why he took the job of SRSG. He, therefore, closes any later 
questions as to the real motivations behind taking such a difficult role. Another 
method of breaking barriers down is when Ruggie talks himself down; he did this at 
Wilton Park in 2005 and performs the same trick in a speech in 2008 when stating: 
“But being a mere political scientist by training, I am also somewhat humbled 
as I stand before you. It is true that my undergraduate college has bestowed 
on me a doctorate of laws—but the parchment also says honoris causa, which 
is probably some secret vow only other lawyers understand. And although I 
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am an affiliated professor in international legal studies at Harvard Law School, 
this puts me in the unenviable position of having to teach law students things I 
was never taught.”97 
This is a clever idea as he is expressing that the difficult task he has been given is 
an area in which he is no expert, therefore, he needs the help of these in the room 
and wider stakeholders in order to accomplish the mandates.  
At a different speech in London after the conclusion of the first mandate, Ruggie 
uses a personal event, the birth of his son in the city to connect with audience, after 
praising London as the place of so many innovative corporate citizenship initiatives.98 
Later in the same speech at Clifford Chance he makes a comparison between his 
recent work and the T.S. Eliot poem “Little Gidding”, focusing on the following lines 
and adding a postfix to reach a conclusion of his speech: 
“We shall not cease from exploration 
And the end of all our exploring 
Will be to arrive where we started 
And know the place for the first time. 
To which I would only add that the exploration was necessary. Now let the 
real work begin. And let us do it together, in the recognition that the stakes are 
incredibly high – for human rights, for business, and for governance on our 
ever-smaller planet.”99 
It may seem a simplistic analysis, but adding in these personal, humorous, or 
interesting remarks helped Ruggie to get the audience’s attention and keep their 
focus on what he was saying. These types of remarks help the speech to stick in the 
mind as the remark will, more likely, be remembered and brought up in conversation, 
allowing memories of the substance of the speech to be recalled alongside these 
other remarks. Finally, these observations help space out the important take home 
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message points of the speech, while not detracting from the overall themes, 
therefore, giving adequate time between the important and the less important 
information. 
Ruggie’s choice of language also comes into its own when dealing with issues or 
questions that are either attacking his work, or when he feels the need to defend 
what he was doing. When dealing with the Buenos Aires NGO statement, he uses 
conciliatory language to be firm that he believes they are wrong, but also respectful 
of their view point, seeking to correct a “misunderstandings or misinterpretations – 
before they take on a life of their own and are repeated as fact.”100 Also firmly 
making the point that: 
“Everything I have described above is in the public domain and could easily 
have been verified prior to finalizing the “Statement.” (For regular updates, 
please visit http://www.business-
humanrights.org/Gettingstarted/UNSpecialRepresentative.)”101 
Ruggie manages to strike that difficult balance between being firm that he is right, 
while also giving time to the points or issues that a concerned stakeholder had 
raised. It must also be considered that Ruggie did reply to this group, when it may 
have been easier to ignore them, and to continue with his work. At other times 
Ruggie expands his work so it is inclusive, in a letter response to NGOs after the 
Latin American consultations Ruggie writes:  
“Many thanks again for your constructive participation at the Bogotà 
consultations. The dialogue was open and sometimes intense, but I feel 
strongly that everyone went away with a better understanding of the 
challenges we face – I know for certain that I did.”102 
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In this letter extract Ruggie uses language such as “we face” therefore, ensuring that 
those that sent him the letter feel as much part of the challenge in creating a 
business and human rights mechanism as himself. This helps reinforce the idea of 
the consultations to take stakeholders with him and feel included in the process. 
Ruggie is very clever with how he uses language in order to gain trust and respect 
from all stakeholders. Talking to all stakeholders and Ruggie’s approachability can 
be seen in the widely recounted tale of Ruggie’s visit to the province of Cajamarca, 
in Peru,103 in which a mining operation between Denver based Newmont Mining and 
Peru’s largest publicly traded precious metals company, Compania de Minas 
Buenaventura, had caused large amounts of hostility between its operation of a gold 
mine and the local population.104 When visiting the area, Ruggie visited not only the 
companies area of operation speaking to company officials and the local Mayor105 
but also a former Priest called Marco Arana, known to his supporters as the red 
priest and acting on behalf of the local population.106 Arana recalled the, now often 
repeated, line as why it was common practice to blockade the mine, “They don’t 
listen to us when we come with small problems, so we have to create big ones.”107 
Perhaps as important as the story itself is to the issues between TNC’s and local 
populations, is how Ruggie approached each different group getting them to tell him 
about the problems and issues that they were having. By talking, not just to the 
TNC’s, Governments, and NGOs, but by talking to the easy to forget local groups 
Ruggie managed to build relationships with all stakeholders. This methodology 
ensures that the often perceived image of taking sides when new individuals come 
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into highly contentious situations is not started or built upon. In doing this he gained 
the trust and respect of stakeholders, especially individuals, who often feel isolated 
from these big international global projects. The approach of actually talking to 
people and gaining trust is vastly different to a legalistic approach that would be 
expected from lawyers, often associated with arrogance and a know-all mind-set. A 
typical joke that has been told on the arrogance of lawyers goes:   
Q. What's the difference between a cat and a lawyer? 
A. One's an arrogant creature that will ignore you contemptuously unless it 
thinks it can get something out of you. The other is a house pet.108 
Therefore, for an example of Ruggie’s rather humble approach, consider the Wilton 
Park Speech “I’m not trained as a human rights lawyer, or a lawyer of any kind”109 or, 
“At this point I don’t have a precise roadmap or even a fixed destination for the 
mandate.”110 This is anything but arrogant, but is essentially respectful and trust 
building. This use of language to talk to those not usually considered important 
enough or using humble language allowed Ruggie to build a far bigger picture than 
previous attempts at finding a solution. 
Linked to this idea of the content of Ruggie’s speeches, are the length of speeches 
that he delivers. He seems to always ensure that they do not take up too much time, 
so the audience’s attention is not lost. On paper, the prepared remarks from 
speeches are usually between six to seven pages and the audio version is roughly 
around twenty minutes long. The speeches usually tend to always take the same 
structure, starting with an introductory statement thanking the place or people for 
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hosting the event at which he is speaking. The opening section will generally focus 
on the failure of the Weissbrodt Norms and also the wider failures to create a 
solution to the business and human rights issue. Next, Ruggie explains the work to 
the point at which he is speaking, usually explaining back to an issue that concerns 
his mandate from the General Assembly or the Human Rights Council. Moving onto 
the main substance of the speech, this will normally be tailored to the audience. For 
example, at the International Institute for Conflict Prevention and resolution he spoke 
about conflict resolution between indigenous peoples and TNCs.111 Ruggie will then 
outline a proposed solution to the issue, sometimes this may only be a loose idea but 
towards the end of both mandates usually a more concrete proposal that should help 
in future. Finally, he will conclude his speech with a positive aspect of his solution 
and sum up the rest of the speech. This speech structure is important as it allows for 
speeches to be tailor made for the audience, yet they are all part of the same series 
saving time during preparation of speeches, of which he gave many. The main take 
home points are, therefore, always easily accessible, and the message, especially 
about the importance of the work due to the failure of the Norms is always repeated. 
Within all his speeches, Ruggie has a talent of being able to take the listener with 
him. His delivery of speeches is very good; the confidence of his words comes 
across as if what he is saying should not be doubted. The delivery is exceptional and 
puts the right emphasis in the right places, to make the speeches dramatic and 
demonstrate his personal charisma.  
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VIII. Principled Pragmatism 
More important than a phrase or use of language, “Principled Pragmatism” was 
Ruggie and his team’s main methodology and working philosophy underpinning 
everything that was undertaken. This sub-section will explore what principled 
pragmatism means, and how this terminology was used to great effect. Principled 
pragmatism sounds like a phrase that a politician would use to describe how they 
work, or what political philosophy they subscribe to, and is perhaps the closest 
explanation to the term. This terminology is defined within the 2006 interim report.112 
Ruggie heads a sub-section of the report section setting out strategic directions 
entitled “Principled pragmatism” with this section of the report how he intends to 
accomplish the mandate. Setting out what this phrase means in the final paragraph: 
“In the Special Representative’s case, the basis for those judgements might 
best be described as a principled form of pragmatism: an unflinching 
commitment to the principle of strengthening the promotion and protection of 
human rights as it relates to business, coupled with a pragmatic attachment to 
what works best in creating change where it matters most - in the daily lives of 
people.”113 
In 2008, Ruggie refines what he means by principled pragmatism stating: 
“The very first time I ever made any remarks on this mandate I was asked to 
describe my approach to this, and I called it principled pragmatism. It is driven 
by principle, the principle that we need to strengthen the human rights regime 
to better respond to corporate-related human rights challenges and respond 
more effectively to the needs of victims. But it is utterly pragmatic in how to 
get from here to there. The determinant for choosing alternative paths is 
which ones provide the best mix of effectiveness and feasibility. That is what 
we have been trying to do with this mandate since 2005.”114 
Whilst never giving a complete definition of what is meant by the concept he speaks 
about its success in 2010 interim report when stating: 
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“The Financial Times reports that the Special Representative “has won 
unprecedented backing across the battle lines from both business and 
pressure groups for his proposals for tougher international standards for 
business and governments”. He is immensely grateful to everyone who has 
supported and participated in the mandate’s comprehensive and inclusive 
process, and the progress achieved to date. Principled pragmatism has 
helped turn a previously divisive debate into constructive dialogues and 
practical action paths.”115 
Perhaps principled pragmatism is best defined and described as Ruggie’s response 
to a comment raised after meeting indigenous peoples in Latin American, when 
challenged that he needed to speak more from the heart, Ruggie responded with: 
“I will let my heart drive my commitment to human rights. But I’ll need my 
head to steer the heart through the very difficult global terrain on which we are 
travelling.”116 
While Ruggie uses this concept, to help explain the methodology of his work, the 
flexibility of the term has also allowed him to develop the meaning, therefore 
ensuring that he did not seem to contradict himself as his work progressed, and 
giving him room to explore the mandate but remain in control of the overall direction 
of the project. With using an ill-defined term he also meant he did not commit himself 
to doing anything that he would later regret. The concept is brought up again in 
Ruggie’s final report117 when he talks of the results of principled pragmatism, again 
refining the concept to encompass all the elements and directions that his work had 
taken off.  
In essence, this terminology appears to be exactly what it sets out to be, not just a 
methodology but also a philosophical concept underpinning the direction from which 
Ruggie and the team were working from. Instead of taking a legalistic approach, 
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which would be alien to the politically trained Ruggie, he intended to navigate the 
tricky task by sticking to Human Rights principles initially undefined as to what these 
were. The pragmatic part was ensuring that actual real progress is made in making 
progress towards a solution within the Business and Human Rights question. It 
seems to reflect the idea expressed by Schieder: 
“Rather than viewing international law as a collection of norms that lay claim 
to a mental existence detached from their creation and application, 
pragmatism allows us to describe international law as an evaluative social 
process.”118 
The loose nature of which Human Rights principles they would be encompassing or 
promoting within the Framework and Guiding Principles was not specified. As 
consultation with stakeholders progressed, the human rights documents which all 
stakeholders could agree on were the “International Bill of Human Rights (the 
Universal Declaration and the two Covenants), coupled with the ILO Declaration on 
Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work, all of which are widely endorsed by the 
International Community.”119 Therefore, as these documents and rights could be 
agreed upon it made sense to the pragmatic Ruggie to use the rights within these 
documents, therefore, meaning that he did not need to reinvent the wheel, instead 
using wheels readily available off the shelf.  
“An authoritative “list” of internationally recognized rights already exists and 
does not need to be reinvented.”120 
This journey by Ruggie and his team towards picking these documents to form the 
principal part was a process which happened over many years and only after much 
consultation and legal research from the team. When Ruggie first used this 
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terminology there was no indication as to what principles he would follow or even if 
this meant creating a new set of principles that would broadly reflect stakeholder’s 
interest. 
The pragmatism element towards the methodology possesses an even more 
important element to Ruggie, having seen the failure of the Norms and David 
Weissbrodt, he did not want to follow the same course. Ruggie, the political scientist, 
could see the failure of the legalistic norms which were created with little consultation 
and were very much a legal instrument symbolising how a lawyer would tackle the 
business and human rights issue, therefore, workability was far more important:  
“The Guiding Principles are not an international treaty, although they include 
both hard and soft law elements. Nor are they intended to be a tool kit, its 
components simply to be taken off the shelf and plugged in, although they are 
meant to guide policy and practice. The Guiding Principles constitute a 
normative platform and high-level policy prescriptions for strengthening the 
protection of human right against corporate-related harm.”121 
On a practical level during the development phase the pragmatic part of this 
methodology was that nothing would be committed to until agreement had been 
reached or tested by stakeholders as Buhamnn states: 
“The gradual development of findings and recommendations was made in a 
way that allowed stakeholders the possibility to make comments. That 
approach therefore also allowed the SRSG the opportunity to test ideas and 
proposals, and integrate them into later stages of the process and its written 
outputs (reports).”122 
The workability as part of pragmatism is seen with the strategic aim set out by 
Ruggie within the process, in his book he highlights that his strategic aim was not to 
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provide a definitive fix all solution to all the issues, but initially to supply a focal point 
in a difficult area.  
“I envisioned a model of widely distributed efforts and cumulative change. But 
for such efforts to cohere and become mutually reinforcing, they require an 
authoritative focal point that the relevant actors can rally around. Providing 
that focal point become my strategic aim.”123 
This deep rooted desire for workability, a key component of pragmatism ensured that 
the creation of the Framework and GPs did not get bogged down in legalistic issues 
in which Ruggie was not trained or had shown particular interest in grappling with 
long winded rights or doctrinal issues. Ruggie was concerned about the 
consequences of not following at this deep rooted workability leading to a pragmatic 
approach: 
“Finally, I wanted at all cost to avoid having my mandate become entrapped in 
or sidetracked by lengthy intergovernmental negotiations over a legal text, 
which I judged would be inconclusive at best and possibly even 
counterproductive. It was too important to get the parameters and perimeters 
of business and human rights locked down in authoritative policy terms, which 
could be acted on immediately and on which future progress could be built. 
Therefore, I took great care to base the mandatory elements of the Guiding 
Principles on the implications of existing legal standards for states and 
business; to supplement those with policy rationales intended to speak to the 
interests and values of both sets of actors; and in addition to Human Rights 
Council endorsement, I also sought to have core elements of the Guiding 
Principles adopted as policy requirements by other entities with the authority 
and responsibility to do that. In short, I aimed for a formula that was politically 
authoritative, not a legally binding instrument.”124 
As seen in the quote above, pragmatism was central to working towards a solution 
which was workable, i.e. not legally binding but derived its authority from a political 
base. This was a notion that Ruggie, trained as a political scientist, would have been 
far more comfortable with, especially after his work on the UN millennium goals, 
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which derive their authority from political commitments. The notion of political 
authority may also seem a far more workable concept to Ruggie in the business and 
human rights environment, due to the large quantity of actors and stakeholders. It 
would be impossible for a legally based system to hold any legal authority, especially 
if that legal authority was derived from a treaty or required states to implement 
certain legal standards. As Buhmann notes:  
“The SRSG process is an example of a politically pragmatic process towards 
a legally pragmatic output. With the Human Rights Council’s endorsement of 
the Guiding Principles, legal work on normative details will deliver the 
compliance “pull” that will make them effective beyond simply coming into 
existence.”125 
While only being a political authority, this could be enough to get compliance with the 
Guiding Principles. The notion of opening up norms creation to non-state actors, not 
just in terms of political derived authority, but also in terms of a global governance 
role using a global public domain, was something that Ruggie had considered at 
length in a 2004 article.126 Ruggie argues that non-state actors can influence the 
development of norms through their use of a global public domain whereby they can 
exercise their powers. Bringing TNC’s inside the Business and Human Rights 
process reflecting them as stakeholders was an extension and realisation of this 
argument.  
The simplicity of this terminology is part of the genius of principled pragmatism, and 
as the term had not been used before, it allowed Ruggie to construct a meaning as 
to its application within international norm creation. By using the term, Ruggie could 
use his status as an independent authorised individual to take the mandate forward 
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in unforeseen ways, using principled pragmatism as the mechanism. The use of the 
terminology allowed for an evolution of policy in the direction which the consultations 
with stakeholders took the work. Therefore, by sticking to the methodology Ruggie 
did not have to commit to a particular outcome, certainly when he started he did not 
appear to have a strategic end goal in mind.   
Principled pragmatism, should not be viewed as a completely original idea, 
pragmatism within international law has been around for a long time. Schieder 
provides two important insights into why pragmatism within international law, more 
generally, has been a useful tool: 
“Legal pragmatism today includes such figures as Daniel Farber (1995), 
Thomas Grey (1998) and Judge Richard Posner (1995, 2003). This 
heterogeneous legal movement has in common that it emanates from the 
pragmatist conception of law, according to which law is above all, a social tool 
for the effective handling of problems.”127 
“Pragmatism provides yet another angle for viewing the matter, one in which 
the states’ right to sovereignty, on the one side, and the necessary protection 
of human rights, on the other, are weighed against each other in a political 
process in which decisions are questioned with regard to consequences.”128 
To the international relations expert Ruggie, these concepts would have been 
familiar. Ruggie adopted the first insight using law as an effective social tool to solve 
problems, certainly the Ruggie Framework three pillars approach is using law to 
solve on-going problem of businesses failure to take minimum Human Rights 
standards into account. The second insight is even more apparent to the issue of 
business and human rights, with the added ingredient of TNC’s, therefore, 
pragmatism provides the only workable solution.  
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Reflection of principled pragmatism is seen in the strategic paths taken by Ruggie 
and his team. Ruggie talks about these strategic paths in both the Sackler lecture,129 
and names chapter 4 of his book130 after them. In total, Ruggie maps out six different 
pathways. These pathways underline how principled pragmatism can be used to set 
out a workable solution to the problem; for instance, the pathway creating a common 
knowledge base,131 was essential to finding a pragmatic way forward. Unless 
everyone shared the same common base lines, different ideas would mean different 
things to different actors, making it impossible to agree on the most basic ideas. 
Road testing the ideas was a great example of this concept. For example, human 
rights due diligence with 10 Dutch companies132 or grievance mechanism was tested 
by four companies in four different sectors.133 Doing this got over the issue that 
“routine objections by those who would be affected by new rules and don’t like them 
is to claim that the rules won’t work in practice.”134 The road testing was a pragmatic 
way in ensuring that the Guiding Principles were not rejected out of hand. The final 
example of strategic paths as a demonstration of Principled Pragmatism was 
“ensuring process legitimacy”,135 which was essentially a pragmatic idea. The notion 
was to get businesses and other stakeholders on board with what Ruggie and his 
team were attempting to do, this would involve that notion already discussed that by 
getting stakeholders onside they were more likely to actually implement the Guiding 
Principles. A different example of the use of principled pragmatism in action was 
when Ruggie used it to turn NGO’s opinions on his work by openly engaging with 
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them in order to undertake research on his and the mandates behalf. One example 
illustrated by Buhmann but worth repeating in full is: 
“One particularly interesting example of the SRSG’s approach was his 
invitation in December 2005 to the IOE [Institute of Export] to develop 
guidelines for companies to deal with dilemma situations encountered in 
“weak governance zones”. In undertaking this work, the IOE would liaise with 
its members and other business organisations, including the ICC and the 
Business and Industry Advisory Committee (BIAC) of the OECD. Recall that 
the IOE and ICC had been strongly opposed to the draft UN Norms. Engaging 
them in work on human rights dilemmas in weak governance zones might 
look like letting the fox into the henhouse. As it turned out, the move resulted 
in a change in stances within those organisations and probably in the support 
among them and their members of the worked and recommendations of the 
SRSG, and a reference to international human rights law as a fallback 
position for companies working in areas where national law is lacking.”136 
This is not only an example of Ruggie’s ability to change minds, but also the practical 
effects that stakeholder inclusion can bring through the use of principled pragmatism. 
From an objective point of view, principled pragmatism was the mechanism that 
allowed Ruggie to succeed where so many had failed before him. The use of this 
methodology raises a number of questions regarding how law should be created. 
The notion of principled pragmatism means that, at the outset, there is no idea of 
what the final concept is going to be, while this has been seen to be extremely useful 
to an independent authorised individual it has its shortcomings in several aspects. 
Firstly, it creates uncertainty for all actors involved, they have no idea what they 
could or might be supporting, and for instance TNC’s could have ended up 
supporting a document that actually hindered their business interests. Alongside this, 
it also creates legal uncertainty in terms of the final document, or when this will be 
produced. The Guiding Principles and Framework Ruggie refers to as “for its 
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implementation aim to establish a common global normative platform and 
authoritative policy guidance as a basis for making cumulative step-by step, progress 
without foreclosing any other promising longer-term developments.”137The UNGP are 
not the end game, so we are left in legal uncertainty as to what the final product of 
the business and human rights issue is or will be.   
An examination of the mandate of the Working Group on the issue of human rights 
and transitional corporations and other business enterprises,138 set up as the next 
step without Ruggie’s driving force the mandate does not set any definitive goals or 
outcomes for the Working Group. Without an individual willing, or able to step out 
and become an independent authorised individual progress could easily become 
stagnated. The working groups mandate promotes ideas of Ruggie’s Principled 
Pragmatism, establishing a forum to interact with stakeholders,139 to receive 
feedback on the Guiding Principles and make recommendations upon information 
received140 and to interact with all relevant international bodies.141 What the mandate 
is setting out is to use Ruggie’s concept of receiving information and acting upon it to 
create or modify a solution to the on-going issues. This notion can create 
uncertainty, unless the stakeholders trust the working group they will not get the 
endorsements from them. Unless the stakeholders trust the working group they will 
not fully commit to the forums or implement any suggestions that the working group 
give.  
The difference of why principled pragmatism worked for Ruggie is that the 
independent authorised Ruggie gained their trust, and his personality and charisma 
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were central to this. For a working group, consisting of five individuals, with none 
presently becoming an independent authorised individual or the de facto group 
leader, such as Eleanor Roosevelt did in the creation of the UDHR, using principled 
pragmatism may be difficult to make actual progress. Presently, the Working Group 
is Ruggie’s metaphorical child, yet the child is currently at the crucial phase of 
learning to stand and walk on its own. The outcomes of whether the working group 
stands and runs using principled pragmatism or continues to crawl along will expand 
our understanding of this methodology outside its use by a single independent 
authorised individual. If the principle has a long term future the Working Group will 
be able to embrace its use and take the Guiding Principles from strength to strength.  
This uncertainty regarding the success of the methodology is part of the overall 
uncertainty about the legal outcomes that principled pragmatism can possibly bring. 
Ideally, in law creation predictability is a desirable element that all stakeholders 
would ideally like, in the human rights and business predictability was not possible 
due to the conflict of interests; however, with the Guiding Principles established 
predictability may be far more important. In other areas of international law and, 
more generally within the law, predictability is not just desirable but essential to an 
effective legal system. To create the Guiding Principles, predictability had to be 
traded for workability, but in the post Ruggie working group environment, where 
Ruggie plays no active role, a possible shift back towards predictability may be 
required to bring stakeholders back onside with the new mandate and authorised 
individuals within the working group, before a full mandate based around principle 
pragmatism can be pushed forward. The Working Group’s mandate would have 
given the stakeholders more trust in their work if they had been given an achievable 
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target to work towards; however, this may have had the negative impact of being far 
too restrictive for the working group to get anything done. 
The use of principled pragmatism has been somewhat of a double edged sword, it 
allowed for the successful creation of the Framework and Guiding Principles 
following a unanimous vote by the Human Rights Council which should never be 
underestimated. This has come at the cost that no one knows what the final end 
product of the process will be, therefore, taking away legal certainty and 
predictability. The advantages are summed up by Buhmann when concluding that 
the approach adopted by Ruggie was unusual in the development of an 
intergovernmental normative framework that was accepted by all stakeholders. The 
approach allowed for an open, frank discussion and prevented the discursive 
struggles that caused the failure of the Norms, allowing for a degree of deliberation 
on interests and their justification. 142 Principled pragmatism was, in essence, as 
important to the process of the Framework and Guiding Principles as Ruggie himself. 
IX. Research and Money 
“I had no power but persuasion, and virtually no material resources to conduct 
the mandate other than those I was able to raise myself.”143 
This limitation proved to be one of the most important factors in Ruggie and his 
team’s success, being able to get Governments, NGO’s and TNC's onside with 
financial and other donations. Most importantly, especially after the Norms, was 
getting TNC’s onside. This posed the question as to how does a business express 
an interest or support something. They do not have specialised knowledge in terms 
of human rights, and they are not good at taking part in discussions or working 
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outside their domain. Businesses are best when they focus on doing business; 
therefore, in order to support, they give money or goods/services in kind. Therefore, 
with Ruggie getting donations from businesses indicates the levels of support for his 
work from the TNCs. One, off the record, source within the UN puts these donations 
towards his work at close to $100million.144 The voluntary contributions of money 
from actors were structured as research grants to Harvard’s Kennedy School of 
Government, which then administered the entire project.145 This ensured that the 
money was not held by the UN and, therefore, avoided the difficult issue of the UN 
accepting money and funding UN projects from private sources.  
The reason for needing to have financial backing from these actors was that 
Ruggie's financial backing from the UN to undertake the mandate was very small, 
after all, this started out as a desk based mandate:  
“Beyond limited staff support and minimal allowances for travel, these 
mandates are provided with no resources for their implementation. I began 
with the part-time assistance of a professional in the Office of the High 
Commissioner for Human Rights and three round-trip tickets between Boston, 
my home base, and Geneva, where the Human Rights Council meets and the 
High Commissioner is located.”146 
As Ruggie stated, the rest of the funds generated "I have done since then has been 
entirely at my own initiative.”147The need for outside money was vital to Ruggie’s 
notion of principled pragmatism; without the interaction with stakeholders on a 
personal level, the relationships and trust could not be built, therefore, without the 
required money the mandate would not have been able to be fulfilled as Ruggie 
wished. Funding issues are a common issue for special mandate holders, with many 
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mandate holders feeling the lack of financial and other forms of support directly from 
the UN forcing them to raise funding using NGOs and other organisations. This 
raises questions about transparency, equality regarding mandates and the 
underlining independence of the mandate holder.148 
One way in which TNC’s demonstrated their support for the work was by giving, not 
just finances, but other gifts in kind, such as the Coca-Cola company hosting a 
conference entitled “Engaging Business: Addressing Respect for Human Rights”, in 
Atlanta 2010.149 The notion of Coca-Cola hosting a conference may be a little bizarre 
to those that question Coca-Cola’s human rights record150 yet it outlines the 
willingness of the company to be involved within the Ruggie UNGP creation process.  
One of the biggest costs but essential to Ruggie was the team that he built. Their 
roles were not funded by the UN, and the mandates make no mention of team 
building, therefore, this required external funding to ensure that the team was in 
place and could continue. Ruggie was always re-adjusting his team to ensure core 
skills, such as fund raising or specialised legal knowledge were always in place at 
the right time. This included adding to the team as and when the opportunity arose, 
for instance when Andrea Shemberg joined the team to specialise in research aimed 
at human rights of investment protection agreement.151 This work on investment 
protection being jointly sponsored by the International Finance Corporation (IFC), 
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therefore, the cost of the position being covered by an NGO.152 The Swiss 
government by way of the Federal Department of Foreign Affairs (FDFA) provided 
both funding and personnel to Ruggie’s team.153 The person provided by the FDFA 
was Gerald Pachoud, who proved to be extremely talented at raising further funds 
from governments and TNCs. The FDFA support also provided a grant for the 
website “http://www.business-humanrights.org/Home” which is the main portal for 
Ruggie’s team’s web presence, which allowed interaction with stakeholders on a 
whole new level and scale. Significant government support, both politically and 
financially, came from both Norway154 and Canada.155 
An important element of the research was the outsourcing of certain components to 
law firms, universities, think tanks, and committed individuals throughout the world156 
who worked pro bono on the research questions set to them. This was a huge gain 
for Ruggie as it allowed the team to have access to high quality research on complex 
legal issues without having a financial or time cost to the budget of the project. This 
pro bono work was supplied from across the globe:  
“The Special Representative is drawing on the support of Harvard Law School 
as well as pro bono research and advice from legal practitioners and scholars 
in the United States, the United Kingdom and Australia. He would welcome 
additional assistance from legal experts, in particular those from developing 
countries.”157 
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“We worked with networks of volunteers in numerous countries; benefited 
from pro bono research provided by more than two dozen law firms, and 
convened extensive consultations around the world.”158 
Additional pro bono work was supplied to the SRSG from Oxford University who 
undertook research on Corporate Social Responsibility soft law developments in the 
European Union.159Clifford Chance, with whom Ruggie spoke at a second 
conference held at their offices, was also involved in pro bono work for which he 
expressed his gratitude stating “I am very grateful to Clifford Chance for … the 
extensive and invaluable pro bono assistance they have provided to my UN 
mandate”.160 Clifford Chance being involved in pro bono work can be seen as an 
expression of wishing to be involved within the creation of new human rights and 
business best practice as corporate social responsibility being an area of specialism 
for the law firm. Ruggie also reached out to non-traditional stakeholders in the form 
of the corporate-law community, through the corporate-and-securities-law project 
and other similar projects, this project was truly global reaching out to companies 
across the world.161 Ruggie even states in his book that with all this help from 
outside research the strategic research that was undertaken could have been wider 
and particular areas could have been more intensely focused.162 This external 
research allowed Ruggie to gather information that was cost free, and, therefore, 
could gather far more information than if all research was done internally by himself 
and his small team. Outside pro bono research support did not just come from 
governments and TNC’s but also from NGOs. Financial support came from the 
Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, on a survey report conducted by Ruggie on Human Rights 
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Policies and Management Practices of Fortune Global 500 firms.163 The Norwegian 
Institute of Applied International Studies, a subordinate body of the Norwegian 
Ministry of Education and Research, working alongside lawyers in sixteen countries 
produced a survey of recent developments in national legal systems relative to 
corporate liability for the commission of International Crimes.164 
Empirical data was gathered during survey work which was sent to Fortune Global 
500 companies asking “whether they have human rights policies and practices in 
place and, if they do, what standards they reference, whether they conduct human 
rights impact assessments and how they conceive of their human rights 
responsibilities towards various stakeholders.”165 The empirical research into 
practices of companies was a key area to establish a base line for the current 
practices which varied differently in effectiveness. “In a similar empirical vein, I have 
asked legal teams in the US and UK on a pro bono basis to assess how American 
and European courts understand the concepts of complicity and sphere of 
influence.”166 Therefore, the empirical research provided a broad assessment of the 
current practices, with work being undertaken on a pro bono basis it also freed up 
time and resources for more qualitative based research questions. The use of pro 
bono empirical work was, therefore, the ideal choice to farm out as this type of 
research which is highly time consuming and does not require the highly trained 
members of Ruggie’s team to supervise. Linked to the empirical work were also 
mapping exercises undertaken by numerous academics and other volunteers. These 
mapping exercises were equally time consuming as the empirical survey work, and, 
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therefore, ideal to give to outside institutions with large resources willing to support 
the Ruggie effort. This mapping work included research on the workings of regional 
human rights systems in the world, the impact of the international trade regime on 
human rights, and obstacles to effective judicial remedy specifically related to 
business and human rights.167 
Ruggie’s success at getting governments, NGOs and TNC’s to give financial and 
other resources towards the work and, therefore, supporting the creation of the 
Framework and Guiding Principles was as important as any other element in their 
creation. The broad range of support allowed more research to be done, thus 
allowing for a better theoretical background for the framework and later the Guiding 
Principles to be based upon it. By getting so much support from a range of different 
actors highlights the desire, across the board, for Ruggie to succeed. This also had 
the double edged effect that these actors were personally involved within the 
process and, therefore, there were reputational issues at stake. Should Ruggie and 
his work fail, it would reflect, in some ways, upon those that backed him.  
X. The Ruggie Team 
When viewing the Guiding Principles process, one element that must be considered 
was that while Ruggie was an independent authorised individual; he was also the 
leader and manager of a team of his own creation. This action of team creation not 
being mentioned within either mandate, further demonstrates his independent 
authorised individual credentials, also indicates that the team derived its authority 
from its association with Ruggie rather from the mandate itself. The importance of 
the team is summed up well by Ruggie when writing: 
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“Once I managed to raise sufficient funds from interested governments, I was 
able to recruit a superb team of professionals without whom it would have 
been impossible to construct the Building blocks for the Guiding Principles”.168 
While Ruggie was critical to the process, the work of those team members should 
not be underestimated. The eight members who worked with Ruggie as he finished 
the second mandate were Christine Bader, Rachel Davis, Gerald Pachoud, Caroline 
Rees, Andrea Shemberg, John Sherman, Lene Wendland, and Vanessa 
Zimmerman.169 Others that were team members at some point included Amy Lehr, 
Michael Wright, David Vermijs, and Jonathan Kaufman.170 
Many of those involved within the team, were legal advisors and legally trained. 
Davis, Pachoud, Shemberg, Sherman, Zimmerman, Lehr and Kaufman all came 
from legal backgrounds and took a role giving legal advice to the politically trained 
Ruggie. The importance of bringing legally trained individuals on board was vital to 
the success of the project, the legal knowledge in understanding wider human rights 
law, but also in drafting the framework and Guiding Principles to ensure that they 
would stand up to legal scrutiny was a key component. Other team members, such 
as Bader, and Vermijs, brought experience from the world of business. The 
remaining member, Caroline Ree, brought experience from the arena of diplomacy 
and international relations, having spent 14 years with the British Foreign Office and 
having led the UK’s human rights negotiating team at the UN.171 Perhaps, critically 
for Ruggie, she chaired the UN negotiations on Business and Human Rights which 
led to the creation of the SRSG’s mandate in2005.172 From 2003 to 2006 she led the 
UK's human rights negotiating team at the UN and in 2005 chaired the UN 
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negotiations on business and human rights that led to the creation of the SRSG's 
mandate. 
Lene Wendland was a different type of team member to her colleagues, as a 
member of the United Nations Office of the High Commissioner of Human Rights 
since 2002. Wendland had an involvement within the Business and Human Rights 
process which pre-dated Ruggie’s involvement, having worked on the Norms project 
with David Weissbrodt. This unique involvement in past projects gave her knowledge 
and an insight into the failures of the norms giving Ruggie important strategic 
information so that his work did not suffer the same fate. Further, her insider position 
within the human rights aspect of the United Nations Secretariat gave Ruggie the 
strategic information needed to manoeuvre successfully through this bureaucracy 
that can, occasionally, baffle outside individuals. Wendland’s on-going influence 
continues as she advised the working group, therefore, giving some continuity 
between the Norms, Ruggie mandates and the working group. Being able to advise 
first Ruggie and then the Working Group on different areas that proved too difficult or 
divisive to cover under the Guiding Principles, or topics, individuals or actors proved 
to be especially useful. 
Without assembling this team it would have been very difficult for Ruggie to have 
undertaken the quantity and quality of the research and consultations that he and the 
team did, not even including the pro bono work undertaken by outside individuals 
and institutions. Managing the team was not a simple task as they were not 
physically based in one location, but across the globe, as Ruggie wrote “we worked 
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together seamlessly as one team with good humour making us forget insane 
workloads and travel itineraries.”173 
Many of these individuals including Ruggie (as chair of the trustees), Rees, Davis, 
Sherman, and Vermijs have since used their expertise in the NGO sector having set 
up a new organisation called “Shift”174 which helps businesses and governments put 
the guiding principles into action. Therefore, a large part of the team is still working 
together on helping actors with implementation, underlining the success Ruggie had 
at bringing these people together and that they have stayed working together within 
the same sector but from a different perspective.  
The importance of the team to process is highlighted by Ruggie when writing: 
“No mere words of thanks can do justice to their immense contributions.”175 
This simple, one line statement sums up the massive contributions that this team 
made and for which it is hard to award credit due to Ruggie being the figurehead and 
independent authorised individual.  
XI. Open Debate 
In opening debate on the issue of business and human rights, Ruggie was able to 
challenge the difficult issues head on, to argue what he thought of as the best 
position. By doing this it cuts off the arguments regarding non consideration of key 
issues, and also gives him grounds as to why certain things were or were not 
included within the Guiding Principles. The willingness to debate is rooted within his 
academic background, and unlike diplomats or politicians he is far more likely to 
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listen and respond to issues and arguments raised. Whereas, with the politicians it is 
seen as a weakness to be willing to engage in such matters as it may lead to 
changing of minds. 
Ruggie and his team were always prepared to debate issues; this was seen in the 
extensive consultation with wider and varied stakeholders. He was prepared to listen 
and respond to suggestions. As part of this, a new mind set for international norm 
creation had to be established from the very start and he stressed the importance of 
this by stating, “in order to get the conversation started”.176 This notion of aiming for 
as much interaction and debate as possible is reflected in how the consultations 
were constructed: 
“To allow for maximum interactivity, each session were introduced by brief 
presentations from speakers from various stakeholders group and followed by 
a 90 min. open discussion.”177 
This construction allowed for all stakeholders to he heard without one particular party 
dominating a consultation. This was, of course, in contrast to the Norms where little 
collaboration was made with TNCs and governments and Human Rights Groups and 
lawyers dominated the drafting process.178 
Part of being open to debate was also being strong enough to disagree with 
stakeholders. Two notable occurrences of this were after the Declaration of the 
Social, Non-Governmental and Union Organizations and Indigenous and Affected 
                                                          
176
 Wilton Park Conference On Business and Human rights, Opening Remarks, October 10-12, 2005 as found at 
http://www.reports-and-materials.org/Ruggie-Wilton-Park-Oct-2005.doc accessed 14.1.13 
177
 Summary Report of Latin America Consultation, Bogota, 18
th
& 19
th
 January 2007. As found in 
http://www.reports-and-materials.org/Ruggie-Latin-America-Consultation-report-18-19-Jan-2007.pdf 
178
 Karin Buhmann, “The Development of the “UN Framework”: A Pragmatic Process Towards A Pragmatic 
Output.” As found in Ed Radu Mares, The UN guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights: Foundations 
and Implementation, (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers: Leiden: 2012), p86 
246 | P a g e  
 
Communities179 in which they made demands upon what Ruggie should include 
within his work, such as: 
“Recognize, respect, and enforce the collective rights of indigenous peoples, 
in conformity with the norms established by Convention 169 of the 
International Labor Organization.”  
“Exhort States to establish mechanisms to prevent, investigate, sanction, and 
compensate for abuses committed by companies”180 
In response to this document, Ruggie answered the stakeholders with a letter on 29th 
January181 thanking them for their input but, importantly, did not commit towards any 
of the ideas expressed within the document. Keeping the tone of the letter friendly 
but firm as to the extent of the involvement of these ideas, will be considered in a 
report of the consultation. A stronger rebuttal of concepts that Ruggie disagrees with 
is in a letter to Jose Aylwin, which not only provides great insight into Ruggie’s work, 
but also shows his strength of character. The letter concerning an NGO statement 
following the Buenos Aires Consultation in 2009, in which it called on Ruggie to take 
a greater account and listen to victims far more than he already was undertaking.182 
Within Ruggie’s letter he states that he disagrees with using language such as 
“before they take on a life of their own and are repeated as fact” and “quite the 
opposite of what you claim, as I hope you now see.” He finishes the letter with 
“please be so kind and circulate this letter to everyone who signed on to your 
“statement,” and please post it wherever you post the “statement” itself.”183 These 
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two incidents demonstrate that Ruggie was prepared to hold his own against those 
with different ideas. Being prepared to maintain his own viewpoint against those with 
alternative or hostile arguments. No doubt the continuous debate surrounding the 
topic prepared Ruggie for this inevitable outcome against NGOs who desired a 
legally binding outcome and thought they had achieved that with the Norms. In 
Ruggie, as with the SPSG, the world of academia had giving him a superb grounding 
in being able to argue and debate. 
Another way of engaging in open debate was when he floated ideas in the public 
domain in order to receive feedback, therefore, being able to judge whether a 
particular concept was viable with all the different stakeholders. Several notable 
examples happened throughout his mandates; one such example was the idea of 
human rights impact assessment when expressing: “Human Rights impact 
assessment today is an underdeveloped as environmental impact assessment was a 
generation or so ago, but the extractive industries are under such social and 
environmental stress that the time available to catch up is short.”184 This comment 
was taken from early March, as this idea appears to receive positive reception; the 
idea becomes a theme of speeches and consultations throughout the later part of 
2006 and early 2007. A different example of ideas being floated in the public domain 
was the issue of treaty creation. While not being the first time it was mentioned by 
Ruggie, it was one of the first times it was stated in the traditional media that a treaty 
creation was not a desirable outcome and was set out in the article in Ethical 
Corporation entitled Treaty Road Not Travelled. Within this article, Ruggie sets out 
why a treaty would “be unlikely to get off the ground, and even if they did the 
                                                          
184
 Plenary Remarks at World Mines Ministries Forum, Toronto, Canada, March 3
rd
 2006 as found at 
http://www.reports-and-materials.org/Ruggie-World-Mines-Ministries-Forum-3-Mar-2006.doc 
248 | P a g e  
 
outcome could well leave us worse off than we are today.”185 Instead setting out four 
different options as to the outcome of his work, these being an International Court, 
Enforcement of Rights by a host state, Enforcement of Rights by a home state, and 
establishing a new treaty body.186 None of these ideas being floated, received many 
positive reviews from the stakeholders, therefore, none were really fully utilised and 
put into action. The closest being the establishment of the Working Group on 
business and human rights to the creation of a new treaty body. The willingness to 
float these ideas in public was important in receiving feedback and tackling the 
problems of implementation. So while ideas were floated in the public domain, not all 
were used. A final example of Ruggie floating ideas in public before using them was 
the issue or lack of an authentic focal point for business and human rights which was 
questioned at the Trygve Lie Symposium in September 2010.187 
This notion was followed up with Ruggie pushing for the Human Rights Council to 
set up a department and later the Working Group on business and human rights. 
These developments seem to spring from this question about the lack of a focal 
point. This is a critical moment to ask such a question with the second mandate 
coming to an end and Ruggie nearing the six year limit for special procedure 
mandate holders. In a similar vein to floating ideas in public was Ruggie’s practice of 
road testing controversial new practices that the guiding principles would 
introduce.188 As previously noted when considering principled pragmatism, this got 
over the routine objection that the ideas would not work in practice. Therefore, new 
concepts such as human rights due diligence, and operational-level grievance 
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mechanisms, went through this process. The process not only prevented the “it will 
not work in practice” argument but also allowed for minor improvements to be made 
when they were rolled out within the guiding principles. This pragmatic approach of 
testing and reflection is a new method of international norms creation.  
Ruggie was prepared to listen to any stakeholders and respond to open debate on 
any relevant issue. Clearly his academic background had an effect on his willingness 
to debate. Ruggie did attempt to limit the scope of doctrinal debates when stating: 
“I hope to avoid doctrinal debates as much as and for as long as possible. 
Doctrinal debates create echo chambers. People hear their own voices 
bouncing back at them and think they’re having a dialogue. Besides, doctrinal 
debates rarely solve real world problems. My mandate is intended to 
contribute to greater clarity, deeper understanding and eider consensus. I 
believe that those are best achieves when posturing is left at the door.”189 
Later, setting out the problems that he had with doctrinal debates: 
“Debates tended to be doctrinal, and doctrinal preferences tended to reflect 
institutional interest: business stressed its positive contributions to the 
realization of human rights coupled with the rapid growth of voluntary 
initiatives, while activists groups focused on the worst abuses and, with some 
of their academic supporters, demanded that some overarching global system 
of corporate liability be established.”190 
Ruggie was prepared to debate ideas, as long as the debate was actually 
progressing. Certainly the need to move forward was very evident with the business 
and human rights being bogged down for the past 20 years, and linked to the notion 
of principled pragmatism. This willingness to avoid unnecessary doctrinal debates 
shows how Ruggie ignored the notion of TNC’s being directly accountable under 
international law. As has been demonstrated, he was willing to engage in debate 
when the substance of the debate stood to further his mandate. This second form of 
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debate was central in the discussion of ideas which could be later incorporated into 
the UNGPs.  
XII. New Ideas 
The openness to new ideas is linked to the willingness to debate. This was central to 
the success of the UNGP. In seeking out ideas from the TNC's and other 
stakeholders, he actively sought out new ideas which would give the process fresh 
ideas to make it workable. Ruggie was open to these new ideas, taking the best 
parts or concepts from the ideas generated by the stakeholders and using them for 
the Guiding Principles.  
Part of this willingness to accept new ideas and concepts was seen when he 
embraced several countries who “referenced the framework in conducting their own 
policy assessments, including France, Norway, South Africa and the United 
Kingdom. Several global corporations are already aligning their due diligence 
processes with the framework.”191 This fairly unusual practice of states using the 
framework before the mandate was finished, indicates the willingness of states to 
have a workable solution but also at Ruggie’s ability to give the basics and let the 
stakeholders get on with actually using the framework. One innovative idea that 
Ruggie used to explain the value and advantage of soft law declarations was the 
“Hotel California Rule”: 
“At the same time, so-called voluntary initiatives may include legislative or 
contractual requirements, such as the Kimberley Process and the Voluntary 
Principles on Security and Human Rights, respectively. And even companies 
participating in initiatives with no mandatory elements at all still are subject to 
the “Hotel California” rule: for those of you who don’t remember that Eagles 
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song, the words go “you can check out any time you like but you can never 
leave.” That is to say, systematic non-compliance or exiting is not costless.”192 
This innovative approach to explaining the benefits of soft law instruments to the 
annual conference of international law association shows an openness to explaining 
old ideas in new ways. This gives fresh insight to the old debate regarding the 
effectiveness of soft law documents. This engagement with this idea was crucial 
during 2008 as Ruggie was pursuing the soft law solution to the Business and 
Human Rights issue; therefore, he needed to gain support for the general concept. 
Not so much a new idea, but the rejection of an old idea, in side stepping the issues 
of which rights should be included within any final document. This has the effect that 
the document succeeded and was not dragged into a dogmatic rights debate about 
which rights should be included and should be implemented by whom and how they 
should be held to account. Ruggie summed up this issue in 2008 interview when 
saying: 
“Now, one tricky thing here is that much of the preceding debate focused on 
which individual rights ought to be included in an instrument that would govern 
companies. So yes, labor standards should be in there, certain community 
rights should be in there, and so on and so forth, and you end up with a list of 
27 or 42. Some companies say that's too many, and some other actors say 
that's too few. 
We try to sidestep that altogether. We did that by analyzing 400 public 
charges against companies and then coding what human rights were 
allegedly being violated. The obvious inference that the research shows is 
that companies are capable of violating any human right, even the right to jury 
trial, by interfering with a jury trial, or bribing a judge or bribing a lawyer or 
bribing a juror.” 193 
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The openness to new ideas can be seen as a result of the challenges faced in 
finding a solution to the problem as stated in the 2010 report to the Human Rights 
Council: 
“It is too complex and requires all of us to learn to do many things differently. 
This is a complex systems design challenge: developing the components of 
an interrelated, dynamic system and structuring them in such a way that they 
interact in a cumulative process to induce progress.”194 
Therefore, the only way to be able to do this was to accept ideas from stakeholders 
and embrace them into the Framework and Guiding Principles. 
XIII. Conclusion 
Ruggie and his team’s unparalleled success at creating the Guiding Principles 
cannot be underestimated, negotiating a difficult path between competing interests of 
different actors they succeeded in getting a unanimous vote in the Human Rights 
Council. The process of how the independent authorised Ruggie achieved such 
success is what is of great interest. The selection of Ruggie was completely different 
to David Weissbodt who had preceded Ruggie in drafting the Norms. The politically 
trained Ruggie had no formal legal training and only an honorary doctorate in law. 
Mainly from an academic background, but with essential UN experience having 
worked on the Global Compact and the UN Millennium Development Goals, Ruggie 
can be seen as a vastly different choice of individual in becoming the SGSR on 
Business and Human Rights. The choice of Ruggie, who became this independent 
authorised individual, is one of the fundamental reasons behind the successful 
creation of the Guiding Principles.  
                                                          
194
 Paragraph 16, UN document A/HRC/14/29 
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As fundamental to the success of Ruggie as an individual, was also the mandate and 
approach that he was given and, therefore, took. The initial mandate given to 
Ruggie, while setting out rather generally what he was to do, did not set any targets 
or an ideal outcome. The second mandate building on the success of the outcome of 
the Framework in the first continued the loose ideas of the first not setting out any 
hard or difficult to achieve expectations. This approach to the mandates was 
important as it did not put pressure on Ruggie and the team to pursue a solution in 
one particular direction, it allowed for the evidence based approach and principled 
pragmatism to define where the mandates reached within the time limit. The 
language of the mandate was sufficiently uncertain in order for Ruggie to create first 
the framework and then the Guiding Principles. The language of the mandate’s, 
especially the first would have allowed Ruggie merely to have researched the issues 
and made recommendations; but clearly, his own motivation and will to succeed 
meant he pushed on to create something new. The mandates did not specify an 
approach that Ruggie had to take; therefore, he undertook an evidence based 
approach, a pragmatic approach. This method meant Ruggie and the team would 
undertake a massive amount of consultation, with all the different stakeholders. The 
approach was based on finding a workable solution to the issue, not necessarily a 
final solution. It quickly became clear to Ruggie that a soft law document would 
provide the solution that the mandate required.   
This approach from Ruggie had its origins in his underlying methodology and 
philosophy of principled pragmatism. The terminology underpins all of Ruggie and 
the team’s work which allowed them the flexibility the approach required. This meant 
the work could push ahead in unforeseeable ways and re-enforced that evidenced 
based approach. The principles that Ruggie would stick to were soon unearthed in 
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using core UN documents to form the basic rights in which to hold TNC’s to account 
using soft law. Principled pragmatism has since been used within the mandate for 
the Working Group on Business and Human Rights, this idea with a mandate for a 
Working Group is new and time will tell whether it will be successful.  
The language that Ruggie used was a key component to his success. His choice and 
use of language brought stakeholders onside, he made clear he wasn’t a miracle 
worker and had no “silver bullets”, in effect lowering expectations to find a perfect fix. 
He often used personal remarks or humour to bring the audience at speeches to his 
way of thinking. He never used lawyer talk, and was anything but arrogant. The plain 
speaking in his speeches, reports, and at the UN clearly put him on a unique level 
whereby people would actually listen to what he said instead of an outright rejection 
of ideas based on previous experience of the business and human rights project. 
With being an SRSG, this entailed limited UN backing for the project, especially as 
the project appeared to be originally conceived as a research based role to establish 
base levels, i.e. a desk-based mandate. The independent authorised Ruggie went 
much further than this, having numerous consultations and visits he required funds 
to undertake this work. Raising funds from governments and TNC’s, structuring them 
as research grants to Harvard, therefore, avoiding the contentious issue of private 
funds within the UN. The support from actors was just financial but law firms, 
universities, think tanks, all provided pro bono research in aid of the project. The 
most intensive and time consuming research work such as empirical survey, or 
mapping research was farmed out to institutions able to provide the man power and 
time to undertake it. The financial backing allowed Ruggie to build a high quality 
team; therefore, he could bring in the legal experts, former diplomats and UN officials 
to give his team all the qualities that it needed. As important as Ruggie was to the 
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process, without the team that he created and managed, the Guiding Principles 
would never have been produced. The team assembled at his own initiative, and 
funded out of the research grant money paid to Harvard made the task manageable 
and achievable once Ruggie had pushed the mandates to their limits.  
Throughout the process Ruggie was always prepared to debate ideas with any of the 
stakeholders, no doubt his academic background coming to the fore here. He was 
not prepared to get into doctrinal debates which had limited the development within 
the field in the past, instead preferring to debate areas in which actual progress 
could be made. As part of this, Ruggie was prepared to float ideas in public, and 
road test them with small groups of TNC, therefore closing off the possible “it doesn’t 
work in practice argument”. This willingness to road test and modify again is different 
to diplomats and lawyers who have the perception of always having to be right first 
time out. These ideas, coupled with the willingness to find new ideas and solutions, 
links back to the principled pragmatism concept and workability. Ruggie 
demonstrated that by working with all the stakeholders and drawing them into the 
process he gained support for a common solution that they were happy with. 
The independent authorised individual takes our understanding a step further in the 
type of individuals that influence and create international law. In the next chapter we 
will step out of the familiar of the authorised individual, and this new take on those 
that make up the independent authorised individuals category. Instead we step into 
the unknown and consider the unauthorised individual in depth for the first time; 
these individuals go beyond anything seen so far and will bring light to a minority 
grouping of individuals that have affected the developing of international law. Such 
individuals as John Peters Humphrey, and Raphael Lemkin will be consider and 
bring the previous unrecognised grouping to light.
 Chapter 5:- The Unauthorised Individual 
I. Introduction 
The previous three chapters have considered individuals, who to a greater or lesser 
extent have authorisation, and are generally representatives of authorised decision 
makers in a particular capacity. The category to be evaluated in this chapter is that of 
the unauthorised individual. The unauthorised individual is an individual who does 
not normally owe their role within the international system to a state based 
authorised decision maker, i.e. a governmental assignment. This has the effect that 
these individuals should not ordinarily have a role in the creation of international law. 
Using past examples from international practice, it will be demonstrated that they 
played a role (and still do) in creating international law.  
An exploration of the unauthorised individual will be undertaken, where they are 
likely to be found, and how they embark on unauthorised actions in law creation is 
vital to a full understanding of this categorisation of individual. The international civil 
service is one of the most likely places where they can be found, especially within 
roles just below political appointees. Another area where candidates for 
unauthorised individual status can be found is within academia. This is likely to occur 
when asked by authorised individuals to anonymously contribute to reports, 
commissions and by governments due to a political instability.  
Specific examples of unauthorised individuals, Raphael Lemkin,1 John Peters 
Humphrey,2 and D.A. Henderson,3 will be used to explore unauthorised individuals 
                                                          
1
 Raphael Lemkin (1900-1959), A Polish Lawyer, who emigrated to the USA in 1941. Best known for his work in 
creating the Genocide Convention. 
2
 John Peters Humphrey (1905-1995), A Canadian legal Scholar, who was the first Director of the UN Human 
Rights Division 
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and what particular contributions they have made towards international law making. 
Lemkin was the author of the Genocide Convention, who worked for many years to 
first see it adopted by the UN, and then ratified by states, all the while without 
holding a formal position within a state delegation or international organisation. D.A. 
Henderson was an international civil servant who worked for the World Health 
Organisation and was in control of the smallpox eradication program, in which he 
broke normal procedure many times in order to achieve his goal. Henderson, while 
not directly involved within law creation, demonstrates how those within an 
international organisation have the opportunity and means to break established 
procedures. John Peters Humphrey was the first director of the UN Human Rights 
Division. Within this role he drafted the first version of the UDHR, and created the 
original idea for the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights. By exploring these 
particular individuals, a greater knowledge of this categorisation can be built up and 
this will allow for a stronger evaluation.  
With an improved knowledge of the substantive contribution of selected unauthorised 
individuals, an assessment can then be made of the skills used by these individuals 
in achieving their outcomes. The evolution of these skills used and developed by the 
unauthorised individual are perhaps the most revealing of the processes for the 
creation of International law. The skills that will be focused on are how the 
unauthorised individual gains access, persuades, and interacts with authorised 
individuals. Unauthorised individuals have to be political shrewd in order to know 
when to bring ideas forward, who to give information to, and how to bring important 
authorised individuals onside. There are two final elements of working methods of 
the unauthorised individual, that of using proxies at meetings in order to have input 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
3
 Donald Ainslie Henderson (1928- ), An American Physician, best known for his work in heading international 
efforts to eradicate smallpox.  
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during discussions and negotiations. While gaining publicity and outside support they 
could use this popular appeal to further the cause for which they champion.  
The final section will consider the different characteristics of the unauthorised 
individuals charisma and determination. Borrowing from Weber’s theory of 
charismatic authority will help provide insight into why others, especially authorised 
individuals follow their unauthorised counterparts. Charisma should not be seen as 
the vital element, not all unauthorised individuals have such gifts yet fortitude and 
determination can make up for any such shortcomings. 
II. The Unauthorised Individual 
In setting out the theoretical understanding of the unauthorised individual, the first 
element is that of who these individuals are. They are usually not government 
representatives, delegates, or nominees of a state and are distinguishable from the 
authorised or independent authorised individuals. These individuals are those that 
would, under conventional standards of international discussion, not be expected to 
have an active position or role within the law creation process. These individuals 
may be at discussions under the mandate of a different aspect of the meeting, 
meaning that these individuals could be part of a secretariat, a consultant of an 
NGO, or an academic.  
Many unauthorised individuals hail from backgrounds within the international civil 
service and work for major international organisations such as the UN, the 
International Labour Office (ILO), the European Union (EU), African Union (AU), the 
World Bank or the World Health Organisation (WHO). As these individuals are 
intended to undertake the role of an international civil servant, they normally should 
not be taking an active role in the creation of international law, instead they should 
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be facilitators providing secretarial support, administrative, and in some case 
technical or legal advice. Under Article 100 s(2) of the UN Charter it states that: 
“Each Member of the United Nations undertakes to respect the exclusively 
international character of the responsibilities of the Secretary-General and the 
staff and not to seek to influence them in the discharge of their 
responsibilities” 
While the First Consolidated Report into the UN Secretariat in 2005 set out the role 
of the secretariat as: 
“The duties carried out by the Secretariat are as varied as the problems dealt 
with by Member States of the United Nations. These range from administering 
peacekeeping operations to mediating international disputes, from surveying 
economic and social trends and problems, to engaging issues of human rights 
and sustainable development. Secretariat staff also inform the worlds’ 
communications media about the work of the United Nations, and organize 
and manage international conferences on issues of worldwide concern.”4 
International civil servants working within international organisations after numerous 
years of service on a particular issue, tend to become highly competent within that 
field. A consequence of this is that the international civil servant is in a strong 
position and has a good knowledge of this particular topic and, therefore, has the 
potential to give significant, meaningful input into any discussions on the topic in 
which they have specialised. This has the effect that they tend to have greater 
knowledge and ideas on the topic than those authorised individuals that states have 
sent to discussions or problem solving sessions on the subject. This is often due to 
states sending career diplomats, negotiators, or even politicians who do not have the 
expertise of someone working within an international organisation. Those that work 
in the given area tend to be better informed as they think and work in an 
environment, where they understand the problems that any particular agreement is 
                                                          
4
 M. Humayun Kabir, Charles Rosenberg, Cass DuRant, Aimee Leung, Tony Proscio, and PrinekaSuri, United 
Nations Secretariat: First Consolidated report 2005, (United Nations Publication: New York: 2006) p6 
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attempting to tackle. The unauthorised individual can easily be drawn into helping 
the discussions through the use of their specialised knowledge even without a 
mandate or position in which to undertake this work. As these individuals do not 
report to their national governments they are in a position to make arguments and 
pull strings in order to get certain items included within agreements which would not 
appeal to states to include.  
Not all international civil servants can be classed as unauthorised individuals, due to 
the makeup of the UN secretariat and other international civil services each state has 
a quota of personnel that can work in the UN Secretariat so that the secretariat is a 
reflection on international society. Within the early years of the UN state pressure on 
the secretariat and influencing policy was apparent with states withdrawing their 
support for a candidate to have their contract renewed at the UN if they felt that they 
were not pushing that state’s agenda sufficiently. This was more apparent from the 
Soviet Union than other states; though the effect of McCarthyism5 on the UN is a 
good example.6 The investigation into American personnel working at the UN during 
the McCarthyism period and the investigation into un-American activities ensured 
sufficient pressure was placed on the UN not to renew contracts of individuals that 
worked against, or were perceived to work against American interests.7 Those 
members of the secretariat that were not in a senior position had to be seen to follow 
their state of origin’s government policy on issues or face having their support for 
their position within the UN Secretariat removed. As an effect of this policy, the 
                                                          
5
 McCarthyism was the process in 1950s America whereby individuals were accused of disloyalty, subversion or 
treason without evidence, towards the USA. Please see Albert Fried, McCarthyism, The Great American Red 
Scare: A Documentary History, (Oxford University Press: Oxford: 1997) 
6
 A.J. Hobbins, “Human Rights inside the United Nations: The Humphrey Diaries, 1948-1959”, Fontanus IV, 
1991, p158 
7
 Dean Acheson, Present at the Creation: My Years in the State Department, (Hamish Hamilton: London: 1970) 
p698 also see A.J. Hobbins, “Human Rights inside the United Nations: The Humphrey Diaries, 1948-1959”, 
Fontanus IV, 1991, pp156-163 
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unauthorised individuals need to be in a sufficiently senior position that it was not 
easy for a state to remove support for them, and their seniority grants them sufficient 
freedom to have both influence and be effective in their undertakings. The 
recruitment policy of the early UN made it difficult for some experienced individuals 
to get jobs within the Secretariat because their own state had, in effect, blacklisted 
them. This can be seen within the extracts below, from John Peters Humphrey’s 
diaries when recruiting for the Human Rights Division: 
  “Thur. 11 Aug. [1949, Geneva] 
Živković, late of the War Crimes Commission and a man who was very highly 
recommended to me by Lord Wright and Col. Ledingham, came to see me 
today. I would have taken him into the Division long ago were it not for the fact 
that he is persona non grata with his government (Yugoslavia) and I 
recommended him very highly for a post at the McGill Law Faculty.”8 
“Wed. 2 Nov. [1949, Great Neck] 
In the afternoon I worried about recruiting problems. Including the posts that 
will be open on Jan 1, 1950, there are about a dozen posts to be filled; but 
there is not one candidate in the whole list that I saw this afternoon over 
whom I can work up any enthusiasm. There is certainly something wrong 
here. Nobody can tell me that it is not possible to find competent people in the 
60 member countries who would jump at the chance of being appointed to 
these posts. Unfortunately our personnel Bureau is quite useless.”9 
These extracts highlight the employment practices of the Secretariat in that positions 
became politicised and that candidates required state support in order to maintain 
and progress within the organisation. This had the effect that well supported 
members could easily become unauthorised individuals as they were under no 
pressure to conform to a particular set of political values, having freedom to push 
their own ideals into secretariat research documents and debates.  
                                                          
8
 A.J. Hobbins (ed), On the edge of greatness: The Diaries of John Humphrey First Director of the United Nations 
Division of Human Rights Volume 1,(McGill University Libraries: Montreal: 1994) pp.198-199 
9
 A.J. Hobbins (1994) p235 
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In the past the UN secretariat was open to state abuse by pushing supporting 
candidates who were willing to support a particular viewpoint within the secretariat. 
The Secretariat has undergone modernisation in the post-cold war environment. 
Under current procedure for entry into the UN secretariat jobs are allocated in equal 
distribution and upon merit to States under regulation 4.2 of the UN Staff Regulations 
and Rules of the United Nations: 
“The paramount consideration in the appointment, transfer or promotion of the 
staff shall be the necessity of securing the highest standards of efficiency, 
competence and integrity. Due regard shall be paid to be the importance of 
recruiting the staff on as wide a geographical basis as possible.”10  
Therefore, about 180 countries have individuals working within the secretariat. The 
effect is that the UN secretariat does not take too many individuals from any 
particular state or a particular candidate pushed forward by a government. For 
example, the young professionals programme is only recruiting from a limited 
number of states in 2013 to ensure that the global geographic distribution is 
maintained.11 The UN secretariat is now much freer to act in its interest than at any 
pervious point; therefore, the scope for an individual to become an unauthorised 
individual is perhaps at its greatest. This can be especially apparent within the 
modern secretariat when the individual is from an underrepresented state. 
The other major area in which unauthorised individuals can be found is that of 
academics who push and develop their ideas until they become international law. 
Many academics in universities and other research based institutions are writing and 
researching on topics that states and international organisations are involved in. 
What academics are proposing within research papers are solutions or observations 
                                                          
10
 UN Staff Regulations and Rules of the United Nations [ST/SGB/2002/2] p24 as found at 
http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=ST/SGB/2002/2 
11
 https://careers.un.org/lbw/home.aspx?viewtype=NCE accessed  06/09/13 
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regarding the practice and development of international law. The ideal outcome for 
any academic would be for these proposals or observations to be adopted or cause 
a change in international law, with their work cited as the cause for this change. As a 
result, the academics work has a real world impact and not just a change within the 
theoretical narrative of the subject. This is, of course, the ideal model for recognition 
and effect. At politically sensitive times the academic may be asked to contribute to 
the development of international law, but due to the situation their contribution may 
have to remain anonymous. In this sense, the academic is an unauthorised 
individual, because although invited to participate within law making by one particular 
group, be that international organisation or delegation, the organisation may not 
have a mandate from all participants for their intervention. This places them closer 
towards the independent authorised individuals nonetheless without support, or at 
least acceptance, for their interventions from all participants remain as unauthorised 
individuals.  
Some specific examples of unauthorised individuals are Raphael Lemkin, D.A. 
Henderson, and John Peter Humphrey. Raphael Lemkin, who is credited as being 
the driving force behind the Genocide Convention, described himself and his role 
perfectly in naming his unfinished autobiography “unofficial man”.12 Henderson was 
in charge of the smallpox eradication program, given very little mandate he was 
forced to create a whole structure and program in order to fulfil that aim. John Peter 
Humphrey was director of the Division on Human Rights, and played a pivotal role in 
the drafting of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the original idea for 
the High Commissioner for Human Rights. From a historical perspective, an 
argument can be made of William Wilberforce, who in a similar way to Lemkin, set 
                                                          
12
 Raphael Lemkin autobiography title, as found in John Cooper, Raphael Lemkin and the Struggle for the 
Genocide Convention, (Palgrave Macmillan: Basingstoke: 2008) p271  
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about trying to abolish the slave trade.13 As seen with the authorised and the 
independent authorised individuals, the unauthorised individual can be seen on a 
scale of independence. On this scale D.A. Henderson and John Humphrey are far 
more towards the upper end of the scale in a position actually working within 
international organisations, as such far freer than an independent authorised 
individual, but still working within a formal structure. Whereas Lemkin was very much 
at the other end of the scale, totally free to do as he wished not working within any 
normal frameworks. 
III. Lemkin, Humphrey & Henderson  
This section will explore examples of the unauthorised individuals in depth, setting 
out why they should be considered as unauthorised individuals. This will consider 
what activities they were authorised to undertake, their substantive contribution to 
international law, and why their actions caused them to become unauthorised 
individuals.  
III.1.Raphael Lemkin 
The outbreak of the Second World War marked a watershed moment in the history 
of the world, and with Lemkin it was no different, providing the most eventful and 
traumatic time of his life. With the end of war Lemkin started his one man mission to 
change international law by introducing and getting his crime of Genocide 
recognised in law. Scholars such as Power and Shaw have argued that Lemkin had 
been arguing for such a creation for much of his life.14 Cooper’s comprehensive 
biography argues that he gave little thought to such things prior to the outbreak of 
                                                          
13
 Please see William Hague, William Wilberforce: The life of the great anti-slave trade campaigner, (Harper 
Perennial: London: 2008)   
14
 Martin Shaw, What is Genocide?, (Polity: Cambridge: 2008), p18 and Samantha Power, A Problem from Hell: 
American and the Age of Genocide, (Harper Collins: London: 2002) pp. 22-23  
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the war, with the exception of when he proposed the notion of barbarity and 
vandalism at a conference in Madrid in 1933, but due to Polish appeasement to Nazi 
Germany could not attend himself.15  
Cooper argues that this early insight into the issue of state mass killings of its 
population must be seen within Lemkin’s conceptual framework of Jewish History, 
with numerous pogroms taking place within close proximity to where the young 
Lemkin lived.16 Cooper’s argument is supported, not only by Lemkin’s published 
works which focused on criminal or company law in which he was a successful 
academic and practitioner, but that he does not publish anything regarding the 
concept of Genocide prior to Axis Rule in Occupied Europe17, where in chapter eight 
he puts forward the concept. With the end of war, Lemkin found himself working 
within the American War department and in this role he was sent to the Nuremberg 
Tribunals where he managed to persuade the prosecution to charge the defendants 
with the crime of genocide.18  
Lemkin’s true starting point for the Genocide convention was when the United 
Nations met at Lake Success in 1946, he successfully sought a resolution on 
Genocide, which was adopted under resolution 96(1). He did this with the help of a 
young man from Ecuador,19 working within the Secretariat, who pointed out to 
Lemkin the significant group of states in South America who would be open to 
supporting such a resolution.20 Lemkin, in turn, asked these delegates to sponsor his 
resolution which gained a significant section of UN state backing at this early stage. 
                                                          
15
 John Cooper, Raphael Lemkin and the Struggle for the Genocide Convention, (Palgrave Macmillan: 
Basingstoke: 2008) p23  
16
 John Cooper (2008) p19 
17
 Raphael Lemkin, Axis Rule in Occupied Europe, (Howard Fertig: New York:1973)  
18
 Samantha Power, A Problem from Hell: American and the Age of Genocide, (Harper Collins: London: 2002) 
p50 
19
 This individual in all accounts doesn’t name this official, despite this authors efforts I have been unable to 
discover his identity 
20
 Raphael Lemkin, Axis Rule in Occupied Europe, (Howard Fertig: New York:1973) p79 
266 | P a g e  
 
With a foot in the proverbial UN door, Lemkin stepped up his campaign for a full 
Genocide Convention. Lemkin left paid employment to move to New York to be in a 
better position to promote, persuade and publicise the need for the convention 
among delegates. Lemkin was successful with his approach, apart from a brief 
period while he left his position as an unauthorised individual becoming an 
independent authorised individual for a brief period, moving completely out the scale 
of unauthorised individual and into the above category at the behest of the Secretary 
General Trygve Lie.21  
As with all international law, the final document was adopted and ratified by states. 
This is the same for the independent authorised individuals work as Special 
Procedures Mandate Holders when they issue guidelines. Trygve Lie asked Lemkin 
to form part of a three man UN commission alongside two other international 
lawyers, Professor Donnedieu de Vabres from France and Professor Vespasian 
Pella from Romania,22 in order to draft a genocide convention.23 Within this role 
Lemkin proved to be the main figure and he largely persuaded the others to follow 
his lead.24 When this work was completed, despite offers to remain working within 
the UN he felt his aim of the Convention would be better achieved working on the 
outside.25 Once back as an unauthorised individual the Convention reached the 
committee stage of drafting, he often used his ability to change minds to ensure the 
convention remained on tracks despite an “unholy alliance”26 of the British and 
Soviet attempts to stop or delay it at every opportunity. The convention was passed 
                                                          
21
 Samantha Power (2002) p54 
22
 John Cooper (2008) p89 
23
 The Draft convention can be found at UN Document E/447 
24
 Raphael Lemkin (1973) p88 
25
Samantha Power (2002) pp.54-55 
26
John Cooper (2008) p231  
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into international law on December 9th27, one day before the UDHR, making it the 
first human rights treaty agreed by the UN.  
Lemkin did not consider his work finished; he moved his campaign towards 
ratification of the treaty by as many states as possible. By the end of his life in 1959, 
he had spent the last 15 years of his life in order to bring about a change in 
international law. He managed to succeed on an unprecedented level for a private 
individual, who had no real place or power within the traditional domain of states. 
Lemkin’s only major regret and failure is that he did not, within his life time, get a 
superpower, especially the USA, to ratify the Convention. This failure should no way 
undermine his work. Lemkin is the essential unauthorised individual, having no place 
within the traditional system for the development of international law, yet having a 
massive effect on international law.  
Lemkin provides an example of an unauthorised individual at the far end of the 
spectrum and is the most unauthorised individual that this chapter will consider. He 
was acting outside a formal system, yet still strongly influenced the creation of 
international law, and its later ratification within states. 
III.2. John Peters Humphrey  
John Peters Humphrey was the first Director of the United Nations Human Rights 
Division, between 1946 and 1966. Humphrey is at the opposite end of the scale to 
Lemkin, he is closest to the independent authorised individual category. While 
spending most of his time working within the UN secretariat performing the role of 
international civil servant and running the Human Rights Division, there are notable 
examples when he went beyond what is expected of someone serving within this 
                                                          
27
 http://legal.un.org/avl/ha/cppcg/cppcg.html accessed 06.04.14 
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role and becoming unauthorised in his actions. Humphrey, a Canadian lawyer by 
trade, had previously practised in Montreal and went on to teach at McGill University. 
It was through his time at McGill he met Henri Laugier a war refugee from France. 
When Laugier took up the position of deputy Secretary General at the UN, 
responsible for Social and Economic affairs, he asked Humphrey to join the UN as 
the head of the Human Rights Division.  
Two notable events can be seen within John Humphrey’s career at the UN that 
demonstrate his credentials as an unauthorised individual, and perhaps more 
importantly as examples of on-going, less notable behaviour which reinforce this 
classification. The most significant event perhaps is that of Humphrey creating the 
original draft of the UDHR, something he was not authorised to do, but went on to 
form the backbone of future Drafting Committee meetings. The origins for Humphrey 
writing the declaration stem from a drafting committee meeting involving three 
members of the Human Rights Commission (HRC), who were chosen to form a sub-
drafting committee. This three member committee considered of Roosevelt, Malik, 
and Chang28 with secretariat support from Humphrey. The reports of the meeting in 
which Humphrey is asked to write a draft declaration is widely available in 
Humphrey’s,29 and Roosevelt’s autobiography,30 and also Glendon’s,31 and 
Morsink’s32 works. The meeting held at Mrs Roosevelt’s apartment in New York, 
involved the infamous tea party in which plans were discussed, however Malik’s and 
                                                          
28 Peng- Chun Change (1893-1957) was the Vice-Chair of the Commission on Human Rights during the drafting 
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. He was the representative from China, and was a playwright, 
philosopher, educator and diplomat. For more information on Chang please see 
http://www.un.org/Depts/dhl/udhr/members_pchang.shtml 
29
 John P. Humphrey, Human Rights & the United Nations: a Great adventure, (Transnational Publishers INC, 
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Chang’s philosophies were too far apart for them to write a document themselves. 
This debate led Mrs Roosevelt to observe: 
“As we settled down over the teacups, one of them made a remark with 
philosophic implications, and a heated discussion ensued… By that time I 
could not follow them, so lofty had the conversation become, so I simply filled 
the teacups again and sat back to be entertained by the talk of these learned 
gentlemen.”33  
At this tea party meeting the three member group of Chang, Malik, and Roosevelt 
asked Humphrey to prepare a documented outline for the proposed International 
Bill.34 In asking Humphrey to prepare this document they had no authority in which to 
ask him to undertake this action. This group of three had been asked by the HRC to 
undertake the work, by passing the work off they acted without authority from the 
commission and, therefore, pushed Humphrey into acting unauthorised. The 
Secretariat was designed to provide support to individual’s action on behalf of 
governments at the UN, under the UN Charter.35 Humphrey was not authorised to 
actually do the work for the group, as the instructions from the group were not, 
strictly speaking, authorised by the full HRC. After this infamous tea party meeting 
there were objections from the Human Rights Commission that the drafting 
committee did not include any representative from Europe or the Soviet Union, 
mainly these complaints came from Cassin.36 In response to this Mrs Roosevelt 
broke UN procedure by increasing the number of the drafting committee members to 
eight so that it included both a Soviet representative and Rene Cassin of France.37 
The now enlarged drafting committee again asked Humphrey to prepare a 
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documented outline; Humphrey wilfully interpreted this as to prepare a full draft bill of 
rights.38  
Humphrey’s unauthorised individual status hinges on how these factors are 
interpreted, firstly that those asking him to produce a draft in the first instance had no 
authority or right to make such a request of a member of the secretariat. Second, 
that a documented outline is a document much more basic and distinctive in nature 
than what can be considered a full draft document. Humphrey in completing his draft 
either through, at best, intentional miss-interpretation or, at worst, purposeful desire 
to ensure the UDHR project had a solid base produced the first draft of the UDHR in 
time for the June 1947 meeting of the now expanded drafting committee. At this 
meeting the Humphrey draft was not alone, the British had also prepared a draft 
document for consideration,39 the committee, no doubt under the influence of 
Humphrey through Roosevelt, Chang, and Malik, agreed to take his draft as the 
basic working document.40  
This draft held several important elements that if it had not been for Humphrey 
drafting this document would not have made it into the UDHR. The most significant 
inclusion into the UDHR was that of economic, social and cultural rights. The 
balance of power in the early UN was such that Western states held an advantage, 
therefore, these states held a desire for the inclusion of only civil and political rights. 
This inequality within rights was not acceptable to Humphrey who felt that civil and 
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political rights had little meaning without economic and social rights,41 therefore, he 
included them within his draft.  
The power that Humphrey had with this original draft was underlined by Geoffrey 
Wilson, Lord Dukeston’s alternate representative on the Drafting Committee, and 
recorded by Humphrey:  
“He said that once the Secretariat had included something in its draft, it was 
very difficult for governments to object to its being there, an obvious reference 
to economic and social rights which significantly enough were not mentioned 
in the draft convention which the United Kingdom presented to the Drafting 
Committee.”42 
The inclusion of these rights made it almost impossible for delegates opposing them 
to remove them completely. Fully advocating for their removal would have created 
reputational damage to the authorised individual and their state, which would have 
affected their status in the drafting process.  
III.2.1. High Commissioner for Human Rights  
A less well known exploit is that Humphrey was the original architect for what is 
today the High Commissioner for Human Rights. The role of High Commissioner for 
Human Rights as we generally know it today only came into force in 1993 in the 
second human rights dawn,43 of the early 90s following the collapse of the Soviet 
Union and end of the Cold War. Humphrey’s basic idea for the High Commissioner 
for Human Rights stems from meetings with the US delegation, and was renewed 
after a visit to Vietnam in 1963 reviewing human rights issues on the ground. The 
                                                          
41
 John P. Humphrey (1984) p32 
42
 John P. Humphrey (1984) p32 
43
 Human Rights dawns are periods of time when international political conditions are ideally suited for great leap 
forwards in instruments in the field of Human Rights Protection. The first was in the immediate aftermath of the 
Second World War, when all the major powers came together and created both the UN Charter and the Universal 
Declaration on Human Rights, prior to the start of the Cold War. The second dawn was in the early 90s after the 
collapse of the Soviet Union and end of the Cold War, events such Vienna Conference on Human Rights in 1993 
and the creation of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights happened during this time span.  
272 | P a g e  
 
meeting with the US delegation was instigated after an address made by President 
Kennedy in the General Assembly in which he indicated that the USA wanted to take 
a step forward in the human rights program. The step forward turned out to be rather 
underwhelming and for the mandate of the Chairmen of the Human Rights 
Commission to be extended so that the chairman could act between sessions of the 
commission. Humphrey advised the US delegate Harlan Cleveland when discussing 
the proposal that this would not be a good idea as this appointment was purely a 
political one.44 This opened the door to Cleveland asking Humphrey what he thought 
would be best, Humphrey indicated to give him a few days and he would get back to 
him with an idea. 45 Little more than a week later a meeting occurred between 
Humphrey, Ambassador Bingham, Marietta Tress and Richard Gardner. In this 
meeting Humphrey set out the basic idea for the High Commissioner for Human 
Rights.46 “The upshot of the meeting was that the Americans left my office full of 
enthusiasm for my suggestions, and I was pretty sure that the High Commissioner 
would be President Kennedy’s long step forward.”47 The new idea for the High 
Commissioner Humphrey emphasised was vastly different to that of Moses 
Moskowitz for a United Nations General Attorney which was taken up by the 
Uruguayan delegation.48  
With President Kennedy’s assassination in November 1963 the idea dropped from 
view within the Johnson administration. After Humphrey visited Vietnam as a Human 
Rights official investigating allegations that the Buddhist Community was being 
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persecuted by the Roman Catholic government,49 he was reassured about the need 
for a high commissioner for Human Rights. Humphrey revised his idea brought about 
by the experience of his visit, the refined High Commissioner role:  
“What was needed, I thought, was an independent officer of great authority 
who would be available to act in a situation like the one in Vietnam if asked to 
do so by a government or by some United Nations Body. But he would not be 
a United Nations ombudsman or have the kind of powers proposed for the 
United Nations Attorney General. If the idea were to be accepted by a majority 
of states one would have to be careful not to propose for the high 
commissioner any powers that would make the office politically unacceptable. 
I figured that if the office could be created, it would take on importance and 
increased powers by the operation of time chiefly through the instrumentality 
of an annual report on his activities which the high commissioner would make 
to the General Assembly and the debates to which it would give rise.”50  
With the Americans no longer interested in taking on the idea of the High 
Commissioner, Humphrey felt the idea was too important to abandon and attempted 
to find a replacement state sponsor. After fine tuning the concept with NGO’s in 
London and Geneva, he asked the Costa Rican Delegation and Ambassador 
Ferando Volio Jimenez to become the primary sponsor, mainly as the ambassador 
had been part of the team alongside Humphrey who had visited Vietnam.51 
Humphrey then moved to start a campaign for the High Commissioner role, when 
asked to write a speech for Jacob Blaustein an American businessman who was 
speaking in the Dag Hammarskjold series at Columbia University, and due to 
Blaustein’s connection to the US State department Humphrey put the idea of a High 
Commissioner into the speech.52 With Bluestein becoming the front man of the idea 
it is, therefore, widely credited that he had the original idea.53  
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A discussion of the difference between lobbying and the feeding of ideas is now 
crucial to the understanding of the unauthorised individual. The lobbying of 
individuals is fine within international law making, providing that this is acceptable 
within the profession in which the individual is employed. The feeding of ideas is 
more than lobbying, especially if the professional remit in which the ideas come from 
is focused on supporting and administrating the international organisation in which 
those ideas will effect. In this case Humphrey fed the idea of the high commissioner 
to notable individuals, the idea for which had been developed within his professional 
life as head of a UN division. The creation of ideas, unless within an official review 
structure, was outside of his remit, otherwise he would have been able to propose 
the idea himself. If the idea had been given as a private citizen outside of the UN, 
then this would have been lobbying and would have been acceptable. It is a fine 
distinction between the two concepts, but when an idea is managed by a civil servant 
within an international organisation who does not have a remit to do such things, this 
is when that individual moves into unauthorised individual territory within the process 
of international law creation.  
The Soviets soon discovered that the High Commissioner was Humphrey’s invention 
and they did not forgive him for passing the idea to the Americans. The effect was to 
cause a rapid decline with his personal relationship with the Soviet delegation and 
secretariat staff.54 The cost for Humphrey was that the last years of his career within 
the secretariat culminated when seeking election to the expanded Sub-Commission 
on the Prevention of Discrimination and the Protection of Minorities in a personal 
capacity and the Soviets made it clear he did not have their support or vote.55 
Humphrey retired from the role of Director of the Human Rights Division in 1966 and 
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without his guidance the proposal to create the High Commissioner was pushed 
between the Human Rights Committee and the General Assembly and back again 
without significant progress.  
By 1977 the Third Commission had a draft resolution before it, but the Cuban 
delegation put forward a procedural motion suggesting that the whole issue be 
passed back to the Human Rights Commission which succeeded.56 From this 
position the concept gradually slipped out of view, to be only revisited with any 
serious attempts during the early 1990s. The original concept of the High 
Commission is truly Humphrey’s but without him at the UN in a position to ensure its 
adoption it took until 1993 to come to any sort of reality. The limits of the 
unauthorised individual can be seen, while he created the idea, and gave it to both 
state sponsors and interested parties to push. Without him on the inside pulling more 
strings and pushing the idea on a daily basis those parties and states did not have 
the willingness to ensure that it became reality sooner, mainly because 
fundamentally they did not have ownership of the concept. 
III.2.2.Day to Day Unauthorised Activities  
The final, on-going, element was Humphrey’s willingness to get involved with feeding 
information and holding private meetings with individual delegates to persuade, 
inform and debate with them; to bring them round to his point of view. While this may 
only be for minor matters they all add up to give Humphrey considerable input into 
the development of Human Rights. The first element was Humphrey’s consultation 
with delegations regarding their ideas or proposals for the UN human rights program. 
Numerous examples of this occur and are well recorded within Humphrey’s personal 
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diary and autobiography. A classic case of this is with Jamil Baroody, the delegate 
from Saudi Arabia, whom Humphrey disagreed with on many things and often 
consulted him before taking some initiative.57 Other meetings include one on October 
13th 1948 brokering an agreement regarding the wording of Article 2 of the UDHR 
which was acceptable to the Russian (Pavlov), American (Sandifer), and French 
(Cassin) delegation.58 Being consulted by delegates shows the influence and respect 
in which delegates held Humphrey, wishing to inform him of the ideas and hoping 
that he might be able to provide an insight into difficulties that the delegations were 
having as seen when he met with the Russian, America and French delegates to 
help formulate a solution. This goes beyond secretariat support, which was within his 
remit.  
Closely linked to being consulted about ideas, Humphrey often held private meetings 
with members of delegations. While there is nothing wrong with this within a 
supporting capacity, but these meetings often went beyond such a role. These 
meetings would be delegates wishing to find out Humphrey’s and the divisions 
viewpoint on a particular idea, or what the secretariat was thinking. One such 
meeting with Miss Bowie, a member of the UK delegation to the Human Rights 
Commission in the 1950s, who was having difficulties with the instructions issued by 
the UK government over the Covenant on Economic and Social rights, she was 
being given highly detailed instructions on every question with the foreign office 
closely watching her voting.59 The accounts of this meeting seem to be expressions 
that Miss Bowie wished to let Humphrey know about the difficulties she was facing 
within her position. Other, less formal, private meetings occurred between Humphrey 
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and delegates. A meeting with Sir Samuel Hoare, again another member of the UK 
delegation in 1957, raised the prospect that Humphrey even admired those arguing 
for positions others than his own:   
“I heartily wished that I had him on my side. Our intimacy was such that I 
could talk to him frankly. One night over a bottle of pinot noir, I told him I 
thought the role he was playing in the commission as doing incalculable harm 
to Britain. The fault, however, was not with him but with his instructions. On 23 
April he nearly torpedoed the seminar program when he suggested that each 
participating country should pay the expenses of its own participants. I could 
never have got the program moving on that basis.”60 
These examples show that Humphrey was good at forming close relationships with 
those that worked within the Human Rights Commission and delegates that 
represented their governments. This relationship building was important to 
Humphrey being able to openly discuss and bring these members around to his 
viewpoint. The effect of this was when requiring support he had built the relationship 
required for authorised individuals to support his unauthorised ideas. 
III.2.3.Appointments  
The final part of Humphrey’s minor unauthorised individual behaviour stems from 
getting delegates into positions where he felt they could do good jobs, even though it 
would be for the Human Rights Commission or the Economic and Social Council to 
appoint an individual by vote. An example of this was when the Economic and Social 
Council decided to undertake a second study on the issue of Slavery. Humphrey 
wanted the new rapporteur to be someone who could be a pivot around which any 
further negotiations were designed to bring an end to chattel slavery, which at this 
time was largely an Arab problem, and Humphrey believed a Moslem would be 
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perfectly suited to the job.61 Humphrey, therefore, arranged to have Mohammed 
Awad of the United Arab Republic appointed as the special rapporteur.62 Awad took 
up this position but never really fulfilled the role that Humphrey had dreamt up for 
him to become the pivot for action. When it came to present his report he was in 
hospital after suffering a heart attack on his way from Cairo.63 The appointment of 
individuals into position such as this may appear a minor aspect, but getting the right 
individual into the job that suits their skills is essential in a highly effective 
international organisation. In demonstrating the power the unauthorised Humphrey 
had, being part of the secretariat he should not intervene in pushing a particular 
candidate into a position, when this is for states to elect.  
III.3.D.A. Henderson  
D.A. Henderson is not strictly involved within law creation, he does provide an 
important insight into how an unauthorised individual can bend and break the rules 
and regulation of an International Organisation, and as such is worthy of analysis. 
While Henderson was authorised to eradicate Smallpox as part of his work within 
WHO, he had to create new protocols and rules while also acting outside existing 
expected protocol in order to fulfil this goal. Henderson’s unauthorised credentials 
are as much in the creation of new protocol of disease eradication as in terms of the 
implementation of these protocol that he created.  
The beginning of the Smallpox eradication program was just one of many attempts 
by WHO to eradicate a disease. This particular program was not considered as 
anything special or above or below other efforts to eradicate disease on a global 
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scale. By the mid-60s the WHO smallpox eradication program was on the verge of 
being dissolved to focus resources on areas where goals were seen as achievable.64 
In November 1965 President Johnson announced a USA five-year program to 
eradicate smallpox and control measles over a contagious bloc of Western Africa.65 
Henderson working in the American Centres for Disease Control was placed in 
charge of the new US project. This American project proved to be the impetus that 
the World Health Assembly required to renew their global campaign of eradication.66 
WHO backed a replenished program in which the General Director Marcelino 
Canadu67 requested Henderson take the lead role. Canadu did not feel the effort 
would succeed and would just suck funds from the struggling malaria program being 
undertaken by WHO.68 Perhaps this played a role in the appointment of Henderson, 
someone without experience of running a campaign of this size, combined with only 
giving WHO financial support for one-seventh of the total cost.69 The one major 
difference between this program and others, undertaken by WHO, was that the 
Soviet Union and the USA70 both supported it.  
The original proposal for the WHO campaign came from the Soviet Union.71 In 
undertaking the Smallpox eradication campaign Henderson had no legal authority to 
make any state comply with the program, and acted on goodwill and his ability to 
persuade states into cooperating.72 One of the main issues which forced Henderson 
into becoming an unauthorised individual was that there was little support for the 
program from within WHO and especially from Director General Candau. The power 
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that Candau had as Director General was that he was the agenda setter for the 
Annual World Health Assembly meetings, on the draft agendas the smallpox 
campaign was regularly omitted, as he felt the goals of the program were too 
ambitious.73 The importance of being on that agenda for the scope of a project was 
crucial to its success, this was because it was the primary opportunity to discuss the 
project with state representatives. If a project was to “capture the attention of 
ministers”74, it had to be on the agenda. Fortunately for Henderson, the authorised 
individuals of the USA and USSR board members of WHO, had the power to ensure 
the program was included on the final agenda. This support, combined with the visits 
from US and Soviet delegations before the assembly to ask which questions it would 
highlight the difficulties faced by the program.75 Henderson’s string pulling ensured 
that the program remained within the eye of state members. 
Henderson was authorised to eradicate Smallpox as head of the team working on 
that project for WHO. What made him an unauthorised individual were the methods 
and process procedures that he used to accomplish the task. These methods and 
processes are not strictly law making, but they demonstrate how the actions of an 
individual serving within a role within an international organisation can have a 
massive global influence by acting in ways that were not permitted. Henderson and 
the project came to be seen as “a square peg in around administrative hole.”76 Three 
examples of the process based actions undertaken by Henderson highlight why he 
has been credited as being an unauthorised individual. The first example was that 
Henderson went against the official WHO procedure of the era to use mass 
population wide vaccination, considered the only acceptable method for successful 
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elimination. Instead Henderson issued instructions for members of the smallpox 
team to use a process of his own creation, which was a “surveillance-containment”77 
technique which was effective, economical and socially acceptable.78 Another 
example of procedural initiative was when Henderson purchased the corpse of a 
smallpox victim in order to prevent it being thrown into the Ganges.79 Buying the 
corpse of individuals is something that WHO generally does not support. Finally, 
other procedural policies instigated by Henderson such as strategies, plans, targets, 
priorities and accountability were not welcomed, even being resented as 
unnecessary and infringing on the authority of the WHO regional directors.80 Details 
of how he undertook this role as an unauthorised individual within an international 
organisation will be discussed in more detail below when the working process of 
unauthorised individuals are securitised. These examples of unauthorised procedural 
changes and breaches highlight how individuals within international organisations 
can have a significant effect upon the international system. Working outside the rules 
set up by the authorising state in how they should work and perform the international 
roles assigned to them.   
IV. The Process of the Unauthorised Individuals 
Each unauthorised individual has been considered in terms of why they are 
unauthorised individuals and their contribution to international law. Each of the 
unauthorised individuals at various times used different processes and methods of 
operating to get their ideas incorporated into international law or international 
organisational procedural rules. This section will explore and evaluate these 
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methods of how, without a formal place or mandate to actively take part within 
international law creation, they managed to make a significant contribution.  
IV.1. Access and Persuasion   
To the academic Lemkin, the most natural route after his success at the Nuremberg 
trials, in which he arranged as part of the prosecuting team to get the defendants 
indicted with “deliberate and systematic genocide”81. His route was to get the crime 
of Genocide recognised in international law by his fellow academics and the wider 
international community at post-war peace conferences in England and France.82 
This was a total failure with many rejecting his proposal as he was “trying to push 
international law into a field where it did not belong.”83 With the now, relatively 
simple, route of getting genocide recognised as part of the immediate post-war 
reconstruction closed off, Lemkin turned to the newly created UN in an attempt to 
persuade delegates to support his idea. Being a single individual without authority to 
introduce or create international law at an international organisation, caused Lemkin 
to develop skills to persuade and influence those authorised individuals to take up 
his cause.  
One of the most important aspects of Lemkin’s ability to persuade authorised 
individuals was that he was able to get direct access to delegates and at the UN 
buildings. In a move that would be considered a major security breach today, 
security guards were prepared to look the other way when the unaccredited Lemkin 
attempted to access the buildings, and even allowing him to turn any empty UN staff 
office into his home for the day.84 The first draft for resolution 96(1) was written by 
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Lemkin in the Delegates lounge, where he had almost unlimited access to state 
delegations, and, therefore, was in the perfect position to push his draft resolution 
into the hands of waiting delegates eager to distinguish themselves at the new 
international organisation.85 This access to UN office space, and delegations gave 
him the space and opportunities needed to meet and persuade delegates as to his 
cause. Without this access to persuade, Lemkin would have found it considerably 
more difficult to get his initiative into international law. 
Lemkin’s need for direct access to the authorised individuals at the UN caused him 
issues with the different organs of the UN moving between Geneva, Paris and New 
York during the early years. This had the effect to cause Lemkin significant travel 
and accommodation costs between UN meetings, which had to be met from his own 
pocket, albeit with the help of generous supporters. Lemkin understood the necessity 
of being in person where the action was taking place, writing in his autobiography: 
“It was clear that I had to go to Geneva at once. Every action at the UN must 
be prepared. One must know the distribution of sympathies and animosities in 
advance in order to get favourable results.”86  
Lemkin understood that access to delegates at the UN was of vital importance to 
ensuring that the Convention was accepted. Other unauthorised individuals who 
already work within international organisations, such as Humphrey, already had 
almost unlimited access to delegates and, therefore, have far more opportunity for 
direct discussions with the authorised individuals. Even within the unauthorised 
individual category those without a legitimate role within the international system 
face more challenges than those working inside of the system. Lemkin was one of 
those outside the system, and it was much harder for him to have the access 
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required to persuade those authorised individuals with the power to bring changes 
into international law. 
IV.2. Breaking Procedure  
Unauthorised individuals, if already working within an international organisation, may 
have to act against the operating rules of procedure or standard protocol, in order to 
achieve their goals. This is where Henderson provides such a good example of an 
unauthorised individual behaving in such a fashion. Accepting that Henderson has 
limited law making credentials, his use within this work is purely in what he did in 
breaking produce and these ideas having the potential to be transferred to law 
making international organisations. 
Henderson had a willingness to interpret rules of procedure in a highly flexible 
manner and in some cases break these rules altogether. Examples of this are seen 
when he implemented a new policy on vaccine potency standard, traditional WHO 
policy stated that all vaccine should be accepted and used no matter its quality; 
Henderson issued his own policy and set a standard for vaccine potency that had to 
be met by those donating or producing vaccines to be used in his eradication 
campaign.87 At other times, Henderson felt he had to act outside the mandate of 
WHO in order to be successful. For instance, when a Soviet produced vaccine was 
found to fail to meet Henderson’s international standards he was denied access to 
visit Moscow to discuss the matter further with Soviet officials. This was due to it 
being against WHOs rules of procedure, with WHO taking the approach not to get 
involved within international relations. The fear was that Henderson’s complaints 
regarding vaccine potency would be interpreted as an American complaint. 
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Henderson waited a couple of months and went to Moscow under the ruse of a 
different reason in order to meet the officials to correct the problem.88 Often going 
against the standard protocol had a negative effect and was resented by officials, 
one example from Henderson’s biography states: 
“Our particular ideas of strategies and plans, of targets priorities, and 
accountability were not welcomed, nor were some of our creative solutions. 
Some were openly resented as being impingements on the authority of the 
regional directors. Not infrequently, it was made apparent that we were 
considered an annoying, irrelevant nuisance.”89 
Henderson’s acting against procedure easily built resentment from colleagues within 
WHO and those working in regional offices. This can be the negative side of 
breaking procedural rules within international organisations that it can build negative 
thoughts regarding the project. The examples used here to illustrate the breaking of 
procedural rules and regulations in order to achieve a goal when inside an 
international organisation, can be transferred to other organisations with more law-
making competencies such as the UN or WTO.  
IV.3.Information Seeding  
Unauthorised individuals have no authority to speak or attend meetings in any other 
capacity than an interested party, observer or in a supporting capacity being 
employed by the international organisation. Not having the direct right to contribute 
to law making is fundamental to the unauthorised individual. Part of Lemkin’s 
method, as has been previously examined, for getting the Genocide Convention into 
international law was to attend every meeting of the different committees dealing 
with the drafting process. When at these meetings and with access to the delegates, 
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Lemkin went further than the persuasion seen above, to information seeding the 
delegates with ideas, detailed information and occasionally speeches. At the legal 
committee in Geneva he prepared memos for delegates, and passed them to 
delegates prior to and during meetings in order to influence the direction of 
discussions.90 He also worked in close connection with a former colleague within the 
state department James Rosenberg who was part of the US delegation team, this 
connection allowed him to feed the legal committee with comments and 
suggestions.91 His information seeding also took on other shapes such as talking to, 
even bordering on harassing delegates in the corridors of the UN, trying to get them 
to support his ideas. Cooper remarks that:  
“...journalists frequently spotted him in the UN cafeteria cornering delegates, 
but they never saw him eat. In his rush to persuade delegates to support him, 
he frequently fainted from hunger.”92 
It indicates the lengths Lemkin was prepared to go to in order to persuade and seed 
delegates with information. At other times, less extreme measures were required 
using his friendship with Dr Hans Opprecht, a publisher and influential Swiss MP, he 
secured a meeting with the Swiss Foreign Minister.93 This meeting brought sympathy 
for his cause, but more importantly a large press conference was arranged by the 
foreign minister for him to publicise the convention throughout the Swiss media.94 
John Humphrey used a different technique for information seeding, favouring talking 
to authorised individuals at lunches and dinner meetings when discussing and 
persuading delegates on important issues. From Humphrey’s diaries there are 
numerous examples of this happening, notable examples are when he lunched with 
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Archie McKenzie part of the UK delegation they “discussed the work of the Assembly 
in the field of freedom of information.”95 On another lunch meeting with Malik at 
which it “discussed the speech (most of which is being prepared in the division) that 
he will deliver during the debate. He was expansive and elated; but the speech we 
have prepared for him is anything if not sober.”96 This last example demonstrates the 
depth to which Humphrey gave, not just information on topics, but also complete 
ideas to the authorised individuals. Humphrey also held informal meetings over 
dinner with delegates, for example with UK delegate Miss Bowie,97 and even less 
informally had a frank and opening discussion over a bottle of Pinot Noir with Sir 
Samuel Hoare.98 In 1949, Humphrey held a meeting with the British delegation on 
the way into central New York this being the only opportunity that they had to meet to 
discuss information about the proposal to set up the Section on the Status of Women 
as a separate Division.99 Lemkin used the advantage of delegates being away from 
home to spend time with them as they would have more time and be more willing to 
listen. When meeting the delegates at their hotel, Lemkin would first discuss items 
such as philosophy, art, music and finally the subject of the genocide convention 
would come up. 100 Therefore, the use of the lunchtime or dinner meeting cannot be 
underestimated as a means to influencing information, planting ideas, and changing 
policy. 
IV.4.Political Shrewdness 
One of Lemkin’s most important skills was his political shrewdness, knowing who to 
persuade at the right time, knowing when to intervene and when not to take a 
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backseat role. Often his political shrewdness saved the convention from being 
delayed or stopped altogether. In a demonstration of these skills “He had deftly 
sidestepped the obstructive tactics of the Arab states, which regarded his scheme as 
a tactical weapon of the Zionist”.101 He also “outsmarted the British and the Russians 
in the General Assembly, when they had wanted to consign the Convention into 
oblivion – no mean feat for a solo player with only a few allies.”102 His greatest 
political moment came early in the process when attempting to get a resolution on 
genocide, when he challenged the Soviet delaying tactic by approaching Pswalfo 
Aranha of Brazil, then president of the General Assembly asking for more time: 
““Mr President”, said Lemkin, “who is making international law for the world – 
Vishinsky or the General Assembly? I ask this now because in 12 minutes you 
will begin presiding over a meeting which may decide to destroy the genocide 
convention by postponing it indefinitely. I appeal to you to hold off the 
vote.””103 
These examples of political shrewdness demonstrate the abilities that unauthorised 
individuals require, not only must they see the dangers posed by delegates to their 
ideas, but they must also move to protect them. They must be the unseen person 
pulling the strings at the right moment. As the Genocide Convention passed to the 
legal committee, Lemkin faced fresh opposition to the convention, primarily from the 
United Kingdom. A former supporter of the convention Dr Karim Azkoul, part of the 
delegation from Lebanon was no longer part of the UN legal committee and had 
been asked to represent Lebanon elsewhere at the UN. Lemkin pulled some strings 
to get a meeting with the Lebanese Prime Minister, in which he persuaded him to 
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move Dr Azkoul back into the legal committee.104 This gave his own position a 
twofold increase, firstly he moved a supporter into a committee in which the 
convention was struggling, and also put someone in place that he had a personal 
relationship with and could feed information to.105 Lemkin increased support by 
approaching friends within foreign offices asking them to instruct delegates in Paris 
to support the Genocide Convention; this tactic received a positive response with 
Sweden backing the convention in this way.106 
Humphrey’s political shrewdness was as important to him as it was to Lemkin and 
this political shrewdness developed over time. During the passing of the UDHR when 
Malik was chairing a Special Committee on Human Rights under the Economic and 
Social Committee, Humphrey was disappointed with Malik’s skills at chairing the 
meeting as he allowed debate and was only slowly moving through the agenda, 
leaving the UDHR without significant committee time.107 Later accepting and praising 
Malik’s procedural skills by getting the UDHR passed to the Third Committee without 
the special committee having any significant input.108 Over time this developed into 
getting the appointment of the right individuals into the right place, this has been 
seen with the appointment of Mohammed Awad of the United Arab Republic 
appointed as the special rapporteur on Slavery in the mid-1950s109 as previously 
noted. Another moment of great political shrewdness was when Malik attempted to 
delay the Genocide Convention in the Economic and Social special committee. 
Humphrey strongly advised against this course of action because of Lemkin’s efforts, 
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and the public support for the convention, with any delay having the effect that it 
might affect the council’s prestige.110  
IV.5.Utilisation of Support 
Publicity and outside support from pressure groups was a vital part of Lemkin’s role 
in pushing for the convention and its subsequential ratification campaign. Being on 
the outside, raising the public profile of the convention was vital to getting public 
support into pushing governments into supporting his work. The public campaign 
was carefully managed by Lemkin, being careful not to overly link the convention to a 
reaction to the events that would become known as the Holocaust and as a 
protection measure for Jews. This was due to his desire to gain the broadest range 
of support as possible from UN member states. Also, the Palestine question caused 
much debate and concern in the early years of the UN, which may have upset the 
conventions process in international law. Cooper sets out the importance of the 
support that he managed to obtain from the major American newspapers which he 
argues was critical to the success of the project.111 Lemkin further also utilised 
support from the Trade Unions, Women’s organisations, Jewish and church 
organisations to add further outside pressure on governments across the globe. All 
this support had Raphael Lemkin at the centre. Humphrey also used outside support 
to gain interest in his idea for the High Commissioner for Human Rights. In writing 
the speech for Jacob Blaustein he gave the idea to a popular businessman that held 
influence both with the public, and the US State Department.112 The support building 
outside the UN is something that is certainly out of the remit of an international civil 
service.  
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IV.6.Relation Building  
As the unauthorised individual tends not have the power required to speak and 
introduce ideas or concepts at meetings, they must often use agents or proxies in 
order to put those ideas forward. Due to the freedom and the powers which they 
pose, the independent authorised individual can be used by the unauthorised 
individual for the mutual gain of both parties. This requires the independent 
authorised individual to have a good and trusting relationship with the unauthorised 
individual as both will be aiming to create a mutually beneficial agreement. This may 
involve the independent authorised individual taking credit for putting forward ideas 
and concepts, while the unauthorised individual gets the benefit of being able to put 
forward ideas under the guise of an individual with the power to do this. Humphrey 
noticed the value of finding such a person in Charles Malik:  
“Some were more independent than their colleagues and some operated 
without precise or any instructions from their governments; and these were 
not the least useful representatives. One such representative was Charles 
Malik of Lebanon.”113 
In a similar approach Lemkin found useful independent authorised individuals in Dr 
Evatt and James Rosenberg, representative of Australia and USA respectively, both 
acted as a collaborators and conduits of information.114 In Dr Evatt, Lemkin found his 
‘go to man’ when he needed to put a point across at meetings, or felt the convention 
needed to take a different route. This partnership was a success with them working 
together until the early part of 1950, well into the ratification campaign. Not all 
delegates could be used in this way; for example, Lemkin attempted to utilise 
Norwegian delegate, Professor Frede Castberg, to sponsor his resolution. Castberg 
failed to obtain authorising instructions from his government in time to undertake this 
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action.115 Thus Castberg was not independent enough to be useful to the 
unauthorised individual, Lemkin. This failure underlines differences between the 
authorised and independently authorised and their suitability as proxies for 
unauthorised individuals’ ideas.  
The unauthorised individual is not a new creation, but recognising the concept is a 
new approach to how international law is made. The practice of the unauthorised 
individual has been happening within international law for many years, yet the 
academic literature does not reflect this. With bringing this concept into the light it 
makes it easier to understand how international law is created, and how individuals 
can have such a large influence even without formal place amongst a table of State 
representatives. This concept may not only bring good ideas to international 
discussions on new international law, but also opens the door to the system being 
abused and having a negative effect on international law. The same can be true for 
any of the other categories discussed above, International meetings are always open 
to negative individuals, be they authorised or unauthorised. As international law 
creation is based on the consent and approval of states we must hope that this 
prevents the effect that negative individuals may have.  
V. Charisma, Determination and the Unauthorised Individual  
In considering the unauthorised individuals and, to a lesser extent, the independent 
authorised individual raises questions as to how these individuals get others to 
support and take on their ideas. Above has been a discussion of some of these skills 
required or used by these individuals. The discussion now moves to examine not so 
much skills, but characteristics that cannot be acquired, such as charisma and 
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determination. In the examples considered within this work, especially in the last two 
categories it’s striking that some of these individuals, such as John Ruggie, Charles 
Malik and John Peters Humphrey, all seem to be very charismatic individuals. While 
others, such as Lemkin, seem to totally lack any charismatic appeal, but instead 
have a steely determination to succeed. This section intends to explore these ideas 
to how important they are to the success of the unauthorised individual and the 
independent authorised individual in law creation. 
V.1. Charisma  
This section starts with an investigation and exploration of what is understood by 
Charisma. There are certain individuals within world politics who can be identified as 
being charismatic, such as Tony Blair, John F Kennedy, Fidal Castro and Mahatma 
Gandhi. But what is it about these individuals that give them that extra something, 
what makes people want to follow the ideas that these people set out, what is it that 
sets these people apart from others in the same situation? For example, Tony Blair, 
former UK Prime Minister, is widely agreed to have been highly charismatic116, but 
the same could not be said about his predecessor John Major, or his successor 
Gordon Brown. Identifying these individuals does not increase the understanding of 
what is meant by Charisma. Within John Potts’ A History of Charisma117 he provides 
an inside into the development of the term charisma and what it means in modern 
society. Pointing towards the early beginnings of the term within early Christianity 
and the writings of Paul, the term Charisma is used to signify the various gifts, 
including spiritual and supernatural abilities ensuing from a divine grace.118 The 
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modern understanding of charisma is much more aligned with that taken from Max 
Weber’s writing119 in which Weber defines Charisma as: 
“The term “charisma” will be applied to a certain quality of an individual 
personality by virtue of which he is set apart from ordinary men and treated as 
endowed with supernatural, superhuman, or at least specifically exceptional 
powers or qualities. These are such as are not accessible to the ordinary 
person, but are regarded as of divine origin or as exemplary, and on the basis 
of them the individual concerned is treated as a leader.”120  
Weber’s focus within this definition of charisma is rooted within a wider centre on the 
political and institutional charisma from which he derived the concept of charismatic 
authority which he clarifies as:  
“Charismatic grounds – resting on devotion to the specific and exceptional 
sanctity, heroism or exemplary character of an individual person, and of the 
normative patterns or order revealed or ordained by him (charismatic 
authority).”121 
This is further elaborated by Weber as: 
“In the case of charismatic authority, it is the charismatically qualified leader 
as such who is obeyed by virtue of personal trust in him and his revelation, his 
heroism or his exemplary qualities so far as they fall within the scope of the 
individual’s belief in his charisma.”122 
Weber argues for the first modern definition of the term charisma, and gives the term 
significant connection to the political arena. This understanding of individuals that 
society is willing to obey due to some level of personal trust, and admiration. 
Therefore, society believes that these individuals are perfect for leadership roles 
whereby they then are in position to create law. One final definition that should be 
considered at this moment, is a more modern definition set out by Pott’s and while 
largely derived from that of Weber, expands upon his original definition: 
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“The contemporary meaning of charisma is broadly understood as a special 
innate quality that sets certain individuals apart and draws others to them. I 
have composed this definition following extensive study of the word’s usage 
not only in recent media, particularly newspapers, magazines and websites, 
but also in the discourse of various academic disciplines, including sociology, 
psychology, management theory, media studies and cultural studies. The 
definition offered here derives largely from Weber, attesting to the power of 
his formulation of the concept of charismatic leadership. However, the current 
meaning has shifted away from the restricted range of charismatic authority 
elaborated in Weber’s sociology. Charisma in contemporary culture is thought 
to reside in a wide range of special individuals, including entertainers and 
celebrities, whereas Weber was concerned primarily with religious and 
political leaders.”123 
This definition is good as it still maintains that authority derived from that inner gift, 
that something special that allows them to lead and to draw others along. But it also 
moves theoretically on from Weber, taking into account the changing technology of 
the age, and the rise of charisma outside of the religious and political leaders. This 
has the effect to give a far broader understanding than the sense that Weber argued 
for, conversely that does not mean that every celebrity has Charisma. Celebrity can 
be manufactured and constructed within an individual, while actual, true charisma is 
that innate gift of genuine quality.124  
Coming up with a final definition of charisma, or even what it fully entails is difficult. 
To know if someone has charisma is as much a judgement of them against those 
also in a similar position. Nevertheless, someone with charisma, appears to be 
someone who has a natural ability to lead and stand out from the crowd, this 
charisma gives them a natural authority, rather than a traditional or legal authority to 
do this. When considering the unauthorised individual and the independent 
authorised individual we can see that these are individuals who have stepped away 
from the crowd and have people who follow and support what they are doing, not 
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based on a legitimate understanding of authority, but based on charismatic authority. 
Therefore, the concept of charisma can help, in part, explain why these individuals 
come forward as they do to have such an impact.  
Having understood what charisma is, this work will examine unauthorised and 
independent authorised individuals that demonstrate this trait. Unauthorised 
individual, John Peters Humphrey, used charismatic authority as an aid to getting his 
ideas implemented. Humphrey is described as an individual that did not have the 
temperament of a diplomat; he was outspoken, straight-talking, bi-lingual, the perfect 
balance for an international civil servant.125 The language skills that Humphrey had 
in being able to communicate in both French and English gave him a significant edge 
in the world of international organisations. This allowed for personal conversation 
with delegates from all around the globe gaining respect and an insight into these 
delegations, and their cultural perspectives. The ability to discuss matters with 
individuals in their own language cannot be underestimated, and the gratitude in 
doing this is important. Humphrey was also prepared to meet delegates and attend 
the social occasions; this all builds relationships with delegates. The relationships 
that Humphrey built and maintained went beyond this, with individuals seeking his 
opinion and looking to him for advice and assistance. 
Independent authorised John Ruggie, while not unauthorised, is an individual with 
considerable personal charisma and, therefore, worthwhile of discussion at this time. 
Ruggie’s charisma is almost undeniable, Ruggie certainly has that ability to walk into 
a room and everyone will focus their attention upon him. When he gives speeches 
he manages to captivate the room, not just with what he is saying and arguing but 
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with his body language. The same speech as a transcript does not have the same 
influence as when Ruggie is actually delivering the work. Ruggie’s charisma is also 
apparent when making small talk with individuals in the context of a drinks 
reception.126 The charisma of Ruggie is reflected in how TNC’s and academics have 
reacted to the Framework making reference to it as the “Ruggie Framework”, not just 
as a colloquial term but also in academic127 and professional texts.128 At other points 
his charismatic influence has been that a law firm, to attract business, uses the term 
“Ruggie-Proof” to determine if those in the extractive industries comply with the UN 
Guiding Principles.129 The term has also been used by other stakeholders to see if 
they comply with the UN Guiding Principles.130 The charisma of one individual to 
have a major international standard judged against their name is an example of how 
much people were willing to follow Ruggie and go along with his ideas, just because 
of who he was and his charismatic authority.  
The identification of these charismatic individuals, combined with their contributions 
to international law131, demonstrates the influence that charismatic individuals can 
have on the law making process. Having a charismatic independent authorised 
individual in the role of a Special Procedures Mandate Holder, such as John Ruggie, 
had the ability to take stakeholders along with his vision of the mandate. This has the 
effect that the implementation of the international law is more likely to be successful, 
                                                          
126
 This effect was witnessed by this author at Ruggie’s book launch in 14
th
 March 2013 at the Royal Society, 
London. 
127
 Mary Dowell-Jones and David Kinley “the Monster under the Bed: Financial Services and the Ruggie 
Framework” As found in Ed Radu Mares, The UN guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights: 
Foundations and Implementation, (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers: Leiden: 2012) pp.193-216 
And  
Tara J. Melish and Errol Meidinger, Protect, Respect, Remedy and participate: “New Governance” Lessons for 
the Ruggie Framework” As found in Ed Radu Mares, The UN guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights: 
Foundations and Implementation, (MartinusNijhoff Publishers: Leiden: 2012) pp. 303-336 
128
 Many business initiatives use this term when describing the framework and Guiding Principles for example 
http://www.ethicaltrade.org/news-and-events/blog/steve-gibbons/ruggie-framework-protect-respect-remedy 
accessed 29.4.13 
129
 John Gerard Ruggie (2013) p151 
130
 http://www.hks.harvard.edu/news-events/publications/insight/markets/john-ruggie accessed 21.05.13 
131
 See chapter 3 for John Ruggies contribution and see earlier in this chapter for John Peters Humphrey’s  
298 | P a g e  
 
as individuals have brought into the creation process and its substantive outcomes. 
For the unauthorised individual, such as Humphrey, they can use charismatic appeal 
in the process of law creation to influence and lead authorised individuals who are 
actually in the position to make the law. This appeal can be used by the 
unauthorised individual when talking to authorised individuals so that they not only 
wish to hear what the unauthorised individual is suggesting, but also fully endorse 
the ideas, and wish to see them made into law. What can be seen is that if 
individuals have charismatic authority they will, more likely, appeal to the authorised 
individuals, and as such their ideas are more likely be taken on board and made into 
international law.  
V.2 Determination  
Not all individuals have the characteristics to be described as charismatic, other 
individuals’ characteristics may lean far more towards a determination and inner 
driving force to succeed. Raphael Lemkin is a good example of an individual without 
the charisma of those discussed above. Lemkin’s lack of charisma can, in part, be 
seen within his failed campaign in getting the USA to ratify the Genocide Convention 
during the 1950s. Lemkin quarrelled with his loyal supporters such as James 
Rosenberg and the members of the United States Committee for a Genocide 
Convention.132 These disagreements with supporters, alongside a mistimed illness 
forced Lemkin into a defensive posture to protect the convention against 
encroachment of rival human rights projects,133 which may have been more 
constructive to work with instead of defending a dogmatic position. Lemkin had 
public disagreements with the most notable human rights activist and likely allies of 
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the time, including Eleanor Roosevelt, Roger Baldwin, Rene Cassin and Hersch 
Lauterpacht.134 Lauterpacht disliked Lemkin and the Genocide Convention to the 
point when he dismissed his work to a mere footnote within his treaties on 
international law.135 His time teaching at Yale during the late 40s and early 50s, 
which culminated with his teaching contract not being renewed in the summer of 
1951, also indicates this lack of charisma. During this period Lemkin was in conflict 
with the Dean of the faculty due to his long absences from academic duties, the cost 
incurred in excessive charges for telephone calls, and telegrams furthering the 
campaign for the Convention ratification across the globe.136 He also failed to win 
over the student body with one rumoured instance of a good student who had 
achieved good grades being given a low mark by Lemkin because they disagreed 
and contradicted with his viewpoint on genocide.137 One unnamed source in 
Cooper’s work describes Lemkin and his lack of charisma as “He struck one 
sympathetic observer as a ‘loner’, a man obsessed with a single idea.”138 Lemkin 
lacked the charisma that others contemporises such as Humphrey or even Malik 
had, yet what he lacked in charismatic authority he made up for in persistence and 
determination.  
Lemkin worked tirelessly for the Genocide convention attempted everything to get it 
created first, and later ratified by states. Lemkin’s single mind-set to do everything for 
the convention blinded him to his own issues that this created. The amount of time 
he spent working on the ratification of convention meant he was unable to hold down 
a teaching job,139 afford the rent on his flat, and in pursuit of ratification borrowed 
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money from friends to travel to Washington only to have to borrow money from 
friends in Washington to pay back the money he owed to those in New York.140 
Lemkin found himself in the situation that friends within the UN would, as he stated 
““plot” to see that I eat at least one meal a day. I am ashamed and try it limit myself 
to a bowl of soup when I am their guest.”141 Lemkin’s determination to see ratification 
of the Genocide Convention can be seen as his undoing, he focused so hard on just 
that, he failed to consider his own wellbeing and future. His greatest strength of 
persistence, determination and fortitude made up for the lack of charisma; this was 
also his greatest weakness. 
Perhaps what can be learnt for law making here is a warning, especially for the 
unauthorised individual, that determination and desire can only take law creation by 
the unauthorised individual so far. Not knowing the limits of how far you can push the 
authorised or independent authorised individual to create the law as desired, can 
start to have a negative effect that they no longer wish to listen to the ideas, or 
actively work against them. The positive aspect is that with determination the 
unauthorised individual can push ideas into international law successfully.   
VI. Conclusion  
The unauthorised individual is an individual that neither has mandate or capacity to 
have an active role at negotiations or discussions within the international law 
creation system. These individuals may be at discussions or negotiations in a 
procedural capacity, or as the member of an international organisation hosting talks. 
They have no mandate or government instructions and, therefore, are acting either in 
a procedural role, or at the grace of government representatives allowing an 
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unauthorised individual to be present. Up to the point of creation, the Ruggie process 
in the formation of new legal rules should be considered a success, yet the true 
value of this legal instrument will only be discovered after the completion of the 
mandate of the Working Group on Business and Human Rights. This will give a 
suitable length of time to evaluate how the UNGPs are working in practice and allow 
any questions regarding their formation come to light. For example, the African 
Consultation, based in Johannesburg, was conducted on a small scale when 
compared to the other consultations undertaken in Europe, the Americas or Asia.  
Often, unauthorised individuals can be found within the international civil service, 
although this type of unauthorised individual is perhaps the least independent. Those 
working within the international civil service are required to be sufficiently senior 
within the system to have effect as unauthorised individuals. This is needed to have 
the influence and access to delegates, and also be sufficiently secure within that 
position. Other unauthorised individuals are found outside of the international civil 
service and are more independent than any other actor within the international 
system. These individuals can be academics asked to contribute to the formulation 
of new law documents, which need to be drawn up by natural parties or in highly 
sensitive political situations where individuals cannot be associated with outcomes.   
Examples of the unauthorised individual, Lemkin, Humphrey and Henderson, all 
show individuals who contributed to the creation of international law or international 
policy and procedures when they had no expectations to undertake such a role. 
Lemkin’s Genocide Convention is perhaps the most remarkable, given he worked 
outside the UN system but, through sheer persistence, managed to get the genocide 
convention adopted and ratified. Humphrey’s achievements in drafting the first draft 
of the UDHR is praise worthy, if he had not included economic and social rights 
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within that draft the document would have taken on a wholly different conception. 
The creation of the original idea of the High Commissioner for Human Rights comes 
from Humphrey and his experiences in going on an observation mission to Vietnam, 
while the Commissioner did not come into force until years later, the essence of the 
idea was Humphrey’s. Henderson’s creation of new procedure, breaking protocol, 
and actions ensured that the WHO campaign to eradicate Smallpox was a success. 
In bringing a new procedure and protocol that was not unsupported by WHO he 
created new methods for disease eradication. 
The skills used by these individuals were fundamental to their success, without 
access to authorised individuals they would never have been able to succeed. With 
this access they persuaded whenever they had an opportunity to interact with 
delegates be that at a formal meetings, over dinner, or when getting a ride in a car. 
With access to authorised individuals also came the need to develop a level of 
political shrewdness, the unauthorised individuals needed to know when the right 
moment to ask a favour was, or perhaps offer to write a speech, or give them a few 
lines of argument during an important debate. Unauthorised individuals, who 
manage to build strong relationships with authorised individuals, can use these as 
proxies during debates and meeting sessions. Information can be given to them and 
they will argue a particular line on the instructions of the authorised individual. This 
brings the unauthorised individuals as close as possible to be actually involved within 
a meeting. Finally, by the unauthorised individual gaining support outside a particular 
international organisation, or law creation event, they can bring direct pressure onto 
authorised individuals to bring an idea into international law. 
The personal characteristics of the unauthorised individual to inspire authorised 
individuals, or have the determination to keep pushing an idea are vital. The ability of 
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the unauthorised individual to inspire others seems to be an expression of Weber’s 
charismatic authority, while important, is not essential. Determination and 
persistence can make up for a lack of charisma. Not all unauthorised individuals can 
be said to be charismatic, as this is an innate gift. Determination to succeed and get 
an idea included as part of international law can make up for any such absence.  
These unauthorised individuals discussed here are mainly people that are 
pragmatists with ideas, but lack the authority to put them into practice themselves. 
They become unauthorised individuals in order to get their ideas into the 
international system because they believe that they would bring a collective benefit. 
The working methods of the unauthorised individual speak of pragmatism rather than 
a grand plan. The power of the unauthorised individual can be seen in a rather 
simplistic argument, which does not take into effect many other factors, yet in the 
drafting of the UDHR an unauthorised individual had a significant role in the drafting 
process which was accomplished within two years. Compared to the UN Covenants 
on Human Rights, in which there was limited input from the unauthorised individual, 
it took sixteen years to be concluded. This argument does not take account of any of 
the political factors, but the influence of the unauthorised individual during this period 
should not be underestimated.  
Having now set out the authorised, independent authorised and unauthorised 
individual over the last three chapters, a new system of categorisation has been 
examined. The next chapter will considered the theory of the individual within 
theoretical decision making in international law. Doing this will reflect on how 
decisions are made by individuals, when law is being made and how the choices that 
they make can have a great effect on the document produced.  
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Chapter 6:- Theory of the Individual Decision Maker in International Law   
I. Introduction 
“Strictly speaking, because individuals make these decisions on behalf of 
states, consent only ensures that these individuals prefer the agreement to 
the alternative of no agreement. If these decision-makers pursue private 
objectives that are inconsistent with the general welfare of their citizens, even 
consensual agreements need not improve welfare. Nevertheless, we expect 
consensual agreements to improve the lots of the parties involved with greater 
frequency than non-consensual, coercive agreements. After all citizens (at 
least within democracies) have at least some check, through the ballot box, 
on the international activities of their politicians.”1  
This chapter intends to examine the theoretical model of the individual decision 
makers within the process of international law creation. Using theoretical models of 
decision making the chapter will seek to propose a greater understanding of the 
                                                          
1
 Andrew T. Guzman, How International Law Works: A Rational Choice Theory, (Oxford University Press: Oxford: 
2008) p60 
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behaviour of the three categories of individuals discussed in the last four chapters. 
Many of the theoretical concepts that will be applied to this work are more familiar to 
other social science disciplines; nonetheless, they provide insight into behavioural 
analysis of the individual. These theoretical concepts will show how the individual 
within their decision making can have an effect on the creation and development of 
international law. These models should also demonstrate the effect and impact that 
the unauthorised individual can have on decision making, and wider law creation.  
It will start by linking the process of international law to the individual decision 
making. Considering the absence of democracy within the creation of international 
law setting out that this is not essential within successful document creation. Setting 
the space for strong individuals able to make good decisions due to the absence of a 
direct link between state citizens and actor’s within the international system. The 
traditional approach to international law decision making will be examined to give an 
understanding of how the theoretical method that international law should be created 
within, be this multilateral or bi-lateral agreement.  
The tragedy of the commons will be examined as a multi-player model of the 
international law creation system. In exploring the tragedy model and the different 
solutions to the problem, its application to contentious law making situations will 
become clear. In solving this theoretical model and real world counterpart it will 
demonstrate the value that independent and unauthorised individuals can have. This 
chapter will turn to the issue of reputation and consider how reputation works in 
relation to the different individuals. Reputation will be seen as fundamental to the 
success of the independent and unauthorised individual, but less important to the 
authorised individual. 
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Game theory uses logic and consideration, to demonstrate different outcomes to find 
the best possible outcome to a decision making process. Within this work, after an 
understanding of game theory is demonstrated, and how these models and there 
outcomes can be understood. They will be used to model the three different 
categorisations of individuals, and how they approach decision making within the 
creation of international law. For the authorised individual this may be in a situation 
needing to fulfil instructions by picking the right moment to introduce a new concept. 
For the independent authorised individual this might be how to ensure that 
stakeholders remain interested in a project as law prevents their bad practice. While 
for the unauthorised individual the decision may be regarding what authorised 
individual to pick in order to persuade them to take up an idea. Four models, 
Prisoners Dilemma, Stag Hunt, Battle of the Sexes, and Dove/Hawk will provide the 
ideal theoretical models for this purpose. Each game will set out to explain why it is 
relevant to the individual within international law creation and the different aspects 
that it can help demonstrate as an analytical tool. These games will demonstrate the 
decision making of all categories of individual, and consider the unauthorised 
individual; the effectiveness in their decision making will be underlined.  
This work has, so far, set out the three different categorisations of the individual 
within the process of international law creation. At times, individuals will be required 
to make decisions that can have huge consequences for themselves as state 
authorised individuals and for international law. These decisions may have to be 
made when instructions cannot be obtained or they are given freedom within their 
role. Examining how these decisions are made will be the primary focus of this 
chapter.  
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II. Theoretical Effective International Law Making and State Centric Decision 
Making    
The state-centric nature of traditional international law creation is one in which states 
come together to discuss, negotiate, and draw up agreements between themselves, 
which are then opened to signature and ratification by governments of states. With 
the move towards the modern foundation of international law and the treaty of 
Westphalia, a growth in states undertaking negotiations with other states using 
authorised individuals is seen. Increasingly, treaties and the creation of treaties have 
taken over from customary international law, with the creation of the UN and the 
International Law Commission established in 1949 with the intention of restating, 
clarifying and revising customary international law into treaties.2 Further, the UN 
Charter Article 13 (1) (a)3 encourages the development and codification of 
international law. A trend has developed, especially since the end of World War Two, 
to move towards an international codified system of law. What is involved within all 
international law creation is a decision making process. This is underlined by the 
development of international law.   
The Caroline case,4 often cited as the earliest example of modern customary 
international law, the US secretary of state Daniel Webster and the British Minister in 
Washington Henry Fox discussed the legal position of their relative states through 
letters regarding the sinking of the Caroline steamship.5 Both were authorised 
individuals representing their respective governments and, therefore, were 
authorised to undertake this action. This type of negotiation is simplistic as there 
                                                          
2
 Alan Boyle and Christine Chinkin, The Making of International law, (Oxford University Press: Oxford: 2007) 
p163  
3
 UN Charter, Article 13 (1) (a) 
4
 The Caroline Case (sometimes known as the Caroline affair) 1837. Extracts of the major letters of the case can 
be found at http://avalon.law.yale.edu/19th_century/br-1842d.asp accessed 10/6/14 
5
 Timothy Kearley, “Raising the Caroline”, Wisconsin International Law Journal, Vol. 17, No. 2, pp.325-326 
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were only two parties, each seeking to get the other to agree to their particular 
concept of the right of states to self-defence, the decision making was narrow and 
self-interested. With this approach to the creation of international law it tends to 
mean that each state is aiming to create or define the law as to increasing or 
defending their particular interests.  
When these discussions are undertaken the state usually sends its top diplomats, 
legal advisors, and politicians to international events to work out treaties between the 
different authorised individuals. These types of negotiations and discussions works 
well when there are a limited number of states taking part, who all have a limited 
ambition as to the type, scope, and implementation of the document intended to be 
created for the benefit of the states involved. A document limited in scope allows for 
easier decision making by the individuals involved. This document may well have 
either a limited or mutually beneficial payoff for the states undertaking the work. 
Other factors may play a role in the outcome and influence the decisions being made 
such as the strength of a particular state, the influence a particular state may have, 
or the skill of the negotiator or diplomat sent to undertake the work. The authorised 
individuals are best placed to undertake this type of negotiation and are best placed 
to make decisions that reflect the state instructions. This is due to the state 
government giving them clear expected outcomes and the strategies employed to 
get the best deal, and when required can make good decisions, which met these 
expected outcomes.  
Traditionally, using this system of authorised individuals for bilateral and limited 
multilateral treaty partners would have been the best way for a state to produce an 
international agreement. The pre-World War One international community, 
especially, only consisted of a far smaller pool of state actors that were officially 
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recognised by each other and only a limited number were able to take part and enter 
into agreements. This limited the number of bilateral treaties that could be made 
between states, and those states’ ability to join international organisations. For 
instance, the League of Nations, at its largest, only had 57 state members6 and the 
original UN only had 51 member states with that number rising to 60 by 1950,7 and 
with South Sudan becoming the 193rd member in 2011.8 With an increased number 
of actors the decision making process for all becomes more complex as different 
influences and desires have to be taken into account.  
When considering the legitimacy of the unauthorised individual within this decision 
making process a criticism of the concept is that the individual has no democratic 
position to undertake their actions. This criticism would be valid in an environment 
which required a direct form of democracy, between individuals and international law 
creation. But the present system of authorised individuals does not, and many state 
administrations have no form of democracy between the governed and the 
government, yet their authorised individuals are accepted into the international 
system of law creation.  
If democracy was a norm required for the creation of international law then we would 
have to discount those states that are authoritarian regimes, or that do not meet the 
required standard of democratic control. In James Crawford’s Democracy in 
International law9 he explores this subject matter, he comes to the conclusion that 
“under international law (apart from treaties), there is no general endorsement of a 
principle of democracy. There is no requirement that the government of a state, to be 
a government, should have been democratically elected or even that it should have 
                                                          
6
 http://www.un.org/cyberschoolbus/unintro/unintro3.htm accessed 09/10/13 
7
 http://www.un.org/en/members/growth.shtml accessed 09/10/13 
8
 http://www.un.org/en/members/growth.shtml accessed 09/10/13 
9
 James Crawford, Democracy in International Law, (Cambridge University Press: Cambridge: 1996) 
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the general support of its people.”10 And “other features of classical international law 
were deeply undemocratic, or at least were capable of operating in a deeply 
undemocratic way.”11 Crawford indicates that the rise of democracy within 
international organisations,12 alongside these organisations working on the one vote 
per nation system, means democracy is becoming more assorted within international 
law. Certainly, it seems there is a trend towards a more democratic way of 
international law creation but there is no norm as to its requirement either within 
states or between states. 
Even with states with democratic systems Crawford sets out “there can be different 
kinds, ideals or versions of democracy.”13 Therefore, which systems would count 
towards a state being sufficiently democratic? For example, would America’s two 
party system in which left wing parties were destroyed by propaganda during the 
cold war be considered democratic enough, or any first-past-the-post system such 
as that used by the UK? The criticism below of the American two party system sums 
up many of the issues with this system and in doing that highlights the weaknesses 
inherit in any such system of governance. 
“Herein lies the central tension of the two-party doctrine. It identifies popular 
sovereignty with choice, and then limits choice to one party or the other. If 
there is any trust to Schattschneider’s analogy between the elections and 
markets, America’s faith in the two-party system begs the following question: 
Why do voters accept as the ultimate in political freedom a binary option they 
would surely protest as consumers? Douglas Amy has put it this way: “just as 
it would be ludicrous to have stores that provide only two styles of shoes to 
two kinds of vegetables, it is no less absurd to have a party system that 
provides only two choices to represent the great variety of opinions in the 
United States.””14  
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 James Crawford (1996) p7 
11
 James Crawford (1996) p8 
12
 James Crawford (1996) p17 
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 James Crawford (1996) p4 
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 Lisa Jane Disch, The Tyranny of the Two-Party System, (Columbia University Press: New York: 2002) p7 
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By starting to pick and choose between which regimes we allow to have authorised 
individuals, international law starts to fall apart and is no longer truly international but 
selective. Support of the acceptance of unelected individuals within states enforced 
on them by the international community is the rise of the bureaucrat and technocrat 
during the euro crisis. Elected heads of states in Italy15 and Greece16 were forced to 
step aside for technocrats in order for that state to be given the bailout needed to 
keep the country afloat.17 The power of the international community in forcing these 
changes and that of the markets demonstrates that democracy and the power of 
international system are not intrinsically related. Just because the international 
system allows authorised individuals from non-democratic states, does not mean 
that the assumption can be made that the unauthorised individuals is also 
acceptable as they too are unelected but wish to work in bettering international law. 
This notion of bettering international law is closely related to the notion individuals 
working for the common good which is questionable in the first place. There is no 
universal meaning for this phrase. As Garrett Hardin sets out in his famous article on 
the tragedy of the commons: 
“We want the maximum good per person; but what is good? To one person it 
is wilderness, to another it is ski lodges for thousands. To one it is estuaries to 
nourish ducks for hunters to shoot; to another it is factory land. Comparing 
one good with another is, we usually say, impossible because goods are 
incommensurable. Incommensurables cannot be compared.”18  
In the same notion as Hardin, what one unauthorised individual may see as the 
common good may not actually be that of the state parties, or those people that the 
international law is aimed at helping. Any unauthorised individual must be 
considered on their own merits, the past actions of one of these individuals cannot 
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 http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2011/nov/10/berlusconi-pm-successor-alfano-monti accessed 30.10.12 
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 http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/business-13856580 accessed 30.10.12 
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 http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2011/nov/08/silvio-berlusconi-to-resign-italy accessed 30.10.12 
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be considered as a justification for the future of this role or for people to take up the 
mantel of this type of individual.  
III. Reputation 
This section will consider the importance of the individual’s reputation in law creation. 
In taking each of the categories of individual in turn it will discuss the significance of 
reputation to each, and to the system as a whole. Reputation is significant to all 
individuals within the international law creation process. Reputation of the individual 
provides them with authority and credibility within debates and gives others around 
them certainty in the process of law creation. 
This work intends to use Guzman’s definition of reputation as “reputation as 
judgements about an actor’s past behaviour used to predict future behaviour.”19 This 
definition is applied within the context of state based compliance, but it can equally 
be applied to the individual within the creation of international law. Guzman makes 
the observation that reputational arguments have been long used in the field of 
political science and economics, but are significantly underdeveloped in the legal 
literature and have yet to be applied to the area of international law.20 Those works 
considering reputation deal with the concept within the theoretical framework of the 
state centric conception of international law. Reputation enters into the narrative 
when examining state compliance with international law such as works by Keohane21 
and Downs and Jones22. Downs and Jones come to the conclusion that within state 
based compliance to international law “Reputation matters, just not so much as 
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some might like.”23 Some of these arguments set out regarding state based 
reputational compliance can be transferred to the individual. Reputation is important 
for states in compliance to international law: 
“When entering into an agreement, states want their promises to be credible, 
and they must ultimately rely on reputation for that credibility. As the expected 
costs of performance increase, states require more credibility and, therefore a 
stronger reputation for the associated promises to be believed.”24  
This equally applies to the individual that without a strong reputation they have little 
credibility at the negotiating table. A consequence being that others will be unwilling 
to work with them to create a document that is successful. 
Guzman’s argument about how reputation keeps states from breaking international 
law, using reputational sanctions can again equally apply to the individuals in the 
making of international law, he states that:  
“Reputational sanctions, then, are not punishment at all, or at least they are 
not intended as such. When a state makes a compliance decision (i.e., when 
it chooses to comply or violate) it sends a signal about its willingness to 
honour its international legal obligations. Other states use the information in 
this decision to adjust their own behaviour. A state that tends to comply with 
its obligations will develop a good reputation for compliance, while a state that 
often violates obligations will have a bad reputation. A good reputation is 
valuable because it makes promises more credible and, therefore, makes 
future cooperation both easier and less costly."25 
In applying this to the three categorisations of individuals requires that each 
individual must have a sufficient reputation, otherwise what they are proposing is not 
credible and makes the international law creation process more difficult. When 
considering the reputation values of significant individuals the value can be seen. For 
example, George Bush’s reputation was forever damaged by the 2003 war in Iraq, 
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therefore, unlike other former presidents, such as Clinton, he has not taken on a 
peace envoy role for the United States. Clinton has made trips to North Korea26 in 
order to free prisoners taken by the North Korean state. Another example would be 
Tony Blair, whose reputation will forever be tarnished by the UK’s involvement again 
in Iraq, and while he has taken on a Middle East envoy role,27 his reputation has 
forever been damaged with Harold Pinter28 and Desmond Tutu29 both publicly urging 
that Blair is tried for war crimes.  
Reputation is something that can be gained or lost by an actor’s behaviour. For a 
state to acquire a positive reputation for compliance they must do more than just sign 
treaties and abide by them. These international law documents must also have 
relevance to the state. For example, landlocked Bolivia cannot expect to build a 
strong reputation for compliance by agreeing to keep its ports open.30 In a similar 
way, individuals cannot gain a strong reputation by agreeing to commit the state to 
particular items with the creation of international law, only for the state to later reject 
the overall document. Or, they would be unable to build a credible reputation by 
ignoring instructions from their authorised decision makers. If they were unable to 
follow their instructions from their authorised decision makers this will not accurately 
reflect the desired document, and therefore, the authorised individual would develop 
a negative reputation, being considered as untrustworthy and not undertaking their 
role. The example here portrays the authorised individual, but this also extends to 
the other two categories of individual. Compliance using reputation ensures states 
abide by international law due to concern out of the reputational damage if they did 
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 http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/asia-pacific/8182716.stm accessed 18.10.12 
27
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not. Individuals require a strong reputation in building international law for these 
documents to be credible, and as representatives of the abstract state a commitment 
by that state that they will adopt and be compliant with the document.  
III.1. Reputation and the Authorised Individual  
For the authorised individual a strong reputation built on trust is important for their 
credibility in creating international law. Without this reputation the arguments that the 
individual makes in order to follow their instructions within negotiating would not be 
credible and are likely to be ignored by the other authorised individuals. A strong 
reputation within the group gives credibility to the individual and, therefore, is a factor 
in why they may be able to have greater influence over the development of 
international law. Reputational damage can occur for the authorised individual if they 
are perceived to be blocking a particular concept, or that their home state acts 
contrarily to what they are saying.  
Reputation for the authorised individual is a two-way flow between the individual and, 
usually, the home government or authorised decision maker. Due to the nature of the 
relationship of the authorised individual and the state means that if an authorised 
individual’s reputation is diminished when undertaking law creation this can reflect on 
the state’s reputation. Should a home government of the authorised individual fail to 
sign, ratify, or comply with the international law document then the state can 
negatively affect the reputation of the authorised individual who helped create the 
document. This is due to it raising questions about the role of the authorised 
individual and the home government. Why has the state undertaken this action? Did 
the authorised individual not undertake their role correctly on behalf of the state? 
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Were there issues with the instructions from the state? Or, did the individual not 
follow them correctly? 
Often, to take up the role of an authorised individual, especially one leading 
negotiating within international law creation, will already have a strong reputation 
within the state in order to get support for their appointment to the position.31 This 
positive reputation may carry through into the international negotiations; for instance, 
Eleanor Roosevelt before undertaking a role within the UN, had already developed a 
strong reputation for civil liberties within her newspaper column “My Day”. Further to 
this was the reputation of the Roosevelt name, for which was held in high acclaim by 
many states and individuals. This perceived reputation by authorised individuals 
within the creation of the UDHR caused her to be elected as the chairperson of the 
Human Rights Commission and the de facto leader of the sub-committee drafting the 
UDHR. 
Compared to the Soviet representatives during the same period of the UDHR 
creation process their reputation was considered to be neutral, if not negative. This 
was caused partially by a reflection of the state on representation and partially with 
issues with the authorised individuals. The issue with the authorised individuals to 
the UDHR negotiations was that they kept on changing who was present at 
discussions. In total they used four different authorised individuals during the 
discussions for the UDHR, Alexander Bogomolov,32 Vladimir Koretsky,33 Alexei 
Pavlov,34 and Valentin Tepliakov.35 This had the effect of preventing reputation 
building of the authorised individual, without building this reputation with other 
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authorised individuals this affected the relationship, and thus made it unlikely for 
them to gain support for ideas and conceptions of rights to be included. In reflection, 
reputational damage caused by the Soviet government also impaired the reputation 
of their authorised individuals, especially amongst Western states. The Soviet 
philosophy to pursue world-wide revolution, coupled with an increase in their sphere 
of influence, and the emergence of the iron curtain all gave a negative image of the 
Soviet Union. These factors caused the image of the Soviet Unions authorised 
individuals to be negatively perceived by other states’ authorised individuals. The 
final reputational damage to their authorised individuals was in being instructed to 
abstain from approving the UDHR; this damaged reputation of the authorised 
individual in that their reputation was one not supporting the development of human 
rights within the early years the UN. Western states held a negative reputation of the 
Soviet authorised individuals. Conversely for fellow communist states, these 
authorised individuals enjoyed a high reputation due to the common political 
viewpoints held.  
For the authorised individual the importance of the individual’s reputation can be, like 
the individuals themselves, on a sliding scale. For the highly controlled individual, 
reputation is perhaps less important than those authorised individuals which have 
considerably more freedom. This is due to these individuals having to take highly 
directional instructions and, therefore, the individual is less central to the law creation 
process. Whereas the freer authorised individual requires far more reputational 
credibility to have weight and sway within the creation process.  
Reputation of an individual is effected by their past behaviour, and, to a certain 
extent, the reflected behaviour of their home government. The knowledge that their 
present conduct will affect their reputation in the future is what gives value to an 
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individual’s reputation. When a significant decision is made regarding the individual, 
the impact upon their reputation and the value that reputation has to the process of 
international law creation is taken into account. This means that the individual may 
need to manage their reputation over time. For example, the authorised individual’s 
reputation may be damaged by not following state instructions, and it may have to be 
re-built over time. For the authorised individual reputation within decision making is 
important but perhaps not central to their success.  
III.2. Reputation and the Independent Authorised Individual  
For the independent authorised individual reputation is even more important than for 
the authorised individual. With significantly more freedom for the authorised 
individual there is less reflected reputation from the established state, therefore, they 
must build and maintain their own reputational credit with those they are working 
with. This strong reputation allows them to have support and credibility in what they 
are pursuing within the law creation process, a negative reputation will lead them to 
be ignored and side lined.  
Without a strong reputation, independent authorised individuals mandated as UN 
special representatives would find their work much more difficult. For example, John 
Ruggie’s engagement with all stakeholders allowed him to create and maintain a 
positive reputation when creating the UNGPs. This strong reputation was one of the 
most significant factors which allowed Ruggie to get all stakeholders to endorse 
them, without feeling the need to re-draft or work the document. This reputation was 
built out of inclusion of stakeholders and listening to concerns, his final document 
was built on a reputation for fair dealing with all stakeholders and this extended to 
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the outcomes of the process. A failure to build a strong reputation can prevent the 
mandate from being renewed or reappointment to the post may be prevented. 
International Judges also require a strong reputation in order to uphold the values of 
the courts in which they sit. Without a strong reputation, the international judicial 
system would suffer from a lack of confidence and, therefore, decline. Considering 
the reputation of the ECtHR in the UK in recent years, the reputation of the court 
and, therefore, of the judges has taken a dent36, due to its judgements in recent 
years relating to the deportation of foreign nations suspected of terrorism37 and 
prisoners’ rights to vote38. This negative reputation can be seen that the Court and 
the individual judges are interpreting the convention into ways which state 
governments are no longer entirely comfortable with. Partly, this is the law creation 
process that international courts and governments will sooner or later get used to the 
higher standard of accountability. But while this process is being undertaken 
governments will continue to express concern over the direction of judicial reasoning, 
and may respond with the appointment of more conservative candidates to the court. 
This can be seen in the appointment and election of the new UK judge Paul 
Mahoney over his liberal rival, Ben Emmerson QC, for the position.39 The importance 
of reputation can further be seen within the advisory opinion of the ICJ and the 
judges that make up the court, as these rulings are non-binding on states, but an 
observation of the law, without a reputation for sticking with these judgements and a 
the court being held in high regard, governments would not abide by them.   
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III.3. Reputation and the Unauthorised Individual  
Reputation to the unauthorised individual is critical to their success, without a strong 
reputation there is no reason for authorised or independent authorised individuals to 
listen to, or take any actions that the unauthorised individual asks of them. This 
reputation needs to be built around a strong understanding of the issues at stake, a 
credible solution to the problem, and a workable strategy to ensure the solution can 
be implemented into international law.  
For the unauthorised individual to have any weight or pull with authorised individuals 
within the process of law creation their reputation must, fundamentally, have 
credibility. The unauthorised individual’s reputational credibility works in a similar 
fashion to that in which Guzman identifies state credibility:  
“[The] greater a state’s reputation, the more credibly it can commit to a 
particular course of action, the easier it is for it to enter into cooperative 
arguments, the more it can extract from other states as part of a bargain, and 
the more likely it is that it can find other states with which to cooperate.”40  
When applied to the unauthorised individual the higher the reputation the more 
credible they appear to be within their work or knowledgeable regarding the topic, 
the more likely that states will be willing to support and promote their ideas during 
international law creation events. For example, Lemkin invented the concept of 
Genocide and as an unauthorised individual his knowledge of the area was the most 
comprehensive having dedicated years of study to the area. As such, his reputation 
and credibility was highly positive.  
When the unauthorised and independent authorised individual is bringing authorised 
individuals into an agreement they are using their reputation, not only to bring 
authorised individuals together, but this also forms of bond or guarantee to work 
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together for the collective interest. Guzman argues that reputation as a form of bond 
brings states together and increases the likelihood that they will comply and makes 
the promises more credible. They will not want to undermine the bond as this will 
damage their reputation; therefore, states will be less likely to enter into agreement 
with them in future should they be aware that they have broken an agreement 
before.41 The effect of this is best summed up in Guzman’s own words when he 
argues: 
“The result of this logic is that states will at times be prepared to forgo short-
term opportunities to violate the law and extract higher payoffs in the hope of 
building or preserving their reputations and thereby enjoying higher payoffs 
later.”42 
In an identical fashion to states’ reputation, the unauthorised individual’s reputation 
works like a bond between him and the authorised and independent authorised 
individual. Should the unauthorised individual be unable to, or fail to keep what they 
are pledging to do, then the bond is broken and their reputation is damaged. 
Reputational damage for the unauthorised individual is similar to Guzman’s state 
reputation, not just in terms of the loss of credibility but the effect this can have on 
their future work: 
"The loss of reputation matters because it makes future promises less 
credible. Potential partners will have less confidence that the state will resist 
opportunities to violate the agreement and capture some immediate gain."43 
Should the reputation of the unauthorised individual be damaged then his role can 
start to fall apart, the very concept requires the authorised individuals to go along 
with what the unauthorised individual wants them to do, or where to start from. This, 
partially, can be seen with Humphrey’s original creation and promotion of the UN 
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High Commissioner for Human Rights in which once he retired from his post as 
Director for the Division on Human Rights his reputation was no longer there to 
support the idea. Without this credibility for the idea, authorised individuals and their 
home governments lost faith in the concept. Without this level of credibility and trust 
between them, there is no reason for the authorised individuals to follow the 
unauthorised individuals advice, reducing the unauthorised individual from this 
powerful role in leading authorised individuals in the creation of international law to 
one in a supporting, back room role, or just another external voice attempting to give 
guidance to the authorised individuals. Therefore, the reputation of the unauthorised 
individual is even more essential than to others who also may find recovering from a 
damaged reputation a lot easier.  
Lemkin’s reputation certainly suffered after he had successfully completed the 
genocide convention. Work on ratification of the convention by states caused his 
reputation to take a nose dive and his attacks on his natural allies, in those 
supporting and working on the creation of Human Rights,44 pushed him into isolation. 
He quarrelled with all the leading individuals, Eleanor Roosevelt, Roger Baldwin, 
Rene Cassin and Hersch Lauterpacht. Lauterpacht considered Lemkin as a crank 
and reduced the Genocide Convention to a footnote within his extensive works on 
international law.45 Lemkin suffered with his reputation being unable to get access to 
those he would need to persuade to get the Genocide convention ratified by the USA 
and being unable to secure teaching work, or book contracts that would be able to 
provide him with a suitable income.46 By the time of Lemkin’s death his reputation 
had plummeted so much that, instead of the respect and admiration that he 
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deserved for someone that did so much in the protection of individuals, his funeral 
was only attended by a handful of friends and, from the international community, a 
Korean ambassador and a diplomat from Israel.47 From these conceptions of 
reputation it seems that a good reputation is important to an authorised individual but 
for an independent and unauthorised individual it is essential. 
IV. Tragedy of the Commons Application to the Process of Law Creation  
Having considered the value of reputation to the individual within international law 
creation and the importance that it has within the process, the argument will now 
switch to consider the value of the tragedy of the commons model on the individual 
decision making within law creation. The name “tragedy of the commons” was first 
given to a situation where many individuals use a finite resource without restriction 
for their own interest. This was first expressed in Garrett Hardin’s article The 
Tragedy of the Commons.48 An example is provided of rational herders grazing 
animals on the commons. If each herder acts in a rational self-interested way then 
each will add as many animals to his herd in order to maximise his profit, therefore, 
reducing the amount of grazing land available to other, and ensuring that the 
commons is overgrazed.49 Hardin nicely sums up the tragedy in the widely quoted 
extract: 
“Each man is locked into a system that compels him to increase his herd 
without limit – in a world that is limited. Ruin is the destination toward which all 
men rush, each pursuing his own best interest in a society that believes in the 
freedom of the commons. Freedom in a commons brings ruin to all.”50 
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This concept has been used to highlight many different issues, but Snidal’s article 
looks at the tragedy in connection with international cooperation.51 Dodge sums up 
the issue of the commons and the harm it does on his chapter on cooperation when 
he writes: 
“The commons model captures a wide variety of situations in which people 
harm each other by pursuing their own personal interest, when the situation 
for the group would be better if they restrained, or cooperated, but there is no 
personal motivation for them to do so. Often, no one gains individually by self-
restraint.”52  
He continues to highlight the failure of an international law in a commons dilemma 
when discussing the international ban on fishing and hunting of whales. The ban 
introduced in 1986 to protect whales has been violated by Norway, Japan, and 
Iceland who have killed some seventeen hundred whales annually, including 
endangered species. With less competition from other states they would have found 
hunting whales easier than before and had greater choice in choosing which animals 
to go after.53 This is a real world tragedy of the commons and demonstrates the 
issues, which states face, while choosing to protect whales several states have 
taken advantage for their own benefit, therefore, preventing the benefit that would 
have happened had all states kept to the agreement protecting whales as a common 
pool resource. John Ruggie’s work creating the UN Guiding Principles on Business 
and Human Rights put a system of soft law in place which gave a measure of 
protection to workers that could be over exploited by transnational corporations. 
Therefore, the tragedy of the commons is a theory that takes into account many of 
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the aspects of international law creation, essentially how do you get states to act for 
the group rather than in their own self-interest.  
So far there has been identification of the tragedy of the commons and some 
examples from international law, the work now moves to identify how the different 
categories of individual interaction within the tragedy framework and how they can 
help provide a solution. Ostrom’s Nobel Prize winning work Governing the 
Commons54, looks at different tragedy situations in the context of common pool 
resource (CPR) management. While not giving any definitive solutions to all the 
issues of CPR management it does give different specific solutions to each CPR 
issues that she covers. Overall, Ostrom suggests that the solution does not rely on 
external enforcement but on contracts and self-organisation.55 This is where the 
independent authorised and unauthorised individuals can have a significant role 
within the creation of management scheme, this being on an international plane 
either as soft law instrument or treaty. Within contentious law creation situations, 
states work towards preserving their own self-interest, in order to defend their own 
sovereignty and national interest.  
When authorised individuals are defending self-interest there can be little room for 
an agreement to be found between the parties, with the effect that the tragedy 
continues without agreement to prevent it’s overexploitation. This is where the 
unauthorised individual and, to a certain extent, the independent authorised 
individual can have a significant influence by highlighting the group interest. This can 
be done by highlighting a group interest, not as an external authority telling the 
authorised individuals what to do, but acting as an independent adviser or feeding 
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the group with information. This can highlight the group interest in the forefront of 
authorised individuals’ minds and controlling authorised decision makers to limit the 
effect of the self-interest of states. For example, Humphrey included economic and 
social rights within the UDHR, which was not in the interests of western state 
authorised individuals’ minds. In doing this the unauthorised or independent 
authorised individual can help get over the biggest issue of the tragedy of the 
commons by helping states realise that their individual rational behaviour, which 
leads to collective irrationality, is not desirable by showing them the bigger picture 
and, therefore, ensuring the individual behaviour considered irrational leads to 
collective rational behaviour.  
The unauthorised individual needs to keep focus on the collective group interest, or 
the outcome with the highest mutual payoff. If this notion is considered and 
introduced into human rights treaty discussions they can have a significant impact. 
Most governments within negotiations will only want to do the minimum, and 
hopefully not have to change how they perform everyday activities when conforming 
to these treaties. Guzman argues a more positive view that:  
“States may be prepared to invest in human rights agreements as part of an 
effort to change the preferences and priorities of other states or of other 
actors within states. Under this view, the agreements do not have a direct 
impact on state behaviour, but instead influence conduct indirectly by 
encouraging the internalization of certain norms."56 
In either case it requires states to put forward different levels of rights, i.e. the 
wording of articles can dictate what is acceptable. Whether by desire or the result of 
realities many states may attempt to negotiate to a lowest acceptable common 
denominator, i.e. a position which costs the state, economically or politically, nothing 
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to implement. If an unauthorised individual drafts a document which is ambitions in 
scope and scale it can provide a good starting point for further discussions. If the 
document is ambitious in nature, authorised individuals will attempt to reduce the 
scope of the document to bring it back in line with their governments’ instructions. 
Once a document has a particular concept or right included in it, states have a 
difficult time removing that from the draft document due to the reputational damage it 
may bring with being associated with its removal. As demonstrated in chapter four, 
John Peters Humphrey included economic and social rights within the UDHR. 
Therefore, states felt that even though parts of the Universal Declaration went 
beyond the scope of what they felt was acceptable to produce, they did not want the 
damage to their reputation as the state that held back a more inclusive or detailed 
document from being produced. The power of reputation perception by one state to 
another cannot be underestimated in terms of its significance when trying to get 
states to agree to measures that they are not completely comfortable with  
 
All three categorisations have a role to play with breaking a tragedy using law 
creation, the authorised individual following instructions from the authorised decision 
making body on their own are unable to find a solution. But, by being present at the 
law creation event it demonstrates a willingness to find a solution, and if a solution is 
presented may be given flexibility after consultation with their authorised decision 
maker. The Independent authorised individuals have the ability to be part of the 
solution to break the tragedy, they have freedom in instructions to undertake actions 
which can bring the group to find a solution. The unauthorised individual can break 
the tragedy of the commons so that the self-interest of the state is no longer the 
dominant motivation and the group interest becomes the focus. The unauthorised 
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individual can provide a solution, be it draft document, private discussions with 
authorised individuals, or information seeding. 
V. Game Theory Models 
Within the law creation process, especially during treaty and soft law documents, the 
decision making process is important. How do those individuals involved in all 
categories make decisions to get the best outcomes from their perspective, be it the 
state perspective or the international organisation’s viewpoint? Various decisions 
have to be made, such as when an authorised individual follows their instructions to 
introduce a continuous issue to a discussion process, or when to call a vote on an 
idea. For the independent authorised individual how do they make the decision as to 
the timing of an injection of an idea into a document so it does not lose momentum? 
For the unauthorised individual as to when do they start information seeding 
authorised individuals, or how do they interject into discussions, who do they 
approach? In using game theory the active choice is being made to consider 
theoretical models in which rational logical outcomes are considered by the actors 
before decisions are made. This takes our understanding of the individual within the 
creation of international law a step further.  
Different theoretical models first need to be introduced as the majority of game 
theory within the context of law and international legal theory is not mainstream.57 
Game theory uses different models to help explain the decision making process, 
each model is examined and there are examples of how it can be used to illustrate a 
decision making process within international law. The most common model used 
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within game theory is the Prisoners Dilemma, as Richard McAdams argues in his 
article Beyond the Prisoners’ Dilemma: Coordination, Game Theory and Law, that 
“for legal scholars to use game theory only by using the Prisoners’ Dilemma. And 
this outcome is like only using mathematics when the problem involves odd numbers 
between twelve and two hundred.”58 This brief introduction to game theory intends to 
include other games such as Stag Hunt, Dove and hawk and the Battle of the Sexes. 
Different games must be used in different circumstances in order to reflect the 
decision making process for example a Prisoners Dilemma Game is far more 
appropriate to difficult negotiations such as the SALT treaty talks between the USA 
and USSR. Other games are more appropriate when discussions are being 
undertaken with more co-ordination and cooperation. For example, the Battle of the 
Sexes game shows levels of cooperation between parties, as seen in the 
international regulation and allocation of radio frequencies and policies addressing 
satellite communication.59  
V.1. Prisoner’s Dilemma  
The first model that should be considered is that of the classic Prisoners Dilemma 
game. This classic game is hopefully familiar. Within this game two individuals or 
players are separated and are unable to or reluctant to coordinate. If they both 
cooperate they get the highest payoff, if neither cooperates they both get a reduced 
payoff. If one side cooperates and one side does not cooperate, whoever did not 
cooperate will get the higher payoff. “The familiar result is that in a one-shot game 
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the only equilibrium is for both parties to defect, leading to a low payoff for both 
players."60 This can be seen in the table below:  
 
Fig 1 
  
P
la
y
e
r 
A
 
 
Player B  
Cooperates  
Does not 
cooperate  
Cooperates  4,4 1,5  
Does not 
cooperate  5,1  1,1 
 
Many authors have used the SALT treaty talks as a classic example of prisoner’s 
dilemma, within international law examples include Schelluings61, Guzman62 and a 
simple JSTOR search returns just under 150063 hits with the search terms 
“Prisoner’s Dilemma and SALT”. The SALT treaty negotiations provide the perfect 
example of this theoretical model within the real world. These treaty negotiations, as 
discussed in chapter two, witnessed deep ideological rivals the USA and USSR, 
attempting to reduce weapons stockpiles. These rivals agreed to the overall aim of 
the treaty talks in cooperating to reduce the stockpiles of nuclear weapons. But the 
cooperation in how to achieve this aim and to ensure that the other side did not gain 
a strategic advantage with reduced weaponry was difficult.  
Placing this example within context is important, as the result for a single play of this 
game usually results in both parties choosing to violate the agreement and 
cooperation failing. Within international law, in a one shot game outcome, without a 
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system of courts or police capable of enforcing the rights of the parties, the 
exchange of promises has no impact on behaviour of states.64 In the context of the 
SALT treaty talks the repeated nature of the game ensured that both sides 
cooperated and did not violate the agreement. 65 The repeated nature within the 
SALT negotiations prevented violation within this context, and this is a significant 
factor within the decision making process. 
The individual within the prisoner’s’ dilemma is the most important part of the game. 
They are the players who follow the instructions of their home government. For 
example, in the SALT talks this was Gerard C. Smith and Vladimir Semenov66. 
These authorised individuals must follow the instructions of the state, but they must 
also ensure that the talks are progressive. These individuals must make the critical 
decisions about when to make concessions and when to refuse. The prisoners’ 
dilemma model is ideal for the individuals as for the state, in that it demonstrates the 
advantages or disadvantages of cooperating at any given moments of discussions. 
As discussions are on-going this game is repeated many times over the course of a 
series of negotiations.  
When an unauthorised individual is engaged in a prisoners’ dilemma situation it 
provides an insight into their decision making process. Let’s consider Raphael 
Lemkin at this moment. Lemkin is the most extreme unauthorised individual, having 
no place within the international system. Lemkin had to find which of his ideas were 
acceptable to the authorised individuals who actually had the power to put these 
concepts into international law. For example, the issues of cultural genocide were 
dropped from the convention because it was unacceptable for the authorised 
                                                          
64
 Andrew T. Guzman (2008) p32 
65
 Andrew T. Guzman (2008) p32 
66
 Please see Chapter 2 for more on this.  
332 | P a g e  
 
individuals.67 For Lemkin he had to make decisions on the scale of the document, 
when to give ideas, to which authorised individuals and when to make decisions. All 
these decisions had different consequences. Lemkin had to use a rational plan, not 
just for each decision, but for the overall project.  
 
Consider the graph above. The x axis refers to the authorised individual’s willingness 
to cooperate with Lemkin’s ideas. The y axis refers to the scope of the document. 
Lemkin needed to ensure that the decisions he made were below the line, i.e. the 
scope of the document should ideally never be above the level of authorised 
individuals’ approval. Turning to the issue of cultural genocide, which failed to get 
approval from the UN Legal Committee, Lemkin questions the wisdom of engaging in 
another battle for the concept as it may have endangered the passage of the whole 
convention.68 The scope of the document is above the line of approval by authorised 
individuals.  
The other effect that the unauthorised individual can have is in assisting the 
authorised individual’s decision making, this can be done through the use of 
                                                          
67
 Donna-Lee Frieza (2013) pp.172-173  
68
 Donna-Lee Frieza (2013) pp.172-173  
Sc
o
p
e 
o
f 
D
o
cu
em
n
t 
Approval of Authorised individuals 
333 | P a g e  
 
meetings to persuade authorised individuals and the exchange of information. One 
of the main issues with any prisoner’s dilemma game is: 
“It appeared that when both players were attempting to maximize their 
personal outcomes, the rational thing for the two sides to do would be 
cooperate. Though that might lead to better results, the game seemed to 
show that with rational actors, cooperation would not happen, and the best 
results would not occur. This obviously would be significant in a decision that 
had serious real world implications.”69  
The apparent likelihood of cooperation is limited, but in a repeated game, 
cooperation becomes more likely as the players build trust and relations to work 
together.70 Although, with a fixed number of games, such as the number of decisions 
that an authorised individual will need to make to form a working agreement, this can 
set in motion a race to be the first to defect, therefore, securing an advantage.71 
Therefore, the best way to ensure cooperation in repeated games is to ensure that 
each player does not know how many games will be played, this being increasingly 
difficult in a law creation process whereby the finished document signals an end of 
the creation process. In international law creation, when treaties are being made, it 
can become too late for a state to object to a particular concept as it would do too 
much damage to that states creditability, therefore, defecting late in the game can 
have negative impact. But defecting early in a repeated game may cause distrust 
amongst the group of states. The solution to prevent a race to defect and a partial 
solution to the dilemma is: 
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“In a world where there was effective third-party enforcement of agreements, 
the response to the prisoner’s dilemma is obvious: the parties would enter into 
a binding agreement to cooperate, thereby modifying the payoff structure and 
escaping the prisoner’s dilemma.”72  
Perhaps this is the role that the unauthorised individual can play. In acting as bond 
between the authorised individuals they use their reputation to ensure cooperation 
and help break the dilemma.  
The unauthorised individual can have another role within breaking the prisoner’s 
dilemma. In a similar method to the unauthorised individual role within breaking 
tragedy of the commons they can break the prisoner’s dilemma by highlighting the 
group interest to the authorised individuals.  
“The Prisoner’s Dilemma demonstrates that in game theory terms, decisions 
that are rational from the point of view of an individual and decisions that are 
rational from the point of view of a group may diverge.”73  
From a creation of international law perspective the individuals’ preferred outcome is 
very different from that of the group; therefore, the unauthorised individual can push 
the individuals towards the group outcome. The influence of the unauthorised 
individual would be to highlight the group interest and using the methodology 
described in chapter 4 to ensure this outcome. An example of the prisoners’ dilemma 
being broken in this way was during the SALT talks, within these negotiations the 
USA and USSR had back channels open between the two governments. Kissinger 
was conducting talks with Soviet Ambassador Dobrynin.74 Here were third parties not 
directly involved within the talks, discussing what they wanted, and then instructing 
the parties to change approaches on various issues.  
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V.2.Stag Hunt 
Within the Stag Hunt game the two parties have a choice of varying degrees of 
cooperation or non-cooperation. The quantity of cooperation will reflect the quantity 
of payoff for both players. If one player chooses cooperation and the other non-
cooperation, the person who chooses cooperation gets nothing. This is illustrated 
with the classic example for this game, from which it takes its name. Two hunters 
can decide to either hunt a stag together or each hunt hare on their own. The stag 
represents the biggest payoff, while the hare a smaller prize. Whoever chooses to 
hunt hare will always end up with the lowest payoff of the hare, but whoever chooses 
to hunt stag requires the cooperation of the other player otherwise he is unable to 
hunt a stag and goes without. This is represented in the following game:  
 
Fig 2 
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A
  
Player B  
Stag Hare  
Stag 2,2 0,1 
Hare  1,0 1,1 
 
Trachtman gives an example of this model working within international law and the 
prevention of terrorism: 
“The analogy to international cooperation in the case of certain types of public 
good is as follows: each state prefers its share of the global public good, such 
as the elimination of terrorist safe havens (stag), but may be distracted by the 
opportunity to obtain local protection from terrorism (rabbit), especially if it is 
unsure of the commitment of other states. If the global public good is the 
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elimination of terrorist safe havens, nonparticipation by even a very small 
number of states can eliminate the gains.”75 
This game sets out why, at times it’s important for inter-state cooperation when 
creating international law, they must all act as one, or the system does not work 
when dealing with issues that have a global significance. This game can also be 
used to model the decision making process in law creation. 
The authorised individual may use this decision making process in determining what 
items should be included within an international law document, should the authorised 
individual pursue an item that no other authorised individuals want included they will 
get out voted and the concept removed. But should they push an idea which is 
acceptable to others the item will get included. This game can also be seen within 
timing of when authorised individuals introduce ideas and follow instructions.  
The unauthorised individual on the stag hunt game is even more apparent, the 
unauthorised individual can give the individuals a mutual group leader who is not 
taking part in the actual hunt to bring the sides together so that they are willing to go 
after the higher payoff and hunt the stag, decreasing the concern that the other 
player may withdraw from going after the higher payoff. The unauthorised individual 
removes some of the uncertainty that the players feel towards each other, especially 
when they do not know each other or there is limited trust between players. The 
unauthorised individuals use their reputation as a bond between players.  
The unauthorised individual on the stag hunt game can have a similar effect as in the 
prisoners’ dilemma game in breaking the dilemma, or here pushing the players 
towards full cooperation. The unauthorised individual in selecting and pushing 
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candidates into jobs can be demonstrated within this game. This can be seen with 
Humphrey pushing for Mohammed Awad of the United Arab Republic appointed as 
the special rapporteur on Slavery in the mid-1950s.76 Humphrey’s chosen candidate, 
Awad, represents the stag and the other candidates represent the hare. If 
Humphrey’s candidate was elected there is a maximum payoff as he is seen as the 
ideal individual for the role from all parties, and an authorised individual that 
Humphrey felt he could work with. While other candidates could also have done the 
job, Humphrey’s perception of the candidates work would have been lower and, 
therefore, a reduced payoff.  
The unauthorised individuals can also find themselves using the stag, hare game to 
model their decision making process, for example, when deciding which authorised 
individual to approach with an idea. This can be seen when Humphrey approached 
the USA instead of the USSR in coming up with the idea for the High Commissioner 
on Human Rights. In this decision Humphrey ended up with the hare instead of the 
stag as he lost support of the USSR for his later works due to this decision. Perhaps, 
in order to get the highest payoff, Humphrey needed to approach both authorised 
individuals from the USA and USSR or a natural state.  
V.3.Battle of the Sexes 
The Battle of the Sexes game requires coordination between two individuals who 
must coordinate to work together in order to maximise their payoff. Should they fail to 
make an agreement then they both get nothing. Within this game the users must 
decide which of the two will get a larger payoff than the other. The classic narrative 
of this game, from which it takes its name, is that a husband and wife can either go 
                                                          
76
 Please see Chapter 4 for more on this  
338 | P a g e  
 
to the theatre or cinema. The husband would prefer to go to the theatre and the wife 
to the Cinema. Whoever gets to go to their preferred place of entertainment gets a 
higher payoff, while the others get a smaller payoff as they prefer the other form of 
entertainment. If they cannot decide where to go together they both get nothing as 
no activity will be undertaken. As a result they must coordinate and one player must 
be prepared to take a smaller payoff for the benefit of the other party involved. 
Guzman sums up the issue when he states “they both strictly prefer coordinating 
their actions to not coordinating, but the players prefer to coordinate on different 
equilibria.”77 
 
Fig 3 
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Theatre Cinema 
Theatre 3,1  0,0 
Cinema  0,0 1,3  
 
An international law example is seen in the regulation of radio frequencies and other 
global communications.78 Guzman also gives an example: 
“Trains running from Spain to the rest of Europe must pass through France, 
yet historically Spanish rail gauges were wider than the international standard 
rail gauges used by France. The result is that trains travelling on the broad-
gauge Spanish railways must pass through gauge-change installations when 
crossing the border. To address this inefficiency, new high-speed trains and 
rails connecting Spain to France and the rest of Europe have been built using 
the international standard-gauge width.”79 
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This game is especially useful when the decision making process requires the 
authorised individuals to consider differences in the payoff that their actions will 
achieve. Authorised individuals must decide if they are prepared for others to have a 
greater payoff than themselves in order get a smaller payoff. This can be seen in the 
contribution of the independent authorised individual, Charles Malik, and his neo-
thomist conceptions during the drafting the UDHR.80 While Malik was in favour of 
inclusion of these philosophical concepts, other authorised individuals, most notably 
Chang, was against them. Had they been unable to find agreement, a document 
would not have been formed and, therefore, there would be no payoff. When Malik 
succeeded, and Chang actually got a document, Malik’s payoff would be higher than 
Chang’s.   
For the unauthorised individual, Henderson’s, decision making was an example in 
breaking procedure to visit USSR officials regarding the strength of their Smallpox 
vaccine. Henderson’s decision making, if successful, was that he had a large payoff 
and WHO had a successful program. If he had not broken procedure WHO would 
have been happy that their policy was observed and Henderson’s smaller payoff 
would be that he at least had some vaccine.    
V.4.Dove and Hawk 
The final game to be considered is the classic Dove and Hawk game, sometimes 
known as the chicken game. This is another coordination problem in a similar vein to 
the Battle of the Sexes. This game requires both players to coordinate in order to 
enjoy an equally high payoff; therefore, for optimal payoff they must both take a 
positive strategy. If they both choose to take a negative strategy then they will both 
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get a negative payoff. If they disagree and one side takes a negative position while 
the other player takes a positive strategy, the negative strategy will win out with a 
higher payoff than if they both coordinate in a positive way. The traditional narrative 
that goes with this game is reproduced below: 
“The “chicken dilemma” comes “from the teenage duelling practice depicted in 
1950s movies, in which two teenagers drive their cars at each other, the one 
who turns away being “chicken”. There are four possible outcomes in this 
game. The best outcome is you drive straight and other fellow blinks: You win; 
he is humiliated. The next best is both blink: Both are “chicken”; neither is 
humiliated. The next-to-worst outcome is you blink, but the other fellow drives 
straight: You are humiliated. But live; he lives and gets to gloat. And the worst 
is both drive straight: Both avoid humiliation; both die. At first glance, since it 
is better to be alive than dead, it might seem that the logical thing to do would 
be to blink and trust the other fellow would too. But it is not so simple. ”81 
This is illustrated in figure 4 below. 
 
Fig 4. 
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Dove 2,2 0,4 
Hawk 4,0 -1,-1 
 
This game suits decision making reflecting international regulation. Charles 
Whitehead gives an example of a dove/hawk game playing out in the international 
financial market regulations sector during the 1980s. Setting out that during the 
1980s global competition caused bank-capital levels to get dangerously low, these 
capital levels provide the security for the banks should markets and other factors go 
against them. The higher the capital levels the less money they have to use at the 
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markets, therefore, reducing profitability. The Basel Capital accord adopted in 1988 
called for regulators to impose minimum capital levels on banks. The Accord favours 
a dove/dove situation whereby all regulators impose the same capital levels, 
therefore, allowing banks to compete on a fair footing and not put financial security at 
risk. As this capital reduces profitability one state setting a higher level (a dove) 
would give banks in other states (hawks) an advantage giving a dove/hawk pay out 
favouring banks that were subject to a lower capital requirement. Allowing banks to 
continue without higher levels of capital would yield a hawk/hawk situation putting 
the global finance system at risk.82  
Authorised independent individual Cassin’s decision making in the debate with the 
right of petition during the drafting of the UN Covenants can be seen within this 
game.83 Had he been successful his payoff would have been greatest, had the 
French government been successful as they were, their payoff was the most. If they 
had failed to agree it would have had negative consequences for both.  
This game model can also be seen within Lemkin’s decision making, when he 
managed to persuade the President of the General Assembly to hold off an attempt 
by the Soviet Union authorised individual, Vishinsky, to stop the genocide 
convention. This required Lemkin preventing a vote on the contents of the sub-
committee draft until he had brought other authorised individuals from Panama and 
Cuba onside to give his ideas enough votes.84 In delaying the vote, the dove 
situation is seen with equal payoff, whereas if he failed the double negative hawk is 
seen. If the Soviets were successful they would have destroyed the convention, 
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meaning a double payoff for them. Whereas Lemkin was successful, causing the 
convention to proceed forward, therefore, a double payoff to him. 
These game theory models can help increase our understanding of how the 
authorised, independent authorised and unauthorised individuals make decisions 
within the creation of international law. In modelling these decisions we can see the 
different, rational outcomes available to the individuals at various times of the 
process. If these ideas have further applications a greater understanding of when the 
optimum time to introduce new ideas to discussion, or when to hold votes, or how 
the unauthorised individual knows the ideal moment to feed an authorised individual 
with information can be attained. These models can also demonstrate how the 
unauthorised individual can aid in breaking these dilemmas and increase 
cooperation between authorised individuals and increase the effectiveness of the 
international law creation process.  
VI. Conclusion  
This chapter demonstrated the importance of the individual’s decision making within 
the process of international law creation. The importance of the decision that they 
make can have a huge influence on the final document produced and also whether 
they have acted in line with their instructions. Examining the decision making 
process also highlighted that once an unauthorised individual is introduced to work 
alongside authorised individuals, they can bring to the attention the group interest 
which can easily be undermined and forgotten. Adam Smith’s theory on economics 
indicates that the best outcome for individuals within a group is when everyone does 
343 | P a g e  
 
what is best for themselves within that group.85 This theory has been overtaken and 
replaced in economics by Nash’s solution that the best outcome occurs when 
everyone in the group does what is best for themselves and for the group. In 
international negotiations each authorised individual is only likely to do what is best 
for themselves and not for the group. If the unauthorised individual represents the 
group interest and keeps that in mind, the best overall outcome can be achieved. 
Nash’s theory has become popular with economists, yet has been overlooked in 
other fields, by expanding the use of this theory into the field of international law it 
will allow for group interest to be taken into account and gives the unauthorised 
individual a basis for their actions of getting involved within international law creation. 
The models explored within this chapter highlight the importance of good decision 
making from all categories of individual. The decision making process is important 
for the authorised individual in following instructions, but perhaps good decision 
making is even more important for the independent and unauthorised individual 
whereby their reputation can hinge on making good decisions.  
What can be seen within the unauthorised individual throughout these models of 
decision making is that they can act to keep the group interest at the forefront on the 
document under consideration. This ensures that the document produced does not 
overly reflect the work of one state, but is a document that truly represents the 
combined group interest. This means that states with conflicting ideologies can be 
brought together to find a compromise that also takes into account the views of 
smaller powers that can easily be overlooked. The use of the game theory and the 
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tragedy of the commons underline the impact that the unauthorised individual can 
have, not just theoretically upon games, but also within the real world. The 
unauthorised individual has the ability to push the authorised individual towards the 
best payoff situation, preventing states losing out.  
Reputation is the key as to how the unauthorised individual can have the impact that 
they do have. Without a good reputation no authorised individual or independent 
authorised individual would take them seriously, or even consider putting their ideas 
forward at law creation events. Reputation is perhaps more important to the 
unauthorised individual than to states.  
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Conclusion 
This work has set out to investigate the role that the individual can have in the 
process of international law creation. In order to fulfil this primary aim this thesis has 
identified three new categorisations of individual: the authorised, independent 
authorised and unauthorised individual. This new framework provides an accurate 
reflection of the realities of the international system to the individual’s role, previously 
not seen within international law scholarship. In the identification of these 
categorisations this work rejects the traditional narrative of the state-centric approach 
to international law creation. Instead it chooses to highlight, not only the importance 
of the individual, but one that has decision making at the heart of the process. This 
deliberate focus ensures that the realities of the international system are placed at 
the centre of the theoretical narrative of international law, instead of the theory being 
isolated and apart. This project argues for the individual as a distinct actor within 
international law, and is a significant leap forward to the subject/object debate which 
has been the primary focus in connection to the individual since the turn of the 
twentieth century. 
In making a choice to consider international law away from the state-centric nature 
gives theoretical room for understanding the individual in being far more than a 
mechanical representation of the state. This move also brings a new perspective to 
legal process theory that it is the individual within the process which is central to the 
success or failure of international law creation. This gives individuals far more weight 
than previously believed, and the theoretical narrative required re-adjustment to 
accommodate such an outcome. By giving greater weight to the role of the individual 
the realities of the international system will be better reflected within the theoretical 
narrative.  
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The adoption of these categorisations allows, not only for the identification of an 
individual’s contribution to international law, but also within each category that 
relatively broad spectrum of individuals that are actors within international law 
creation. Each category allows for a spectrum of behaviour, with each definition of 
what makes an individual fit within a category broad enough to occupy a range of 
individuals, but definitive enough to give distinction to each. This spectrum can 
accommodate any individual actor on the scale of control. Individuals may move 
around on the scale depending on circumstances and the matters of the day in which 
they are actively engaged.    
One conclusion, that this work gives rise to, is that the state is no longer needed. 
That is not the objective of the work to assess the continued value of the state, yet 
this work, while advocating the recognition of the individual, is not aiming for the 
individual to replace the state. States are still needed to perform governance roles 
and give members of states a voice at international summits. The authorised 
individual is still working on behalf of the states government. The independent 
authorised individual, at times, is nominated by the state, such as when working for 
international courts. The state is still an important unit within international law, and 
greatly aids the organisation of the international system.  
I. Framework for the Individual  
The authorised individual is one that is under instruction for an authorised decision 
maker; these are usually home governments of the authorised individual. This 
category of individual is the work horse of the international system, representing 
governments and other actors at international law creation events. They must follow 
the instructions given to them, and in the strictest cases this can be to ensure an 
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idea or concept is included or excluded from a document under creation. At other 
times more flexible instructions may be given to the authorised individual, in an 
attempt to move the process forward. The authorised individual is the individual that 
almost all scholars to international law would recognise and they make up the 
majority of all individuals within the international system. The authorised individuals 
can work for states, international organisations, or non-state actors; they perform 
roles within these groups following instructions given to them by those that run these 
actors on a day-to-day basis. The authorised individual is not just an individual 
employed by a state, but appointed to perform a role within the international system 
by an authorised decision maker. This categorisation can include non-state actors, 
and even terrorist organisations. This type of individual will always have a place in 
the international system; they are needed to represent governments of states at 
international events and in international organisations. Perhaps, greater 
transparency is needed with their appointments to the role with greater democratic 
scrutiny from legislature; this applies especially in the UK.  
The independent authorised individuals have far more freedom from their authorised 
decision makers. While given general aims they are not instructed to the extent of 
the authorised individual. This gives them freedom in what is included within the 
document but also the strategy employed during the process of law creation. This 
category of the individual can be found in increasing numbers and in varieties of 
areas, including government representatives, international judiciary, independent 
experts, be that on a UN treaty body or as a special representative. Due to the wider 
range of places that this individual is found means that the influence and significance 
of international law being developed without direct state instruction is on the rise. As 
a result, this category of individual is the future of international law creation in highly 
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contentious areas, where authorised individuals are unable to form agreements. The 
methodology employed by John Ruggie within the creation of the UNGPs, 
demonstrates how this category of individual, given sufficient freedom, can 
successfully create new international law. This Ruggie methodology has, so far, only 
been used by himself within the creation of a soft law document, yet it has enormous 
potential for the future. The methodological concept of Principle Pragmatism is, 
perhaps, the most important lesson that can be taken from the Ruggie process and 
has potential with its application to other areas to change the law creation process. 
With the identification of international judiciary within this category, the acceptance of 
them as international law makers is also accepted, and, therefore, the influence over 
state selection of candidates for the posts will become increasingly concerning to 
state governments. 
The independent authorised individual, especially the special procedures mandate 
holders, demonstrate a model and framework for how future contentious 
international law can be created. By mandating an expert individual to undertake the 
law creation process, and taking this traditionally state-driven area into a new 
domain, may allow for new law to be created which is issue focused and not driven 
to protect interests. This is, perhaps, where the Ruggie’s example of principled 
pragmatism within wider international law creation will play an increased role. An 
independent authorised individual mandated to create law, using previously agreed 
international law as the base, therefore, remains principled, but willing to find a 
pragmatic solution to the issue. This may mean small steps, but small steps are at 
least moving forward towards a better solution. As stated, this model has only been 
used within soft law creation, but the willingness for states unable to find legal 
solutions amongst themselves (especially when drafting of legal documents that can 
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take extended periods of time); provides a realistic prospect to drive international law 
forward. Possible future areas for the model to be applied include regulation of 
climate change and other environmental issues.  
The unauthorised individual is under the traditional narrative of state-centric 
international law creation and has no place within the international system. They are 
usually found within the secretariats of international organisations, but can also be 
found in exerting pressure on international law creation process as a private 
individual. This classification of individual is rare, and the most independent 
unauthorised individuals acting to get an idea into international law are almost never 
seen, the primary example being Raphael Lemkin. To have an effect on the 
international system these individuals use a variety of skills and personal 
characteristics in order to ensure that those with the power, the authorised 
individuals, are brought onside to their ideas for them to become part of international 
law. These individuals must have a strong, long term strategy, but also be sufficiently 
flexible to react to events that are occurring in order to ensure their ideas are 
adopted. The unauthorised individual’s contribution goes beyond that of lobbying 
authorised individuals, into a process of giving ideas, writing speeches and 
attempting to ensure authorised individual support is sufficient should a vote be 
undertaken. This category of individual raises questions of legitimacy within the 
process of law creation, but due to the rarity of these individuals this does not cause 
too many issues. These concerns regarding this individual are perhaps the most 
important; here is an individual acting totally without authority and mandate. They do 
have to use state actors in order for their ideas to be recognised within international 
law    
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The decision making elements of the individual is significant to all categories of the 
individual, as is reputation. When international law creation is broken down to an 
individualist level, reputation becomes important to all categories to work together to 
form an agreement, it has the power to act as a bond for the group. In considering 
the theoretical elements of the individuals decision making brought a new approach 
and application of game theory. With this application the process of individuals 
became clearer but also how each category made decisions and reached logical 
conclusions had been assessed. This examination of theoretical decision making 
also highlighted another useful element of the unauthorised individual, being that 
they can keep the group focus away from self-interest of state governments but on 
the interest of the group. In examining the decision making process, how the 
different categories of individual interact with each other becomes clear, the 
unauthorised individuals require the assistance from either the authorised or 
independent authorised in order to get their ideas adopted into international law. This 
decision making by the unauthorised individual, therefore, means that the concept is 
acceptable to the actor which he is using as a proxy to get the idea approved by 
other authorised individuals. The unauthorised individual, when embedded within the 
secretariat of the UN and taking part within discussions within a supporting role, may 
be able to add ideas to reports. Once these ideas are within the general framework 
of talks, it may become very hard for the authorised individuals to remove them from 
discussions without sustaining reputational damage.  
By identifying these categorisations of individual it brings greater transparency into 
the development of international law. Prior to this research, the acceptance was that 
the state created international law, yet now with the acceptance of a greater role of 
the individual we can trace ideas back to individuals. This increased transparency 
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means that the development of international law can be understood. Greater 
transparency in international laws creation also allows for better implementation of 
the law due to a better understanding behind its creation. With recognising the 
individuals’ roles, across all categories, gives greater transparency to how 
international law is created. No longer is international law created by the face entity 
“the state” but by individuals within different roles.  
II. Value of Outcomes 
This thesis has interacted with five broad themes: consent, legitimacy, authority, 
process and the abstract nature of the state. These themes have engaged with the 
theoretical framework of the individual, and also the different ways of perceiving 
international law making. These themes demonstrate that the framework fits into the 
international system of law creation. 
At first glance it may appear that this thesis is arguing that consent is not important 
to the creation of international law. This could not be further from the case, consent 
is a major part of international law creation, and the identification of the authorised 
individual underlies a commitment to the continued success of international law from 
the consent of state government representatives. The independent authorised 
individual, no matter how independent on the scale, still requires consent of 
authorised individuals, whether in the form of a mandate or as nominee of an 
international judiciary. The unauthorised individual is where consent by others is 
perhaps best demonstrated with a return to the idea that in order to get ideas into 
international law they require the authorised individuals to support and accept them. 
Perhaps, the closest the unauthorised individuals come to working without consent is 
when working on reports as part of the secretariat, and include new ideas which 
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push international law into places that authorised individuals have not consented to. 
Consent is needed from all categories of individual in order to get ideas accepted as 
international law, but for the unauthorised individual, consent is perhaps less 
important.  
Along the lines of consent, these categorisations raise concerns about legitimacy 
within International law creation. While legitimacy and legality should not be 
confused, having a legitimate international law is important to ensure the law is 
respected. This legitimacy is, partially, derived from its creation. Having a strong 
insight into how the law is created and how actors interact with each other can only 
make this stronger, especially when the law is made with consent and authority of 
states’ authorised individuals. It should not matter if the process of law creation has 
come from a mandated individual asked to investigate and find solutions to a 
particular difficult idea, or an unauthorised individual expresses ideas, due to them 
gaining legitimacy from the authorised individuals.   
Questions are raised about authority and authorisation for creating international law. 
The authorised individual is an identification of the on-going position, and does not 
pose questions. Individuals are required by authorised decision makers to be present 
to negotiate and sign new international law documents. The independent authorised 
individual poses a different sort of question. The international courts regularly create 
new law, those independent authorised individuals of a judicial nature are nominees 
of states, and as such derive authority for their actions from this and from the 
international court itself. Others within this category, such as special procedure 
mandate holders, are mandated to undertake the work. But as has been seen with 
how John Ruggie interpreted his mandates, they can be open to interpretation and 
possible abuse. Therefore, by placing trust within these individuals to create new 
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international law and giving them authority, this may undermine international law 
should these individuals fail to meet the high standards expected. 
This thesis underlines the importance of examining international law as a process. 
The interaction between different individual actors outlines that process used within 
the creation of international law is similar to the process used within the application 
of law. This links back to the work of the Yale school, which identified the 
international law as a process. Therefore, this work fits closely into that theoretical 
narrative, but brings with it a closer examination of one particular actor or authorised 
decision maker. By considering international law, and especially its creation as a 
process, the difficulties, and often subtlety of its creation which are often reflected 
within the final documents can be better understood, giving a better understanding of 
the law. Further, by understanding the process of law creation, lessons of how and 
why it is difficult to create new international law can be drawn out more easily. These 
lessons can be applied to future law creation events, therefore, improving the 
process.   
This work has argued that the abstract nature of the state means that to increase 
understanding, the theoretical perspectives need to look beyond the state to the 
actors actually undertaking work in the name of states. This links back to the idea of 
the international law as a process, in understanding the actors actually at the heart of 
creation events. By looking beyond the state to the individual, the decision making of 
those individuals starts to be given more insight and understanding. In knowing how 
decisions are made within the negotiation process of law creation different styles and 
types of negotiations and decision making can be identified. This is important as it 
would allow individuals to re-adjust their tactics as to how other individuals were 
behaving. Decision making is also important as it means that reputational issues that 
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may occur during discussions can also be a two-way flow, the individual within the 
room may be tarnished by the reputation of the state, but also the state’s reputation 
may be tarnished by the individual’s decision making. The idea of reputation and the 
influence that it can have on decision making is another reason to look beyond the 
abstract notion of the state. There may be no reason if an individual is sufficiently 
independent of their home government for reputation to be shared, or at least for 
reputation to be damaged by poor instructions or decision making.  
III. Lessons & Challenges  
With this model arises several lessons and challenges, one of the biggest challenges 
with any such law creation model which emphasises the individual, away from soft 
law instruments, is the perception by states of an encroachment of international law 
into state sovereignty, and the imposition of a third party forcing change onto states. 
This challenge is met, partially, by the mandates for independent authorised 
individuals would need to be agreed by state authorised individuals as to consent to 
the individuals work, further the final proposed document would also require passing 
by state authorised individuals and ratification by states themselves. Just like the 
international courts could be seen to damage state sovereignty, the growing realities 
of the international system has seen an explosion in the number of international 
tribunals as effective ways to settle disputes. This proposed system merely sets out 
a solution to the issue of international law creation within contentious areas of law, in 
creating workable international law in the first instance. Despite these drawbacks this 
model for future international law development, given the necessary space, the right 
mandates, and the appointment of the right individuals could have a lasting impact 
upon this area.  
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The independent authorised individual requires a trade-off between the transparency 
and democratic creation of international law, and effectiveness of future law creation. 
Mandated independent authorised individuals have enormous potential for changing 
how international law is created, but their success may come at the price of 
democracy within international law. No longer will state based authorised individuals 
be able to have a significant input into new legal instruments, but instead only into 
the creation of mandates. While the authorised individuals require a final vote and 
acceptance to the new legal instrument, especially if it was dealing with a formal 
treaty this would leave it open to being changed during those final discussions by 
authorised individuals. This would then have the potential to undermine the work of 
the mandated independent authorised individual, therefore, the authorised 
individuals may have to make an active choice to let works, unchanged by them, 
pass into international law, as such undermining democracy.  
One area for future investigation is the pressure that a modern, private individual 
could have as an unauthorised individual. While following as Lemkin did, by gaining 
access to delegates, getting UN security guards to let him into UN buildings, and 
using unoccupied desks, just would not happen in the age of counter-terrorism. 
Instead, the modern unauthorised individual may have to build a campaign for a new 
international law instrument online, using social media to gain support and interest. 
Many authorised individuals working within organisations have social media profiles; 
for example, Sir Mark Lyall Grant the UK Permanent Representative to the UN is on 
Twitter “@Lyall Grant”. The use of social media allows for a direct relationship 
between private individuals attempting to introduce a new concept into international 
law and the authorised individual. This type of relationship was fundamental to the 
success of Lemkin and Humphrey who used close relationships with authorised 
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individuals to advance their own ideas. Without daily direct face-to-face access, 
available to potential unauthorised individuals, online contact may be the only open 
communication for individuals.  
The general growth area for unauthorised individuals is not in the production of new 
big ideas or treaties, but within an area which requires further investigation into how 
the modern secretariats within international organisations influence the development 
of the law. A suspicion that this is undertaken in secretariats writing reports on behalf 
of experts, along the organisations positional lines and asking experts to sign off 
reports would be the most obvious root of this happening. The expert mandated to 
perform this role and their ideas is, therefore, side lined in favour of the unauthorised 
individual’s ideas.  
The unauthorised individual also raises questions of legitimacy and democracy 
within international law creation. Why are these individuals able to create law without 
a democratic or legitimate mandate? This is partly derived from the final creation 
actually falling to the authorised individuals and partly through the effectiveness 
these categories of individual can have in creating effective law. 
IV. Future Questions? 
This work is just the start of a new method of viewing the work of individuals within 
the creation and development of international law. The framework gives rise to 
further questions and areas considered within this thesis require more investigation 
which goes beyond the scope of this document. Such questions raised are:  
The ever increasing numbers of UN Special Procedures Mandate Holders, what can 
they learn from the UNGP process and would the UN be willing to use the Ruggie 
model in other areas? If so, are the factors highlighted within chapter four 
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transportable to different areas, where stakeholders may not have the financial 
resources that TNC’s had in the creation of the UNGPs? 
With success of the independent authorised individual; should the international 
community in continuous law making situations trade some transparency, consent 
and democracy, for workable solutions?   
How does a positivist conception of the individual in international law, which has 
dominated the theoretical narrative, move forward with an increased recognition of 
the individual, especially from a creation perspective?  
Has a sufficient balance within the framework been struck between the role of the 
individual, especially the authorised individual, and the dominance of the state? Has 
this work gone too far in undermining the need to states?  
Can the unauthorised individual have as much success in today’s world, with a 
desire of accountability, transparency, and democratic controls as the likes of Lemkin 
and Humphrey?  
The new theoretical model for the individual may be a shift towards a greater 
understanding of how individuals have a significant role in the creation of 
international law. With a new understanding will bring challenges to the model, no 
doubt supporting of a strong state-based approach to international law will reject the 
model outright. The model does not seek to do away with states as international 
actors, but seeks to give increased understanding to how the abstract ideas of states 
practically operate using individuals within the international system. At other points 
within the system the individual has far greater scope for law creation than previously 
seen, especially from the independent authorised and the unauthorised individuals. 
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The actions of these two categories of individual is perhaps the most remarkable in 
that these individuals can have as much power in creating law as the positivist 
narrative would reserve solely for the domain of states. 
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